As an aviator my stress levels are only just coming down now from seeing this headline and clicking expecting there to be deaths.

EF is Finland actually. The first letter is region code, and Europe is divided into multiple regions. Northern Europe is E, Southern Europe is mostly L (so France is LF).

Wikipedia has a nice map showing the different boundarys on it's ICAO airport codes page.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICAO_airport_code#/media/File:...

This is mostly only the case in the United States, since it has a single-letter K prefix, so they can append the 3-letter IATA code to make a valid 4-letter ICAO code. In the rest of the world the second letter of the ICAO code is used to designate countries, so the 3-letter IATA code cannot be appended.

ICAO-registered U.S. airports in the contiguous 48 states start with a K. Alaskan and Hawaiian airports start with a P and other U.S. territories get other different initial letters depending on their region (e.g. TJ for Puerto Rico or NS for American Samoa).

https://www.cirruspilots.org/Safety/CAPS-Event-History?id=3

The parachute has never "failed" in any engineering sense. The stat is taking into account all deployments, including those well outside of the deployment envelope, such as not enough altitude or too much velocity. No one can expect any parachute to deploy if you're too close to the ground.

Within the envelope of deployment, the statistic says it has a 100% success rate.

The SR-22 can recover from a spin, using conventional anti-spin control inputs. EASA testing showed that.

It is true that Cirrus secured an “equivalent level of safety” ruling during FAA certification and so did not demonstrate conforming spin recovery in flight testing here, but it can recover.

I think the commenter was making the point that the weight of the paint is not a significant consideration, not that recalculating the weight and balance after a paint job should not be done.

I flew with him as a child enough to have experienced some of them myself. I remember:

- An inflight electrical fire, at night, over the Sierras.

- A very tense IFR final into Monterey, at night in fog, in a twin Comanche just ahead of a Learjet when the controller had a power outage and lost radio contact.

- A test flight in a STOL Maule Rocket that ended with stalling and bouncing in the rough just short of the 7600 hundred foot runway at Stead AFB. The gear collapsed during roll out and damaged the wing and prop, but there were no injuries. Sadly, Maule went out of business and the aircraft was never repaired.

IIRC, Cirrus is now encouraging pilots to use CAPS in any engine failure with sufficient altitude for it to work, on account of the number of such accidents, in CAPS-equipped aircraft, where the pilot chose not to use it, and someone aboard was killed or seriously injured. This will presumably further muddy the used/saved ratio, while probably increasing the total number of saved.

In a collision situation, at least one as violent as this one, you can't be sure whether some vital control or structure has been damaged to the point where it is about to fail, so using a parachute of any sort, where feasible, seems to be the rational choice.

Quite by accident, I came across this pucker-inducing article a couple of days ago, where thre's little doubt that bailing out, if it were an option, would have been the right thing to do, even though this flight ended safely in this case.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/student-flight-control-j...

(On second thoughts, if the pilot had a parachute, he could have attempted to free up the controls without making his situation any worse.)

Note this was a midair with a much larger, faster aircraft and at an unfavorable aspect. The empennage was sliced nearly entirely through by the other aircraft's propeller and the elevator/horizontal stabilizer is deflected into a position commanding a steep dive.

SR22 Vs0 is 59 knots (call it 60 to make the math easier). 1.3 x Vs0 is a reasonable "over the fence" speed, so 78 knots (call it 80) indicated would be good on short final, maybe 90 on base-to-final. (Instead, they were descending and thus accelerating slightly and hit 169 knots on the base leg.)

Bombing into the pattern over 50 knots faster than appropriate (70 knots faster than the traffic you're following and 40 knots faster than the much larger and on-profile Metro on the parallel) might be contributing, but certainly suggests to me that the Cirrus crew was behind the airplane.

https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=a4eabe,a2cee7,a90ffa&la...

This is what I think aswell. The overshoot may be either way a miss identification of the runway, or just a poorly executed turn to final of the 17R. The investigation is going to be interesting.

Oceanic procedure, without radar control, is to turn 45 degrees off track while descending, but it takes a little bit of time to set all that in motion when things go wrong while you were just seconds before happily cruising straight ahead on autopilot (autopilot is mandatory above 29,000 ft in a lot of airspace)

It used to be more common to have a flexible combination of seats/baggage/fuel. But pilots flip out (or crash) if they can't fill the tanks, every seat and the baggage compartment and come in under gross. So the same airplanes often don't have the "bonus seats" they used to.

Numbers from Wikipedia, from the 1972 PA-32 owners handbook:

3,400 lb gross - 1,788 empty - (4 hours * 15gph * 6 lbs) / 7 passengers = 178 lbs per passenger. The average adult in the 70s was about 160. So you're not going across the country, but you could safely do a day trip with a 90 minute flight each way.

Now the average adult is 180. And they're a little taller than they were in the 70s, but not much. So every passenger has an extra 20 pounds horizontally. So in 2021, you'd be just over gross except that the people can't actually fit in the airplane.

Even with FAA standard people it would be small for 7.

I recall him saying 7, but that was a few decades ago (the plane was destroyed by its new owners in 2006, and I hadn't flown in it since a few years prior to that). :)

They changed this because it turns out that the same phenomenon that leads to private pilots taking undue risks in the rest of flight ("Get-there-itis") also makes them reluctant to pull the chute even when it's clearly their best option. Pilots who clearly couldn't reach a safe landing spot, yet had working CAPS would dig themselves (and their passengers) a grave rather than just pull the handle. So teaching them to start by assuming they'll pull the chute and only then considering whether there are other options reduces the fatality rate.

Some planes have more margin: the Cessna 182 for example is a four-seater and can carry full fuel plus 800 lbs, so you really can load it up with four people plus bags and still go somewhere.

But all planes will be close to their operating limits when fully loaded. Even a jetliner will typically be very close to its operating limits on takeoff and pilots have to pay very close attention to this. If you think about it, this has to be the case. If it weren't, the plane would have been over-designed and much more expensive than it has to be, and so it would lose to the competition.

This is likely true. He was the only person onboard the plane, so he would not have been able to get up and look. Unlikely he could see the extent of damage from his seat. And as noted, on final approach, he doesn't have time for much to change plans. Even if he knew the extent of the damage, the choices are roughly the same - land as planned, or go around.

That said, he did exactly what he should. Aviate, navigate, communicate. He controlled the plane, made a decision, and communicated that to ATC. Well done.

Or—to rewind the causal chain just a little further—pilot hubris, impatience and/or ignorance, which leads to weather being a factor in the first place. The choice to wing it and hope bad weather in the area will not affect you is the pilot’s.

From my shallow study of fatal and non-fatal GA accidents, there is hardly ever such a combination of life-or-death urgency and absence of alternative transportation options besides flying that could justify risking one’s own life and lives of one’s passengers by wilfully or accidentally ignoring weather forecast, and yet too often that appears to be the case.

It’s not a pleasure to talk about incidents like that, but “all plane crashes are pilot error” strikes me as a decent framing of the situation to adopt as a pilot when considering a risky flight.

I don't know what the characteristics are of that airport but I've been in the plane during a really touchy landing in bad snow, before. The occupants described that "everything seemed fine", they were coming out of the clouds and expecting to see the runway up ahead, but instead found tree-tops.

In the case of landing with my Dad in similar weather, the clouds were very low, he had no visual and was reaching the point where he'd have to put it down or abort the landing[0] when he suddenly flung the clipboard at my mom's lap and grabbed onto the yoke.

We were on the ground in a few tense seconds and I've never seen my Dad jump like that -- it seriously freaked me the hell out. His explanation was that he had already decided to abort the landing when the clouds broke and he realized he was in a good position to put it down. I get the impression that he was a little surprised about the position he was actually in -- and it was an uncharacteristically violent landing.

[0] I'm not sure what the technical details are or if I am getting that right...

Well, flying VFR into IMC anyway.

In a Cirrus with what is probably a GFC 700 with flight director capabilities I would expect any competent instrument rated pilot to have the FD on and approach mode armed (the 1 missing button I meant) exactly to avoid this mistake.

Great to hand fly, but in a capable airplane just plain stupid not to use all the tools. And even mandatory on the professional side of things in many cases.

Official Cirrus guidelines include verbalizing "CAPS is available" when crossing 600ft AGL during climb-out.

Source: I fly an SR22.

I'm curious. The airport is at about 5900ft and they were at 6400. If that's AGL for them that seems like a long and high approach. If not, then they were going to do a 3 mile straight in at 500 feet AGL? Either interpretation doesn't fit my (limited, student) experience.

I think my Dad applied that to small plane/private pilots, rather than commercial, as well. While it might make someone with that absolutest thinking feel good to say "The pilot should have known someone's phone battery was nearing explosion before it blew a hole in the aircraft and required an emergency landing", I think my Dad would land somewhere in the territory of "If the pilot had a reasonable way of preventing the problem and didn't, it doesn't matter if it was negligence or lack of creative thinking". Me, I define that "reasonable way of preventing" as "it's in the checklist". I think my Dad would expect a whole lot more.

And even though I'd be more forgiving in my judgement of pilots, I can't fault him for his thinking. Every time something unexpected/dangerous happened in the air to him, he wouldn't get back up in the plane until he had figured out how to eliminate/greatly reduce the risk. When telling the story of what happened, he'd point out why it was his fault[1] and I don't doubt that he believed that when nobody was looking.

Over the years, he added a device to monitor the exhaust temp after the pipe blew threw the front of the aircraft and made the plane into a fireworks show of ignited exhaust. He added these strange (very inexpensive) rubber wire-like things to various parts of the wings after being struck by lightening which broke his radio, resulting in an interesting problem with getting clearance for landing[0]. He owned the plane with a partner who used it on the weekends, occasionally (they paid the company to use the plane), and they both had this same philosophy, so by the time he sold it, there were more gadgets attached to the dashboard than built into it. They had a weather radar gadget that was hypnotic to watch.

I can't think of a single incident my dad encountered in the air that would have fallen anywhere near the category of "skill-related/irresponsible failure". It was always a mechanical fault where the plane lacked any way of detecting/alerting the pilot and there was no other way for the pilot to confirm, before take-off, that the condition would not occur. And weather at Romeo airport can switch on a dime in the winter[1], which he managed with radar on his plane. Outside of the small explosion and an occasional hit from a bird, the plane was never damaged/crash landed or even had a non-runway emergency landing[2] despite losing the engine a few times and having many, many other problems.

Often these things just sat and monitored things that should never fail -- in the case of the exhaust heat, a separate fault caused the excess heat, which caused the (very small) explosion -- it should never have gotten that hot, but were it to get that hot, it didn't have to result in a fault or even an unscheduled landing. For the lightening, adding the $3 wires, apparently, eliminates the threat entirely. And despite all of the flying he did, I don't think he ever encountered the same kind of (or even related) problem more than once. That's about as perfect a score as you can get, in my opinion. :)

[0] I was told this as a kid and probably have most of it wrong, but he had these extremely bright flashlights as part of his emergency kit (strange, ABS plastic, four C-cells, not mag-lite, but these were damn bright); they were for Morse-code signalling (had both an on-off switch and a button that turned it on when depressed and off when released). He somehow had to notify the tower and receive a reply using the flashlight -- I imagined he flew the plane past the windows like in the movies, but it was probably less dramatic.

[1] He frequently ended up landing/having to get a ride from Oakland County International because of weather he wasn't willing to land in -- I don't know how the licensing works with that, but after he got his IFR but before he got the remaining (something related to a Loran-C and weather), he'd enter his flight plan and find out he wasn't allowed to fly due to weather. That stopped after he "leveled up his license a few times" over an expensive 3-year period.

[2] The closest he was to that would have been nearly having to do an emergency landing at Selfridge ANG. This was the early 90s, so who knows what this looks like today (and my recollection is lacking) -- IIRC, it would have been illegal for him to land there, but in an emergency, they'll accommodate. I remember him saying something about losing his license/having it suspended had he done it but I don't know the details.

Yes you're gliding right now, but whilst that's better than just falling uncontrolled from the sky it's no guarantee you'll walk away.

Now if you're gliding... right towards a perfectly nice runway you were already lined up on then CAPS is likely the wrong call, not least because you may already be too low. But if you're just in the middle of nowhere then CAPS is much safer than hoping that's just a big empty grassy meadow you see ahead and doesn't have a thin, wheel-snagging ditch, or a barbed wire fence, or a dozen other obstacles that you wouldn't see until it's too late.

Even for a water landing, if you have never practised there are a lot of ways for putting a conventional plane down in the water to go badly, including flipping or breaking up the plane, whereas CAPS should just plonk you in the water, relatively gently, right side up, not great news, but very survivable.

Sometimes you succeed in [save your life] and are still on-track / on-piste pointing in the right direction and are back to [win the race] in the space of a few seconds. Other times, you are on the sidelines, and hopefully not on the way to the field clinic.

But the switch in perspective must fully committed and absolutely not include [save the equipment], which is replaceable, even custom one-off gear. Anything else is over-constraining the problem and inviting disaster.

Of course there is, that's the reason I emphasised it.

> I don’t think it’s happened in the about 100 parachute activations so far

That's good, although there could be a selection effect there: pilots might be more hesitant to deploy it if they think the falling aircraft could do harm.