> Well, what if I do that an infinite number of times, then it's no longer a mountain. When does it not become a mountain, right? So we don't quite have answers to that.
Is interesting how 21st century technologists are basically asking the same questions as Socrates and his disciples were asking ~2500 years ago. If I remember correctly (I last read some Plato about 15 years ago) the example that Socrates gives related to that is one about a table. Is a table with only 3 legs still a table? Probably, many would say. Is a table with only 2 legs still a table. Less probably. Is a table without any legs still a table? Probably not. Is it correct to ask about the idea of a table? i.e. is there such a thing as a table in the abstract? (or a mountain in the abstract, to go back to Norvig's example). Plato famously thought that there was such an idea, many other Greek philosophers were a lot more ambivalent about it (with Heraclitus I think the best-known example).
What I'm trying to say is that maybe today's engineers should go back to reading some philosophy, not the modern US-version of analytical philosophy which doesn't teach anyone almost anything, but all the way back from the Greeks up until the late 19th-early 20th century, maybe that way those engineers would also be more forthcoming in accepting their ethical responsibilities. I personally didn't like how Norvig was quick to set aside AI's ethical responsibilities, passing the hot potato to the general field of engineering, i.e. to no-one in particular.
If you rephrase the question as, "Is there such a thing as a more real table than this table?", or if "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" sparks joy (or puzzlement) in your heart, you might enjoy reading Neal Stephenson's Anathem.
I can't write why, for spoilers. I can say the book is heavily inspired by Platonism, as well as many other things. If a science fiction story about philosophical monks, astronomy, and adventure appeals to you, give it a read.
We programmer do it instinctively, but having read about it gives me such a greater confidence to actually apply it methodically every time i design a type hierarchy...
(*) basically, the idea is to mutate the property, and see if the object's essence is unchanged. If it is unchanged, then the property isn't constitutive of its essence. As an example, changing the color of a table doesn't change the fact that it's a table, so "color" isn't an attribute of the "Table" concept. Number of feet, however, could very well be (or at least a boolean "has feet" ;)
By that line of thinking, the essence of a table may have very little to do with it's shape, and more to do with it's purpose. But I can see how that just opens up a new rabbit hole to go down...
That's pretty much what Plato believed, but also that for the most part we can never access that Platonic Ideal. We could only, in effect, access the equivalent of shadows on the wall case by light against objects. Seeing only shadows for all of our lives, we believe they are the true reality since that is all of reality that we perceive.
As a concept it is a strong precursor (and no doubt a strong influence) on Immanuel Kant's work. He basically pointed out that we have only 5 senses, and each those are intermediated by various layers, and so even through those sense we do not experience the thing in itself, and are limited by those 5 senses. And of course we know that other animals have other senses. We have invented some of artificial ones of our own (vision that is heat based instead of light based, etc).
If you're interests go in that direction. his work Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysics is where he begins to explore this. It's dense, but not too inaccessible as philosophical texts go especially if you have the background in logical reasoning and layered abstractions that programming instills. Here's a link to a free Google Books version that also allows PDF download: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Kant_s_Prolegomena_to_A...
Incidentally, Kant was 100% correct: His ideas were so compelling that pretty much any philosopher after him looking to explore metaphysics could not simply dismiss them out of hand.
Secondarily, Prolegomena was also somewhat of a response to work by David Hume on the nature & human perception of causality, and together they formed the foundations upon which science has continued develop that area of physics, even if it has moved on somewhat from those earlier ideas.
I think Philosophy often gets a bad name today as a useless of self-indulgent field, but it's important to remember that philosophers were in many ways the first scientists and refined the ideas & practices that ultimately developed into the scientific method, breaking off into a separate (but still connected) branch of study. For modern examples where that synergy still exists, the works of Danielle Dennet are an excellent example.
Prolegomena is less rigorous and in-style than Critique.
Such questions reappear on higher levels when you're reasoning about AI. But since the field hasn't been grappling with them overall, I'm doubtful they'll come up with great insight at this point.
I don't understand. The "idea" of a table is an object that provides a level surface to place stuff on.
What am I missing? What is the interesting part?
You surely wouldn't call a boulder sticking out of the earth "a table", even if it did have a conveniently level surface to place stuff on? The point is that what we call "a table" is not just about function - it's also about form.
Heidegger would probably say something like "the table tables" (more on brand in German "Der Tisch tischt") - so a table is a thing that supports tablelike actions.
Of course "table-like" is a gradient instead of a binary flag. An archetypical four-legged table is the way you might draw a table when asked about it — so it might — for that individual living at that time in bistory be as table-like as it gets. However, there are totally recognizable tables with just one leg, or even with no legs (e.g. carved into a stone wall) or with alternative ways of suspensions (hanging from the ceiling, mounted on the wall, etc). In the end even a rock could act as your table when you are out hiking. Of course you still recognize it as a rock, but it has shown table-like qualities now, it can be your table for the moment.
Then there are also different kind of tables: work benches, kitchen tables, desks, coffe tables, long and thin tables, more akin to shelves, but used as tables, folding tables, tables with rolls on them etc. They can totally differ in their proportions and usage, yet we call them tables, mostly because ofhers will know which object we mean, when we say it. When you however demanded a table at work and they gave you a tiny coffee table you would exclaim: "This is not a table!". Rightfully so, for the context you are in it is not useful (it differs too much from an office table).
So if instead of asking if something is a table, asking whether something can be used as a table (if it has table-like qualities to it) is more like how I think object-subject relations work in practise. We call things a table because we use it as a table. We don't call things a table because somewhere out there in the universe exists a clear definition of what the concept of said table constitutes.
If you were to shoot a film or direct a theatre play, then you wouldn't be interested in whether in principle the object can be used as a table, you would be interested in it's readability as a table that hints to the viewer a certain millieu or social background. This might also be something you'd consider when the primary purpose of your table/desk is to impress your subordinates.
Of course the table-like quality of an object would be just one of its many dimensions. One could also go in and ask about arbitrary dimensions like the bulkyness of the object, about the intentionality (that hiking picnick rock is a table, but an unintentional one). One could ask about many aspects that constitute subject-object relations, however it is important not to forget that in our daily lives we just ballpark these categories intuitively. So what I might still call a table might not at all be seen as a table by another person ("This is not a table, it is a rock") and yet both of us a right and wrong at the same time.
Interestingly AI goes a lot into looks, where the dimension of usability might be more useful (but harder to extract from images). So internally an AI would represent table-likeness as a floating point number and only says something is (or isn't) a table based on thresholds somebody found useful.
Firstly, is an idea that we've deeper learned ML quite a lot, and we need more representations / abstract thinking again to make more fundamental progress. Nice, I like the sound of that.
Secondly,
> ... So Christian Szegedy and Sarah Loos have the system where you take sort of a regular theorem prover and you give it a problem. And then you have a neural net decide out of the million axioms I have, which 100 are most relevant to this problem. ...
I also thought combining machine learning with theorem provers would be an excellent avenue for further research: we have abstract reasoning that doesn't "go wrong" as it does in many end applications ("expert systems don't work"), but is also still extremely "rich", and not trivially automated because it's intractable without intuition/heuristics.
Glad to hear the big leagers are also interested.
“The ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life give the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not continue.”
Which I guess is kind of in the eye of the beholder.
That said he misrepresents Kurzweil a bit with "if you're Kurzweil all the curves are exponential and they're going up. And right now is a special time." Kurzweil has already said the singularity will be about 2045 and now is not a special time in that way.
I don't understand this point. If a point is interesting on an exponential curve, e.g. because it's within a human lifespan of human intelligence being exceeded (which I think is the context of the quote; I'm not looking to debate this point), how does changing the Y axis to a log scale make that any less interesting?
Here, Peter Norvig is advocating for, essentially, neuro-symbolic AI (there is an actual research field, with a conference and all, named that, but of course here he's talking more generally about the combination of pattern matching and logical reasoning).
My question is, how is this ever going to work when tutors are removing resolution theorem proving from the curriculum and Russel and Norvig have cut down that part of their book, to an inch of its life, as Peter Norvig says earlier in the interview:
>> We kept a lot of the old material, even though we know people are skipping it. So professors aren't teaching resolution theorem proving anymore, but we kept that in. We cut down that material quite a bit, but it's still there.
We got plenty of folks trained to fill in the "neuro" part of Peter Norvig's plan. How about the "symbolic [reasoning]" part?
Not really interested on birthing a new type of living being too soon. It's not capitalism. But as a tool it can be usefull mocking reality, not surviving to it.
Machines already are good communication tools. Can be good enough processing tools. Not more than enough.
For evidence, see almost any computer-based tool, my favourite examples being Windows, Android, and DNS.
I suspect that computers will be vastly superior to humans in many, many tasks long before we acknowledge that the singularity has already happened.
From Vinge's essay where I first heard of the term: I. J. Good2 wrote: "Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an "intelligence explosion," and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. . . . It is more probable than not that, within the twentieth century, an ultraintelligent machine will be built and that it will be the last invention that man need make."
So the final step is an AI that can generate other AIs of greater capacity in terms of compute/time, computer/$, utility/$, etc.
https://frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/book98/com.ch1/vinge.singularity...
I think the question of whether the exponent is changing depends on exactly what you're measuring.
Superficially, the exponent of something like Moore's Law is fairly constant, but when you throw additional aspects like the Gini Coefficient (how the power of computing is distributed within a society), Jevon's Paradox (lowering the cost of a resource causes the total consumption of the resource to go up) and network effects (use value of some capabilities grows as function of the number of participants), and the Innovator's Dilemma (low-end entrants to a market improve and push entrenched ones into higher margin but shrinking segments until they're squeezed out entirely) which causes systems to go through phase changes that can be fairly abrupt, even though the underlying transistors-per-dollar measure is accelerating at a constant rate.
In my view, this is the basis of any philosophy – the confidence that some conception is (and must be) defined like you do it out of habit. Philosophy is psychology under cover. Ask a psycho what is a table and they will easily point at a heap of flesh and bones, or at their t-shirt. Table is a word. All philosophy does is an iterative pseudoagreement between human minds, which were randomly trained at verbalizing inputs. Sometimes it finds similar sounds, but that’s it.
(The most helpful link I can think of is James Franklin's article on Stove's Gem, the "Worst Argument in the World"—Very lucid writing, and not a bad introduction to talk of things-in-themselves. https://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.html )
The Thing-in-Itself was once controversial but undeservedly. It's necessary to prevent the subject knowing the object fully, so thus it is treated in the sense of Cassirer/Cohen's Infinitesimal. No one has trouble with Noumenon maybe only in the disappointment with the intractability of metaphysics to answers some of the most pressing questions.
It is not intended as an introduction to Critique of Pure Reason it works from the conclusions of that work and why those conclusions are necessary.
We can remember the title isn't Prolegomena to Critique of Pure Reason but instead Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.