10 years ago |
10 years ago |
I wrote a simple script that emails/texts me using AWS SES if my external ip address changes. Very crude, and just runs every 10 minutes via cron on my raspberry pi.
https://github.com/zacharyp/whatsmyip
Then I manually update the DNS I do have that points at that new IP.
The scripts saves the external ip to a file. Checks every ten minutes to see if it has changed. Emails me if it has changed.
In both places I installed ddclient on Debian, which works with many DDNS providers. I've not had any problems, and I've been using it for about 12 years through various DDNS providers. I also have a hostname for the private LAN address, which is useful.
/etc/ddclient.conf:
pid=/var/run/ddclient.pid
protocol=dyndns2
server=members.dyndns.org
login=XXXXX
password='XXXXX'
use=web, web=checkip.dyndns.org/, web-skip='IP Address: '
external.example.org
use=if, if=eth0
internal.example.org
Why did author wrote this remark? I was under impression that hidden services provide encryption (and even better than HTTPS because there's no need to trust CA). This recommendation is true when you are talking about accessing HTTP sites via TOR relay but when we are talking about hidden services, they are encrypted.
Maybe the author doesn't trust Tor's encryption?
Duckdns took about 10 minutes to get an access token and setup a cron-job on my raspberry-pi. After ~ 12 months it's worked without issue.
Also, FWIW British Telecom only seem to update my IP when my router is power-cycled.
There are Tor browsers for iOS. Or is SSH what they're worrying about?
> This detection reduces the anonymity set of a user from millions of Tor users to just the users of hidden services.
My understanding is that when that set of users is just 1, you can correlate other circuits to that user.
It's not like "oh, running SSH to your home server means you are X", but it dramatically simplifies the task of identifying you.
Still, what you've said is true.