Audited by an independent (E.G. EU's) agency, with open records...
EITHER: A review of the actual paper trails and sources of the news story and build logs.
OR: A randomized sample of like 5-10% of the planes from the suspect time range looking at the suspect parts in question.
I think FAA had a fantastic record until this whole MAX PR nightmare - they’ve certainly damaged their reputation. But I feel like domain experts at Boeing or Airbus definitely are going to have an edge vs a lowly paid government auditor. EU’s agency or whatever are still going to have to rely on Boeing engineers input.
Having worked in the aviation industry (I was designing C-130 fuselage section) as a Mechanical Engineer, I can tell you that the whole enterprise sometimes feels like it’s supported on stilts, it’s a house of cards.
Now the NTSB on the other hand does a tremendous job. Sadly they only come in after disaster has struck.
[1] http://www.brusselstimes.com/magazine2/5828/myths-and-truths...
That is still vastly better than letting FAA + Boeing to keep misleading the public.
What FAA did are way worse than just PR nightmare, FAA didn't find out the design problem when 737 Max was given the green light to go kill people, after two crashes and 346 dead bodies, FAA still defended Boeing to the very last minute. It was the US president that ordered the 737 Max to be grounded in the US, not by the FAA, let's don't forget that.
FAA has no reputation left after the 737 Max incidents. The level of corruption is just shockingly unbelievable.
In any case the root cause of the problem is Boeing cheaper out on the Angle of Attack detector, by default only one is installed, a second one as an added-cost option. To be fault-tolerant, you need a quorum and thus a minimum of 3, as Airbus does. I would also add the 3 need to be made by different manufacturers to avoid systemic issues, if disk array manufacturers can do it, so can Boeing for safety-critical equipment.
This is incorrect.
The 737 MAX 8 comes with two AoA vanes.
The paid upgrade package is to wire them both into the flight computer, and to add an AoA disagree notification light.
>To be fault-tolerant, you need a quorum and thus a minimum of 3, as Airbus does. I would also add the 3 need to be made by different manufacturers to avoid systemic issues, if disk array manufacturers can do it, so can Boeing for safety-critical equipment.
This is correct, but not infallible. It's really complicated as the last batches of discussion here have gone into great length on.
Boeing fubar'd by not accurately categorizing MCAS as a safety-critical system, as their original classification was "Hazardous" instead of "Catastrophic".
The original implementation had only +/- .6 degrees authority. After the paperwork was filed, they upped the gain to 2.5 degrees up to maximum trim down over time, without reclassifying the subsystem as safety critical. Therefore no-one ever made sure that subsystem chain was bulletproof.
Here is some data that contradicts your arguments, but I would like to analyze it further and I do not know the reputation of the source.
Quoting the article:
> Comparison between countries is also possible when it comes to salaries. American and Belgian public employees come out better than their Swedish and British counterparts in this regard.
By the way, please refrain from using rhetorical questions when making arguments, it comes across as impolite and brash.
The fairest comparison of salaries would be, to your point, two-fold: ratio of salaries relative to private-sector workers in the same role in the same countries, and PPP-adjusted salaries between countries.
Anyways, my usage of the word “American” is in quotes for a good reason. American is almost certainly a typo there and was likely supposed to be Austrian, Austria being the country right below Belgium on that chart.
None of the charts reference the US, and nowhere else is the US mentioned. This is data about European countries.