A 19 basis point portfolio beats the average of most college endowments(awealthofcommonsense.com) |
A 19 basis point portfolio beats the average of most college endowments(awealthofcommonsense.com) |
An endowment is a fund of money designed to sustain operations of it's benefactor forever. Not 10 years. Not 50 years. Literally forever. When you're operating on an indefinite timescale your idea of "risk" changes considerably.
Take a look at the Harvard Endowment report[1], specifically the table on page 2. They are incredibly well diversified, across domestic and international public equities, as well as private equity, commodities, fixed income securities (bonds, etc), real estate, and a category they call "absolute return", which is where they've placed money into external hedge funds. If the US economy tanks, they'll be fine. If Europe falls apart, they'll be fine. A bunch of start up unicorns fail in Silicon Valley? Fine.
My point is that the article completely misses the goals of an endowment. They don't particularly care about matching or beating an index, nor do they care about risk (as measured by volatility). They care about wipe out risk, on the scale of centuries.
[1]: http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/Final_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
1) When the economy is bad, they need to provide more financial aid, so they want some counter-cyclical assets. (Long term bonds who increase in value when rates decline are an example.)
2) If they want to expand in the future, they don't want to be priced out of their neighborhood, so they're more likely to invest in local real estate.
This doesn't mean that endowments are all optimally managed - many would still be better served with ETFs. It's just not as simple as tossing everything into the S&P500.
This does not appear to be true. See page 14 of this paper, which shows the 2008-2009 performance of six privately endowed colleges and universities in New England. The smallest loss was 18%, the largest was 30%. Between January 1, 2008, when the S&P500 was at 1,378.76, and January 1, 2009, when the S&P500 was at 868.58, the S&P500 lost 37%. A reasonable mix of stocks and bonds would have had a similar loss as the endowments.
I think you're probably unfamiliar with the Harvard endowment's performance over time. They were badly hosed during the recession, despite their diversification.
> They care about wipe out risk, on the scale of centuries.
Perhaps they should, but they don't. They could easily put all their money in TIPS, after all.
The various college endowments are quite competitive with one another, with all the risk taking that implies. It's very silly.
1) Harvard's endowment gets massive donations every year
2) Harvard has an incredibly high rate of return on invested capital, not low-risk low-reward
EDIT: For people who look first at comments - the article compared some endowment funds returns with broad market returns and found that funds did not outperform the market. My argument that this is flawed comparison since it ignored risk.
(I know your point was also about size and the risk of distorting the market but I think you added in an unnecessary caveat there.)
The main planning I could see overlap is executing large trades since they're both moving massive amounts of money.
Lets look another way. If you are a golfer, the "average" score for a golf round is called PAR. Ask the regular golfer what would they do to be able to play par rounds all the time, most would sell you a beloved grand parent. The index funds are a way to play / invest in the market and get "average" returns.
The leverage that Vanguard has is that these index funds are pretty easy to manage, so they don't charge a lot of fees. Presently on the Index 500 fund, it's 17 basis points. So not much of your capital or your profit is going back to Vanguard. On the other side the big investment places are taking fees anywhere from 2 to 10 times what Vanguard gets. That can make a big difference in your annual rate of return.
Vanguard also has the advantage that in some cases Fund XYZ will be selling a stock while Fund ABC is buying a stock. So it ends up being an in-house purchase, so there is no brokerage fee, lower cost to both funds.
Mutual funds, and specifically index based mutual funds are a good way to get average results across a long period of time. Sure run wild some with that Gold Fund investment and those Oil funds, but be prepared for the downside)
(disclaimer: Long time Vanguard customer)
1) one may be interested in the opportunity of above-average returns. If the average vanguard return is 7%, and the average self-managed return is 6.9%, on average of course vanguard is in your best interest. But what if you think you can do better? Harvard's ran a 12% return for 20 years, for example. Should they forgo it because the average is a more guaranteed, safe, and on average, better bet? Probably not. Does it signal to weaker funds to simply go with the Vanguard option? Yes.
e.g. check out this report: http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/docs/Final_Annual_Report_2015.pdf
2) looking at just returns is myopic. You need to look at risk-adjusted returns, for which finance has proposed a whole bunch of measures. I would not be surprised if the endowment funds were less risky than the vanguard, although it's hard to tell. And guess which years generate brilliant performance for risky portfolios that are heavy on stocks? Post-crisis years where the market rebounds. Risk isn't the only thing, there are all kinds of objective funds can set. Most colleges for example set liquidity limits that would be unworkable for traditional hedge funds that invest in high-potential returns in illiquid assets. Limiting yourself like this changes your roi.
That having been said, there's obviously a lot of value in this simple perspective. And it completely confirms a new reality: outperformance is getting harder and harder and investors are less likely to beat the market and add value with their investing know-how. It's pretty recent that this has been happening to this extent.
Basically a fund of funds with a bunch of mutual funds. They are facing competition for PE deals and maintaining higher risk trading desks with high cap costs.
I would note that while the numbers in the article did beat performance now could be the best time to have a trade desk. Most indices look like this
/\/\/?
Not
/
/
/So having a group work on minimizing that could be profitable
The underlying question is, why should universities employ big teams of investment experts to manage their investments? (Those salaries are, I suspect, not accounted for in these performance numbers: the source says they are "net of fees", but I assume that's only counting actual fees from the investment products themselves rather than the costs of in-house staff.) If you can get consistently average results with almost no investment strategy at all, what are all those salaries for?
(See my clarification below. I'm talking about the costs only for the employees making investment decisions.)
(Rereading my words, I can certainly understand that interpretation. Sorry.)
Perhaps the lower return simply reflects the less aggressive nature of their portfolio. But ironically while waiting in the lobby of a prominent VC I met a college endowment fund manager who was currently using machine learning to trade options. I believe part of the endowment is now traded using his system (not 100% sure about this).
When I asked why his approach won't suffer the same fate as LTCM, an algorithm-based options-trading system run by Noble-prize winner Robin Scholes, he claimed that his approach relied on less leverage. But he didn't address the point on how his system would have predicted the Asian flu and Russian default that ended LTCM. I guess it would have been harmful but not fatal.
What's acceptable risk for a Wall Street fund isn't necessarily appropriate for an endowment fund regardless of the upside.
Comparing fund performance is a tricky business and often you can cherry pick methodology easily to support any conclusion you desire.
I have to admit that I have no clue whether the endowment funds did better or worse than an index fund tracking the stock market but I imagine if one has $30B to invest (and you depend on dividends to run a third of one's operations) then surely you can't admit to be completely risk averse without reducing ambitions.
> In a sign of the economic times, Harvard has sent a letter to its deans saying that the university’s $36.9 billion endowment fund lost 22 percent of its value in the last four months and could decline as much as 30 percent by the end of the fiscal year on June 30.
Buffett is very likely to win that bet.
http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/berkshires-buffett-adds-to-his...
"The amount handed over [to charity], though, is not likely to be $1 million, because of changes that Buffett and Protégé made in the wager a couple of years ago"
One paragraph later:
"Buffett also issued a guarantee: He will pay the winning charity $1 million if the Berkshire stock bought isn’t worth that much at the bet’s end."
Nitpicky I know, but it sounds like the winning charity is guaranteed $1 million.
I think that just about any indexing fan would be perfectly content to say, "Yeah, please feel free to track this mix into the future, too." It's one size fits all investment advice, but again, that's pretty close to what index funds are all about.
When the (e.g.) 500th and 501st largest companies swap places, don't they need to sell one and buy the other to keep tracking a 500 share index?
The way these index ETFs work though is that broker dealers can trade a basket of securities matching the index for a share of the ETF (and vice versa). Because of this price mismatches get fixed very quickly. S&P announces also changes ahead of time so while there is initial price movement it's not all instantaneous.
Sometimes you can. Chart [1] shows the ratio of a particular diversified portfolio's value (4x25 Permanent Portfolio) to the three fund portfolio's value starting in 2005. The ratio increases sharply in 2008-2009 and retains its edge through the subsequent stock bull market.
[1] http://morning-wave-7809.herokuapp.com/#iau,vti,shy,tlt/vtsm...
The chart page doesn't explain things very well, so it takes a bit to unpack, but the point of the chart is actually to give a better idea of comparative performance over a time period rather than focusing on a particular number like average return. Basically it's dividing the current value of one portfolio by the other at each point. The ratio shows the ebb and flow of the two portfolios against each other. John Bogle's speech [1] and this forum [2] probably explain it better.
[1] http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/sp20020626.html
[2] https://www.bogleheads.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=138973
EDIT: cleaned up the first paragraph.
But GP's claim seemed (to me) to be that that's exactly what university endowments do (or attempt to do). GP claimed that universities aren't looking for return or low volatility, they're looking to 'be fine' when the economy tanks. To check whether they succeeded, I looked at university endowment performance during a period when the economy tanked, and found that they still didn't do any better than an average index fund investor would have.
My claim with respect to this thread is that there is a strategy that outperforms in certain conditions like the 2008 selloff and 1970s inflation and does so without the risk of losing the gains as soon as the market turns around.
Relative to stocks or 60/40 during a bull market, it doesn't look so good, but it still generates positive returns, holding for some time any edge gained during the earlier conditions.
The overall result is a smooth climb, so I do claim it works well (enough) all the time. I don't claim absolute outperformance long term.
The best chart for what I'm trying to show is beneath the data table in [1]. And the Envy calculator at [2] has great data back to 1972 for different assets (and lets you change the start date).
[1] http://www.crawlingroad.com/blog/2008/12/22/permanent-portfo...