One Bad Apple(hackerfactor.com) |
One Bad Apple(hackerfactor.com) |
Why? You can get any false positive rate you want if you don't care about the false negative rate.
It seems likely that that was a design criterion and they just tweaked the thresholds and number of hits required until they got it.
The last analysis on HN about this made the exact same mistake, and it's a pretty obvious one so I'm skeptical about the rest of their analyses.
It is nice to have some actual numbers from this article though about how much CP they report, the usefulness of MD5 hashes, etc.
Edit: reading on, it seems like he just misread - it sounds like he thinks they're saying there's a 1 in a trillion chance of a false positive on a photo but Apple are talking about an account which requires multiple photo hits. The false positive rate per photo might be 1 in 1000 but if you need 10 hits then it's fine.
I don't even want to imagine what very religious people and countries will think about the iPhone then.
Apple could argue they were already going to receive the photo (since this algorithm only affects Photos destined for iCloud Photos) and thus "when in the upload process it was classified" is simply technological semantics.
> This was followed by a memo leak, allegedly from NCMEC to Apple:
Well, we certainly are the minority. If a majority of people knew and were mad we'd have protests in major cities.
Its seems insane to me that anyone would knowingly upload CP to a forensics site on purpose. Much less several times a day.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but wouldn't it be more correct to say they "would be in possession of images recognized by PhotoDNA as child pornography" rather than actual CP?
Problem with all this is that the images of naked children made by their parents is CP in the eyes of its consumers.
Perceptual AI is the best approach, but produces a certainty < 1.
In my cryptography course I had a project about invisible watermarks and secret messages in imaging. The first hurdle was beating partial images and compression, so most early algorithms worked in the frequency domain. At that time it was basically an arms race between protection or deletion of said messages and I think that hasn't changed.
Conventional file hashes can be beaten by randomizing meta data since a quality hash function would immediatly create a completely different hash. Never mind just flipping or probably just resaving them.
If you create a polynomial approximation of frequencies or color histograms of an image, you have a relatively short key indicator. But you need a lot of those to even approach certainty. Could always be an image of a duck.
If this is true, how has this gotten past Apple's legal team? Are they not aware it would be a flagrant violation of the law?
That's a real kicker in my opinion. Unless they get training data from NCMEC I struggle to understand how they're training their model? Unless it's entirely algorithmic and not based on ML?
Also, none of this topic is something I would want to deal with.
If this is a sincere effort, clearly Apple has failed to thread the needle. This announcement could also be a fumbled attempt to reframe what is already a common practice at the company, to get ahead of a leak. I heard from a friend who's related to an Apple employee that Apple scans the mountains of data on its servers, already, for "market research". The claims otherwise... marketing gambits
Having known many victims of sexual violence and trafficking (Seriously. I deal with them, several times a week, and have, for decades), I feel for the folks that honestly want that particular kind of crime to stop. Humans can be complete scum. Most folks in this community may think they know how low we can go, but you are likely being optimistic.
That said, law enforcement has a nasty habit of having a rather "binary" worldview. People are either cops, or uncaught criminals.
With that worldview, it can be quite easy to "blur the line" between child sex traffickers, and traffic ticket violators. I remember reading a The Register article, about how anti-terrorism tools were being abused by local town councils to do things like find zoning violations (for example, pools with no CO).
Misapplied laws can be much worse than letting some criminals go. This could easily become a nightmare, if we cede too much to AI.
And that isn't even talking about totalitarian regimes, run by people of the same ilk as child sex traffickers (only wearing Gucci, and living in palaces).
”Any proposal must be viewed as follows. Do not pay overly much attention to the benefits that might be delivered were the law in question to be properly enforced, rather one needs to consider the harm done by the improper enforcement of this particular piece of legislation, whatever it might be.” -Lyndon B. Johnson
[EDITED TO ADD]: And I 100% agree that, if we really want to help children, and victims of other crimes, then we need to start working on the root causes of the issues.
Poverty is, arguably, the #1 human problem on Earth, today. It causes levels of desperation that ignore things like climate change, resource shortages, and pollution. People are so desperate to get out of the living hell that 90% of the world experiences, daily, that they will do anything (like sell children for sex), or are angry enough to cause great harm.
If we really want to solve a significant number of world problems, we need to deal with poverty; and that is not simple at all. I have members of my family that have been working on that, for decades. I have heard all the "yeah...but" arguments that expose supposedly simple solutions as...not simple.
Of course, the biggest issue, is that the folks in the 0.0001% need to loosen their hands on their stashes, and that ain't happening, anytime soon. I don't know if the demographic represented by the Tech scene is up for that, since the 0.0001% are our heroes.
Not to tools like IDA and Ghidra
Now, I suppose you could DDoS Apple's verification process.
Either way, though, it's not like anyone who would do either of these things would win any points in the court of popular opinion. I can see the headlines now: "Hackers Disable Apple's CSAM Reporting Tools; Legitimate CSAM Reports Get Lost".
What website are we on?
pre this thing:
* before syncing photos to icloud, the device encrypts them with a device local key, so they sit on apple's servers encrypted at rest and apple cannot look at them unless they push an update to your device that sends them your key or uploads your photos unencrypted somewhere else
after this thing:
* before syncing photos to icloud, the device encrypts them, but there are essentially two keys. one on your device, and one that can be derived on their servers under special circumstances. the device also hashes the image, but using one of these fancy hashes that are invariant to crops, rotations, translations and noise (like shazam, but for pictures)
* the encrypted photo is uploaded along with the hash (in a special crypto container)
* their service scans all the hashes, but uses crypto magic that does the following:
1) it does some homeomorphic encryption thing where they don't actually see the hash, but they get something like a zero knowledge proof if the image's hash (uploaded along with the image in the "special crypto container") is in their list of bad stuff
2) if enough of these hit, then there's a key that pops out of this process that lets them decrypt the images that were hits
3) the images get added to a list where a room full of unfortunate human beings look at them and confirm that there's nothing good going on in those photos
4) they alert law enforcement
a couple points of confusion to me:
1) i'm assuming they get their "one in a trillion" thing based on two factors. one being the known false positive rate of their perceptual hashing method and the other being their tunable number of hits necessary to trigger decryption. so they regularly benchmark their perceptual hash thing and compute a false positive rate, and then adjust the threshold to keep their overall system false positive probability where they want it?
2) all the user's photos are stored encrypted at rest, it seems that this thing isn't client side scanning, but rather assistance for server side scanning of end to end encrypted content put on their servers.
first off i think it's actually pretty cool that a consumer products company offers end to end encrypted cloud backup of your photos. i don't think google does this, or anyone else. they can just scan images on the server. second off, this is some pretty cool engineering (if i understand it correctly). they're providing more privacy than their competition aaand they've given themselves a way to ensure that they're not in violation of the law by hosting CSAM for their customers.
but i guess the big question is, if people don't like this, can't they just disable icloud?
They do not provide more privacy than the competition (in this regard at least), and yes, people can just disable iCloud services. That argument that "you can just not use it" is a pretty weak one for defending poor privacy practices. The same could be said for any website or server with poor privacy practices and given the prevalence of iCloud photos, this change affects lots of people.
it does the matching client side, so the hashes never leave the client. what it does send with the photos is this threshold thing where if enough of them are hits, it reveals them, otherwise they see nothing.
it seems pretty unequivocal that this is all a system to support scanning of e2e encrypted images on icloud. there would be no need for such an elaborate system if they could scan the images on the server. as far as i know, google does not e2e encrypt images, and for all we know, they actually do engage in server side scanning.
to quote their statement https://www.apple.com/child-safety/:
> To help address this, new technology in iOS and iPadOS* will allow Apple to detect known CSAM images stored in iCloud Photos. This will enable Apple to report these instances to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC acts as a comprehensive reporting center for CSAM and works in collaboration with law enforcement agencies across the United States.
> Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching using a database of known CSAM image hashes provided by NCMEC and other child safety organizations. Apple further transforms this database into an unreadable set of hashes that is securely stored on users’ devices.
> Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the known CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic technology called private set intersection, which determines if there is a match without revealing the result. The device creates a cryptographic safety voucher that encodes the match result along with additional encrypted data about the image. This voucher is uploaded to iCloud Photos along with the image.
> Using another technology called threshold secret sharing, the system ensures the contents of the safety vouchers cannot be interpreted by Apple unless the iCloud Photos account crosses a threshold of known CSAM content. The threshold is set to provide an extremely high level of accuracy and ensures less than a one in one trillion chance per year of incorrectly flagging a given account.
> Only when the threshold is exceeded does the cryptographic technology allow Apple to interpret the contents of the safety vouchers associated with the matching CSAM images. Apple then manually reviews each report to confirm there is a match, disables the user’s account, and sends a report to NCMEC. If a user feels their account has been mistakenly flagged they can file an appeal to have their account reinstated.
Just wasted the weekend on this, and now asking for options: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28111995
Worse, they've also opened the door to government censorship of images and content and propped that door wide open.
There's going to be absolutely no oversight or transparency into occasions when an image is removed from a device. Nobody will ever know when a non-CSAM image is accidentally pulled back from a device. All the public will ever see are headlines to the tune of "CSAM scanning system catches bad person once again".
This is a really awful path that we're going down, and this is absolutely going to get abused by regimes around the world.
1. The few who care about privacy.
2. That's about it. Maybe 1% if you're being generous. ( And subtract the portion of that 1% on this site who DO care about privacy but are being compensated $400k/yr by Apple and with Bay Area rents being what they are, they shouldn't rock the boat, and they really need to make good on their Tesla Roadster reservation. )
But go ask your mother-in-law, your dad, or any random normie friend. They're fighting PedoBear! And if they expand this further, well, they're fighting terrorists! And if they expand even further, well, I have nothing to hide! Do you?
feh ~/memes/dennis_nedry_see_nobody_cares.gif
Presumably the quid pro quo outcome is that Apple is allowed to win the Epic vs Apple lawsuit.
If you are a parent and lose a child then you would want every possible avenue taken to find your child. You would be going mad wanting to find them. If there is a way to match photos to known missing children then I say it should be at least tried.
I equate this to Ring cameras. They are everywhere. You cannot go for a walk without showing up on dozens of cameras, which we know Amazon (god mode) and law enforcement abuse their access privileges. However, if a crime happened to you and a Ring camera captured it, then I know almost everyone would certainly want that footage reviewed. Would you ignore the Ring footage possibility just because you despise Ring cameras? Probably not.
It’s all an invasion of privacy until you’re sitting on the other side of the table where you have a vested interest in getting access to the information.
It seems just as rational to argue that the people who live in those homes should be willing to give up their right to not have their home searched if it means potentially finding a missing child in a potential criminal's home.
We can come up with all kinds of hypothetical situations. I am empathetic to parents going through the hell of a missing child, and to the children themselves. But the protection of children and victims must be balanced with the preservation of rights and freedoms considered deeply sacrosanct.
the problem with this argument is that you can use it to justify basically anything.
That's why it's so insidious. People keep making it about children, which are a very worthy cause. Nobody wants child abuse. But the problem is that the technology can be used for anything. Wouldn't it be nice to read all of the internal Slack messages at a company you're about to acquire? Wouldn't it be nice for Apple to have a copy of Google's source code? Wouldn't it be nice for a political candidate to cause their opponent some legal trouble? Spying on other people is always very valuable and governments (and corporations, probably) spend billions of dollars a year on it.
If we want to make this just about detecting abuse of children, I'm totally on board. Pass a law that says using this technology to steal corporate secrets or to gain a political advantage is punishable by death. Then maybe it can be taken seriously as something very narrow in scope. That, of course, would never happen. (Death penalty arguments aside; I'm exaggerating for effect.)
I can't believe that once this technology is out, it's only going to be used for good. (I imagine politicians will love this. Look at the recent Andrew Cuomo abuse allegations -- he abuses women, and then his staff try to cover it up by leaking documents, to discredit the abused. Sure would be nice to see what sort of things they have on their phone, right? Will someone like Cuomo NEVER have a friend that can add detection hashes to the set and review the results? I would say it's a certainty that a powerful politician will have loyal insiders in the government, and that if this system is rolled out, we're going to see colossal abuse -- flat-out facilitation of crime, lives ruined -- over the next 20 years.)
I have to wonder what Apple's angle is here. It would cost them less money to do nothing. They could be paying these researchers to work on something that makes Apple money, and banning users from their platform (or having them hauled off to prison) doesn't help them make money. I really don't want to be the conspiracy theory guy, but doesn't it seem weird that the Department of Justice wants to investigate Apple's 30% app store cut, and right about that time, Apple comes up with a new way to surveil the population for the Department of Justice? Maybe I read too much HN.
But it's just a totally different situation isn't it? I'm not personally opposed to the general concept of security cameras in public spaces. If you choose to install one on your property that doesn't seem unreasonable. If you choose to share that footage with the police that doesn't seem unreasonable.
The problem with Apple's system isn't even the current implementation (which is on device, but iCloud only). It's that the system can be trivially expanded to all on device content, and report the user of the phone for any unacceptable behaviour.
It's more like a camera in your home that reports you to the police if you do anything unacceptable. Would anyone choose to have that?
But the bigger problem is that Apple have been selling products based on "privacy first" marketing. By reporting on their users off-line content they break that trust. And there are really few viable options in smartphones so you can't really just move to another provider.
Kinda unrelated to that, is the 4th amendment, which protects the rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
It is still an invasion of privacy regardless of the side on which you sit. This situation is unlike a ring camera capturing footage in a public space where individuals already have no expecation of privacy.
That’s the thing about privacy that so many don’t want to admit. “Everyone deserves it, until they don’t”. All of society’s privacy is more important than your single child, sorry.
Meanwhile I created this great new technology. It runs in the background super efficiently on your phone. It immediately detects housefires and alerts you. It uses a combination of sensors to literally detect the spark of flame and there’s only one in 1 trillion false positives.
Simply download the app and give it permission to sample your microphones, cameras, accelerometers and historical gps data to build a profile, then flick a lighter anywhere in your house and sure enough your phone alarm goes off.
How it works is incredible, an algorithm listens for supersonic soundwaves created by the chemical reaction during combustion. Video and sound samples are then reviewed by one of our technical representatives.
Housefires and house fire deaths will be a thing of the past. The only compromise is that our algorithms listen to all of your video and audio and occasionally monitored by a human technician, which might include audio of you making love to your wife.
You and your wife bumping uglies just isn't that special, your embarassment about it is way out of proportion to the amount necessary. The fact that you would rather people die in house fires than a small chance that a stranger hears you breathing heavily and talking dirty should cause you a lot more concern than it seems to be causing you.
This is very insightful. It's also depressing, because it's a great point for those who oppose privacy. I even find myself swayed by this reasoning.
The reason this violation was able to take place is because…
> It’s all an invasion of privacy until you’re sitting on the other side of the table
The thing about privacy and the government is you must always envision yourself on the wrong side of the table, because you are. Right up to the point they are inside you. [1] Your right to privacy is your strength and without it you are a slave to forces you don’t understand, can’t see, hear, taste, or smell.
Privacy or lack there of changes who you are and how you act. It changes what you say and why.
Be very careful how you submit to surveillance. The privacy you forfeit can never be recaptured.
[1] https://news.yahoo.com/mexico-man-sues-over-repeated-anal-pr...
That it's worth having a random human being able to listen to all said conversations?
To me at least it's incredibly reasonable to make that tradeoff. As a society we make tradeoffs all the time and people die as a result. Some of those tradeoffs are arguably unreasonable but this hypothetical seems very clear...
Furthermore, e2e isn't all that meaningful with this feature. A client-side scanner that allows someone to view a thumbnail of the photo if it matches some other photo they have kinda takes most of the protection e2e is supposed to provide...
have you ever seen a system like this that would be capable of flagging accounts for hosting bad material with a tiny false positive rate while being capable of e2e encrypting the material at rest like this one? i haven't, and it's an awful lot of engineering going to waste if that's not the goal.
no e2e on iCloud has been a major issue for years. It's not like they're beta testing (the underlying principle/structure that is)
and again, I haven't seen a system that flags bad material that is also e2e because the whole premise is flawed.
they probably already do server side scanning, and probably regularly find stuff.
assuming that was true (which it very well could be) it would be insanely irresponsible to roll out e2e at scale without something like this...
there are probably hundreds of people or more at apple who can legitimately access the contents of a user account. e2e with inbound scanning would completely ameliorate that.
In one of the previous discussions, I've seen claims about the NCMEC database containing a lot of harmless pictures misclassified as CSAM. This post confirms this again (ctrl-f "macaque")
It also seems like the PhotoDNA hash algorithm is problematic (to the point where it may be possible to trigger false matches).
Now NCMEC seem to be pushing for the development of a technology that would implant an informant in every single of our devices (mandating the inclusion of this technology is the logical next step that seems inevitable if Apple launches this).
I'm surprised, and honestly disappointed, that the author seems to still play nice, instead of releasing the whitepaper. The NCMEC seems to have decided to position itself directly alongside other Enemies of the Internet, and while I can imagine that they're also doing a lot of important and good work, at this point, I don't think they're salvageable would like to see them disbanded.
Really curious how this will play out. I expect attacks either sabotaging these scanning systems by flooding them with false positives, or exploiting them to get the accounts of your enemies shut down permanently by sending them a picture of a macaque.
I'm the author.
I've worked with different parts of NCMEC for years. (I built the initial FotoForensics service in a few days. Before I wrote the first line of code, I was in phone calls with NCMEC about my reporting requirements.) Over time, this relationship grew. Some years, I was in face-to-face development discussions, other times it have been remote communications. To me, there are different independent parts working inside NCMEC.
The CyberTipline and their internal case staff are absolutely incredible. They see the worst of people in the media and reports that they process. They deal with victims and families. And they remain the kindest and most sincere people I've ever encountered. When possible, I will do anything needed to make their job easier.
The IT group has gone through different iterations, but they are always friendly and responsive. When I can help them, I help them.
When I interact with their legal staff, they are very polite. But I rarely interact with them directly. On occasion, they have also given me some very bad advice. (It might be good for them. But, as my own attorney pointed out, it is generally over-reaching in the requested scope.)
The upper management that I have interacted with are a pain in the ass. If it wasn't for the CyberTipline, related investigators, and the IT staff, I would have walked away (or minimized my interactions) long ago.
Why haven't I made my whitepaper about PhotoDNA public? In my view, who would it help? It would help bad guys avoid detection and it will help malcontents manufacture false-positives. The paper won't help NCMEC, ICACs, or related law enforcement. It won't help victims.
About this time, someone usually mocks "it's always about the kids, think about the kids." To those critics: They have not seen the scope of this problem or the long term impact. There is nearly a 1-to-1 relationship between people who deal in CP and people who abuse children. And they rarely victimize just one child. Nearly 1 in 10 children in the US will be sexually abused before the age of 18.
The problem is people use this perfectly legitimate problem to justify anything. They think it's okay to surveil the entire world because children are suffering. There are no limits they won't exceed, no lines they won't cross in the name of protecting children. If you take issue, you're a "screeching minority" that's in their way and should be silenced.
It's extremely tiresome seeing "children, terrorists, drug dealers" mentioned every single time the government wants to erode some fundamental human right. They are the bogeymen of the 21st century. Children in particular are the perfect political weapon to let you get away with anything. Anyone questions you, just destroy their reputation by calling them a pedophile.
What you are saying here kind of sidetracks the actual problem those critics have though, doesn't it? The problem is not the acknowledgement of how bad child abuse is. The problem is whether we can trust the people who claim that everything they do, they do it for the children. The problem is damaged trust.
And I think your last paragraph illustrates why child abuse is such an effective excuse, if someone criticizes your plan, just avoid and go into how bad child abuse really is.
I'm not accusing you of anything here by the way, I like the article and your insight. I just see a huge danger in the critics and those who actually want to help with this problem being pitted against each other by people who see the topic of child abuse as nothing but a convenient carrier for their goals, the ones that have actually heavily damaged a lot of trust.
I think we have seen "think of the kids" used as an excuse for so many things over the years that the pendulum has now swung so far that some of the tech community has begun to think we should do absolutely nothing about this problem. I have even seen people on HN in the last week that are so upset by the privacy implications of this that they start arguing that these images of abuse should be legal since trying to crack down is used as a motive to invade people's privacy.
I don't know what the way forward is here, but we really shouldn't lose sight that there are real kids being hurt in all this. That is incredibly motivating for a lot of people. Too often the tech community's response is that the intangible concept of privacy is more important than the tangible issue of child abuse. That isn't going to be a winning argument among mainstream audiences. We need something better or it is only a matter of time until these type of systems are implemented everywhere.
Making it public would allow the public to scrutinize it, attack it, if you will, so that we can get to the bottom of how bad this technology is. Ultimately my sincere guess is that we’d end up with better technology to do this not some crap system that essentially matches on blurry images. Our government is supposed to be open source, there’s really no reason we can’t as a society figure this out better than some anti CP cabal with outdated crufty image tech.
The exploitation of children is a real and heartbreaking ongoing tragedy that forever harms millions of those we most owe protection.
It's because this is so tragic that we in the world of privacy have grown skeptical. The Four Horsemen, invoked consistently around the world to mount assaults against privacy, are child abuse, terrorism, drugs, and money laundering.
Once privacy is defeated, none of those real, compelling, pressing problems get better (well, except money laundering). Lives are not improved. People are not rescued. Well-meaning advocates just move on to the next thing the foes of privacy point them at. Surely it will work this time!
Your heart is in the right place. You have devoted no small part of your time and energy to a deep and genuine blooming of compassion and empathy. It's just perhaps worth considering that others of us might have good reason to be skeptical.
I have to respectfully disagree with that statement and the train of thought unfortunately. However, you should seek legal counsel before proceeding with anything related: the advice from a stranger on the web.
a) You are not in the possession of a mystical secret for some magical curve or lattice. The "bad guys" if they have enough incentive to reverse a compression algorithm (effectively what this is) they will easily do that, if the money is good enough.
b) If we followed the same mentality in the cryptography community we would still be using DES or have a broken AES. It is clear from your post that the area requires some serious boost from the community in terms of algorithms and implementations and architectural solutions. By hiding the laundry we are never going to advance.
Right now this area is not taken seriously enough as it should by the research community -- one of the reasons also being the huge privacy, and illegal search and seizure concerns and disregard of other areas of law most of my peers have. Material such as yours can help attract attention necessary to the problem and showcase how without the help of the community we end up with problematic and harmful measures such as what you imply.
c) I guess you have, but just in the slightest of cases: From what I have read so far and from the implications of the marketing material, I have to advise you to seek legal counsel if you come to the possession of this PhotoDNA material they promised or about your written work. [https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-fede...] Similarly for any trained ML model -- although here it is a disaster in progress still.
There is incredible second-order harm in overreach, because the reaction to it hurts the original cause, too.
If you try to overcorrect, people will overcorrect in response.
The sort of zeal that leads to thoughts like "screeching minority", I think shows carelessness and shortsightedness in the face of very important decisions.
I have no informed opinion on Apple's CSAM tool, beyond deferring to the FotoForensics expert.
> "There is nearly a 1-to-1 relationship between people who deal in CP and people who abuse children. And they rarely victimize just one child. Nearly 1 in 10 children in the US will be sexually abused before the age of 18."
One thing I wondered and have not seen brought up in the discussion so far is this: As far as I understand the perceptual hash solutions work based on existing corpora of abuse material. So, if we improve our detection ability of this existing content, doesn't that increase the pressure on the abusers to produce new content and in consequence hurt even more children? If so, an AI solution that also flags previously unknown abuse material and a lot of human review are probably our only chance. What is your take on this?
Maybe it's the fact that I don't have kids, or that I spend most of my life online with various devices and services. But I would much rather drop the NCMEC, drop any requirement to monitor private messages or photos, reinstate strong privacy guarantees, and instead massively step up monitoring requirements for families. This argument seems like we're using CSAM as a crutch to get at child abusers. If the relationship is really nearly 1:1, it seems more efficient to more closely monitor the groups most likely to be abusers instead.
It even seems to me that going after a database of existing CSAM is counterproductive. With that material, the damage is already done. In a perverse sense, we want as many pedos as possible to buy old CSAM, since this reduces the market for new abuse. It seems to me that initiatives like this do the opposite.
I am not defending CSAM here. But CSAM and child abuse are connected problems, and istm child abuse is the immensely greater one. We should confront child abuse as the first priority, even at the expense of CSAM enforcement, even at the expense of familial privacy. With a rate of 1 in 10, I don't see how not doing so can be ethically defended.
Yes, let's think about the kids, please.
I certainly don't want my children to grow up in an authoritarian surveillance state...
A lot of people allegedly knew about Epstein and he was completely untouched while connected to high ranking politicians. You wouldn't have needed surveillance to identify child abuse and if it had turned up anything, I doubt something had happened. Even with that surveillance implemented, evidence would only be used if politically convenient.
If you are against child abuse, you should add funding to child care. People there will notice more abuse cases when they have the support and funding they need because that means more eyes on a potential problem. An image algorithm is no help.
But it will help all of society by preventing a backdoor from gaining a foothold. If the technology is shown to be ineffective it will help pressure Apple to remove this super dangerous tool.
Once a technical capability is there, governments will force Apple to use it for compliance. It won’t be long before pictures of Winnie the Pooh will be flagged in China.
Would it help activists push for more accurate technology and better management for NCMEC? Would it help technologists come up with better algorithms? I see all kinds of benefits to more openess and accountability here.
Can you give a source for this please? Also by "deal in" do you mean create or view?
I don’t really want to take any specific position on this issue as I don’t have enough context to make a fair assessment of the situation. However, I do want to point out one thing:
By supporting a specific approach to solve a problem, you generally remove some incentives to solve the problem in some other way.
Minted to this situation, I think it would be interesting to ask what are other potential solutions to the problem of child abuse and how effective may they be compared to things like PhotoDNA? Is it the biggest net benefit you could habe or maybe even a net cost to work on this to solve the problem of child abuse?
I don’t have the answer but I think it‘s important to look at the really big picture once in a while. What is it that you want to achieve and is what you are doing really the most effective way of getting that or just something that is „convenient“ or „familiar“ given a set of predefined talking points you didn’t really question?
All the best to you :)
Please lets not invent distorted statistics or quote mouthpieces who has it in their own interest to scare people as much as possible into rash actions just like Apple has done.
I've long held a grudge against Microsoft and NCMEC for not providing this technology, because I live in a country where reporting CSAM is ill-advised if you're not a commercial entity and law enforcement seizes first and asks questions later (_months_ later), so you end up just closing down a service if it turns out to be a problem.
This puts it into perspective. PhotoDNA seems fundamentally broken as a hashing technology, but it works just well enough with a huge NDA to keep people from looking too closely at it.
NCMEC needs a new technology partner. It's a shame they picked Apple, who are likely not going to open up this tech.
Without it, it's only a matter of time until small indie web services (think of the Fediverse) just can't exist in a lot of places anymore.
This is making it worse : because people with an agenda use CP as an excuse to force immoral behavior into us, now child suffering is always associated with bullshit. Those action are hurting the children by supressong the social will to take it seriously.
Stop hurting the children!
I would suggest that the people NCMEC are most enthusiastic to catch know better than to post CSAM in places using PhotoDNA, particularly in a manner that may implicate them. Perhaps I overestimate them.
2. Assuming all that as true, opaque surveillance and the destruction of free, general computing is much worse than child abuse.
I'd say it's the other way around. If freedom dies this time, it might die for good, followed by an "eternity" of totalitarianism. All violence that occured in human history so far combined is nothing compared to what is at stake.
> Free thought requires free media. Free media requires free technology. We require ethical treatment when we go to read, to write, to listen and to watch. Those are the hallmarks of our politics. We need to keep those politics until we die. Because if we don’t, something else will die. Something so precious that many, many of our fathers and mothers gave their life for it. Something so precious, that we understood it to define what it meant to be human; it will die.
-- Eben Moglen
Does CP being available create victims? I'd say that virtually everybody who suddenly saw CP would not have the inclination to abuse a child. I don't believe that availability of CP is the causal factor to child abuse.
But putting aside that and other extremely important slippery slope arguments for a minute about this issue: have you considered that this project may create economic incentives that are inverse of the ostensible goal of protecting more children from becoming victims?
Consider the following. If it becomes en vogue for cloud data operators to scan their customers' photos for known illegal CP images, then the economic incentives created heavily promote the creation of new, custom CP that isn't present in any database. Like many well-intentioned activists, there's a possibility that you may be contributing more to the problem you care about than actually solving it.
I have no doubt that some cases of sexually abused children must have also existed in the environment where I have grown up as a child, in Europe, but I am quite certain that such cases could not have been significantly more than 1 per thousand children.
If the numbers would be really so high in USA, then something should definitely be done to change this, but spying on all people is certainly not the right solution.
After all, surely 99% of uploaders don't hold the copyright for the image they're uploading, so retaining them is on shaky legal grounds to begin with, if you're the kind of person who wants to be in strict compliance with the law - and at the same time, it forces you and your moderators to handle child porn several times a day (not a job I'd envy) and you say you risk a felony conviction.
Wouldn't it be far simpler, and less legally risky, if you didn't retain the images?
It would help those victims who are falsely accused of having child porn on the phone because of a bug.
It would also help those people who is going to be detained because PhotoDNA will be used by dictatorial states to find incriminating material on their phone just as they used Pegasus to spy on journalists, political opponents, etc.
An organization is determined to act like the management wants. If management consists of jerks the organization they lead will always behave accordingly.
A fish rots from the head down…
These are clearly propaganda statistics. There is absolutely no way 10% of the US child population is molested.
The fact that you not only believe this, but repeat it publicly calls into question your judgement and gullibility.
You’ve been recruited to undermine the privacy and security of hundreds of millions (billions?) of people and indoctrinated with utterly ridiculous statistics. Your argument is essentially “the ends justify the means”, and it could not be any more ethically hollow.
Why did you specify "In a few days"?
It is harder to look in the mirror and see something similar happening in the US. In the US, we superficially see government doing it (Snowden disclosures) and then we see corporations doing it separately (Facebook, Google ad tracking, etc...). However, I think government and tech giants are working closely together to act like China. This feels like another bud of this trend.
- Social credit system
- Loss of financial services (PayPal)
- Loss of access to social media (Facebook, Google, Apple, YouTube)
- Loss of access to travel related services (AirBnB, travel ban)
- Banning of material (Amazon)
- Control of media (owned by just a few major corporations who don't have to make money from the media... Comcast basically has a monopoly on land line Internet, AT&T has a very strong position on mobile, Disney has a strong position in films... they own CNN, NBC, and ABC)... EDIT: And let's not forget Fox
You can say all you want about freedom of association, but the effect is similar in China and the US. You are ostracized from the system.
Tech has lost its neutral carrier status and now is connected into a system that enforces consent. I wonder why? Are we being prepared for an economic war? Is this the natural evolution of power seeking power? Is this just a cycle of authoritarianism and liberalism?
P.S. I don't think groundswell upcry leading to cancellation means much. I am much more concerned when corporations do it. I just think they are much, much more powerful.
Child sex abuse seems to have become the excuse to create these heavy handed policies to terminate accounts with no recourse by Google and scanning locally stored photos by Apple. Even receiving a cartoon depicting child sex abuse can get you in trouble.
Hopefully this will be a catalyst to reform the law.
Stopping to that level is what they want, CNN: “‘privacy activists’ have released a tool to allow the spread of CP”
>shadowy government affiliated agency abuses its role of protecting children to install malware on a billion devices
Being a decent enough human, I made many reports to NCMEC. Human verified(me) reports.
Never once did I hear back. Not even some weird auto-reply. Needless to say, I have zero faith in that agency. Fitting they'd get others to do the work.
Would it help anything? Apple isn't using PhotoDNA, so proving PhotoDNA is bad would just be met with "we don't use that".
A post here some days ago (since removed) linked to a google drive containing generated images (which displayed nonsense), the hashes of which matched those of genuine problems images.
https://9to5mac.com/2021/08/06/apple-internal-memo-icloud-ph...
It does say "We know that the days to come will be filled with the screeching voices of the minority."
"Due to how Apple handles cryptography (for your privacy), it is very hard (if not impossible) for them to access content in your iCloud account. Your content is encrypted in their cloud, and they don't have access. If Apple wants to crack down on CSAM, then they have to do it on your Apple device"
I do not believe this is true. Maybe one day it will be true and Apple is planning for it, but right now iCloud service data is encrypted in the sense that they are stored encrypted at rest and in transit, however Apple holds the keys. We know this given that iCloud backups have been surrendered to authorities, and of course you can log into the web variants to view your photos, calendar, etc. Not to mention that Apple has purportedly been doing the same hash checking on their side for a couple of years.
Thus far there has been no compelling answer as to why Apple needs to do this on device.
The CPPA had bans on virtual child porn (e.g. using look-alike adult actresses or CGI), that was overturned by SCOTUS, and then Congress responded with the PROTECT act which tightened up those provisions. These laws on possession are practically unenforceable with modern technology, peer to peer file sharing, onion routing, and encrypted hard drives.
Thus, in order to make them enforcement, the government has to put surveillance at all egress and ingress points of our private/secure enclaves, whether it's at the point of storing it locally, or the point of uploading it to the cloud.
While I agree with the goal of eliminating child porn, should it come at the cost of an omnipresent government surveillance system everywhere? One that could be used for future laws that restrict other forms of content? How about anti-vax imagery? Anti-Semitic imagery? And with other governments of the world watching, especially authoritarian governments, how long until China, which had a similar system with Jingwang Weishi (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jingwang_Weishi) starts asking: hey, can you extend this to Falun Gong, Islamic, Hong Kong resistance, and Tiananmen square imagery? What if Thailand passes a law that requires Apple to scan for images insulting to the Thai Monarch, does Apple comply?
This is a very bad precedent. I liked the Apple that said no to the FBI instead of installing backdoors. I'd prefer if Apple get fined, and battle all the way to the Supreme Court to resist this.
The main problem is that Apple has backdoored my device.
More types of bad images or other files will be scanned since now apple does not have plausible deniablity to defend any of ghe government’x requests.
In the future a false? positive that happened? to be of a political file that crept in the list can pin point people to the future dictator wannabe.
It’s always about the children or terrorism.
I'm glad these issues were addressed in a much more elegant way than I would have put them:
> Apple's technical whitepaper is overly technical -- and yet doesn't give enough information for someone to confirm the implementation. (I cover this type of paper in my blog entry, "Oh Baby, Talk Technical To Me" under "Over-Talk".) In effect, it is a proof by cumbersome notation. This plays to a common fallacy: if it looks really technical, then it must be really good. Similarly, one of Apple's reviewers wrote an entire paper full of mathematical symbols and complex variables. (But the paper looks impressive. Remember kids: a mathematical proof is not the same as a code review.)
> Apple claims that there is a "one in one trillion chance per year of incorrectly flagging a given account". I'm calling bullshit on this.
I'm not sure, after reading the article, who is/has the most insane system of Apple or NCMEC.
Surely Apple's lawyers have also reviewed the same law, and if it's that clearly defined, how did they justify/explain their approach?
And the line where the law is crossed is fuzzy. Say you use an AI classifier, at what accuracy is validating the results of that AI a crime? 50.000001%?
When I worked telecom, we had md5sum database to check for this type of content. If you emailed/sms/uploaded a file with the same md5sum, your account was flagged and sent to legal to confirm it.
Also if a police was involved, the account was burned to dvd in the datacenter, and only a police officer would touch the dvd, no engineer touched or saw the evidence. (Chain of Evidence maintained)
Prob changed since I haven't worked in telecom in 15 years, but one thing I've read for years, is the feds knew who these people are, where they hang out online, even ran the some of the honeypots. The problem is they leave these sites up to catch the ring leaders, the feds are aware, they have busts almost every month of rings of criminals. Twitter has had accounts reported, and they stay up for years.
I dont think finding the criminals are the problem, seems like every time this happens, theres been people of interest for years, just not enough law enforcement dedicated to investigating this.
All the defund the police, I think moving some police from traffic duty to Internet crimes would be more of an impact on actual cases being closed. Those crimes lead to racketeering and other organized crime anyways.
Not a lawyer, but I believe this part about legality is inaccurate, because they aren’t copying your photos without notice. The feature is not harvesting suspect photos from a device, it is attaching data to all photos before they are uploaded to Apple’s servers. If you’re not using iCloud Photos, the feature will not be activated. Furthermore, they’re not knowingly transferring CSAM, because the system is designed only to notify them when a certain “threshold” of suspect images has been crossed.
In this way it’s identical in practice to what Google and Facebook are already doing with photos that end up on their servers, they just run the check before the upload instead of after. I certainly have reservations about their technique here, but this argument doesn’t add up to me.
Is there even any evidence that arresting people with the wrong bit pattern on the computer helps stop child rape/trafficking? If so, why aren't we also going after people who go to gore websites? There's tons of awful material out there easily accessible of people getting stabbed, shot, murdered, butchered, etc. Do we not want to find people who are keeping collections of this material on their computers? And if so, what about people who really like graphic horror movies like Saw or Hostel? Obviously it's not real violence, but it's definitely close enough, and if you like watching that stuff, maybe you should be on a list? If your neighbor to the left of you has videos of naked children, and your neighbor to the right has videos of people getting stabbed and tortured to death, only one should be arrested and put on a list?
This is all not even taking into account that someone might not even realize they are in possession of CP because someone else put it on their device. I've heard there's tons of services marketing on the dark net where you pay someone $X00 in bitcoin and they remotely upload CP to any target's computer.
It seems like we are going down a very scary and dangerous path.
We went through this 20+ years ago when US companies then couldn't export "strong" encryption (being stronger than 40 bits if you can believe that). Even at the time that was ridiculously low.
We then moved onto cryptographic back doors, which seem like a good idea but aren't for the obvious reason that if a backdoor exists, it will be exploited by someone you didn't intend or used by an authorized party in an unintended way (parallel construction anyone?).
So these photos exist on Apple servers but what they're proposing, if I understand it correctly, is that that data will no longer be protected on their servers. That is, human review will be required in some cases. By definition that means the data can be decrypted. Of course it'll be by (or intended to be by) authorized individuals using a secured, audited system.
But a backdoor now exists.
Also, what controls exist on those who have to review the material? What if it's a nude photo of an adult celebrity? How confident are we that someone can't take a snap of that on their own phone and sell it or distribute it online? It doesn't have to be a celebrity either of course.
Here's another issue: in some jurisdictions it's technically a case of distributing CSAM to have a naked photo of yourself (if you're underage) on your own phone. It's just another overly broad, badly written statute thrown together in the hysteria of "won't anybody think of the children?" but it's still a problem.
Will Apple's system identify such photos and lead to people getting prosecuted for their own photos?
What's next after this? Uploading your browsing history to see if you visit any known CSAM trafficking sites or view any such material?
This needs to be killed.
Right now Apple’s biggest unhappy user is the DOJ. As it stands with the legislation coming down the pipe and both previous administrations building on a keenness to ‘get something done’ about big tech, Apple will do as they’ve done in China and ‘obey the laws in each jurisdiction.’
Right now there are a lot of unwritten laws that say Apple better play right or lose quite a bit more —
So, how it’s getting done is a side show.
That said, it wasn’t long ago that they stood toe to toe with the FBI —- but there also weren’t wonderfully strong ‘sanctions’ on the horizon.
Then they wouldn't be the governing body. By definition the governing body does not obey the people; they govern the people.
>As noted, Apple says that they will scan your Apple device for CSAM material. If they find something that they think matches, then they will send it to Apple. The problem is that you don't know which pictures will be sent to Apple.
It's iCloud Photos. Apple has explicitly said it's iCloud photos. If it's being synced to iCloud Photos, you know it's getting scanned one way or another (server side, currently, or client side, going forward).
It notes privacy issues, but... iCloud syncs by default. You wouldn't do the kind of work they're talking about (e.g, investigation) and store that kind of material where it could be synced to a server to begin with.
Everyone keeps proclaiming that Apple is scanning your entire device, but that's not what's happening with this change. It's not even comparable to A/V in this respect - it would be a very different story if that was the case. The wording and explanation matters.
It is insane that using perceptual hashes is likely illegal. As the hashes are actually somewhat reversible and so possession of the hash is a criminal offence. It just shows how twisted up in itself the law is in this area.
One independent image analysis service should not be beating reporting rates of major service providers. And NCMEC should not be acting like detection is a trade secret. Wider detection and reporting is the goal.
And the law as setup prevents developing detection methods. You cannot legally check the results of your detection (which Apple are doing), as that involves transmitting the content to someone other than the NCMEC!
Yes, it's a "failure" of a "private" Non(lol, technically, wink wink) Governmental Organization who works extremely closely with the FBI to put their camel-shaped nose under the very tent that the FBI happens to have been trying to breach for 20+ years.
Come on. It's beyond gullibility, at this point, to believe that NCMEC isn't an arm of the Feeb. Specifically, it's an arm that isn't required to comply with FOIA requests, which is particularly convenient.
Two years. At the current rate, you have approximately two years until the Feeb have full access to your iDevice. Though, I will admit, Apple's development of the SEP, their high-priced bug bounties, and their convincing play-acting at defying the FBI after the San Bernardino case definitely had me fooled.
We probably should have been more keen after they failed to close the bugs that GreyKey et. al. exploited.
But now we know. Everything they gave to China, they will give doubly so to their own corporate domicile.
It feels to me like they want to hide their detection algorithms so people don't find out how bad they are.
For me the risk is much more that through some mechanism outside my control real CSAM material becomes present on my device. Whether its a dodgy web site, a spam email, a successful hack attempt or something else like that, I feel like there's a significant chance some day I'll end up with this stuff injected onto my phone without me knowing. So I'm not at all concerned about the technical capacity to accurately match to CP etc. In fact I'm even more worried if its really accurate because then I know when this unfortunate event happens I face a huge risk of being immediately flagged before I even know about the content and then spending years extricating myself from a ruined reputation and a legal system that treats evidence like this with far more trust than it should have.
I also have notifications off on it and check it when I need to.
All this needs is someone forwarding me something that’s in the DB.
My phone is not mine. nor is the data on it. nor is yours. That’s the real state of computer security today.
all of this is ill conceived.
The day someone chooses to mass release their worms on iPhone will be a wake up call.
Apple has built the system to scan your entire phone, their claims about its limited scope are suspect.
This process is automated and turned on on most iPhones. Most iPhones will have automatic photo upload to icloud enabled, and that's when this scanning takes place.
Perhaps this is just the benefit of longevity but from my POV it was engineer early adoption and advocacy that made Apple, Google Search etc what they are, and it will be engineer early adoption and advocacy that dethrones these problematic companies from controlling the ecosystem..
Back 20 years ago, before the community filled with $_$ dollars-struck startup founders, software was built by people who wanted to use it.. rather than sell it. There are still some people doing this now, Look at Matrix network for instance.
What will it take for a grass-roots software industry to start building privacy-first apps and systems that don't suck, based on decentralised, distributed principles? We have the skills to build highly polished alternatives to these things, but it takes a determination to step away from convenience for a period of time for the sake of privacy.
How bad does it have to get before the dev community realise this? or are we in a frog boiling slowly scenario and it's hopeless?
Namely the “1-in-a-trillion” false positives per account per year is based on the likelihood of multiple photos matching the database (Apple doesn’t say how many are required to trip their manual screening threshold).
A user might store multiple variants or near-duplicates of the same image on their client. In our language, this means that a single client could hold two triples (y,id,ad) and (y,id′,ad) that have same hash y, but different identifiers. This causes an issue that is addressed outside of the cryptographic protocol. Suppose a user copies a single image from a USB drive onto his or her device. The image will be assigned an identifier id. Later the user copies the same image from the USB drive onto a different client device. The new copy of the image will be assigned a new identifier id′ which is likely to be different from id. Because the two copies have different identifiers they will count twice towards the tPSI-AD threshold. In particular, the two triples will cause two distinct Shamir shares to be sent to the sever, even though they correspond to the same semantic image. Several solutions to this were considered, but ultimately, this issue is addressed by a mechanism outside of the cryptographic protocol. [0]
[0]: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Apple_PSI_System_Secu...
0: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2252A#:~:text=(d)...
Yes. That is an analogy only with Apple's software but not hardware. In Apple's view they are selling you the experience. So they are more like Hotels, You dont own the hotel room, the bed, the TV or anything inside that room. And in a Hotel, they can do Room Cleaning anytime they want.
This is always the terrifying part for me. They will access your personal photos or data without telling you. I’m surprised how is that even legal given all the law that are already available. Are they immune to those laws stated in thd blog?
Also what happens when they launch this in EU, AU, etc with different privacy laws?
Also, this only applies to pictures you upload to iCloud. So, it's not like they're accessing your personal photos without telling you.
[1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
Likewise the copyright issue; The user has already sent these files to Apple themselves by enabling iCloud photo library, and Apple are not making any additional copies that I am aware of.
It also says "The problem is that you don't know which pictures will be sent to Apple." - but we do know exactly which pictures will and will not be sent to apple; the ones that are already sent by iCloud Photo library.
[To be clear, I don't like the precedent/slippery slope that this kind of technique might lead towards in the future, but it doesn't seem like all the criticisms of it today are valid]
> If Apple wants to crack down on CSAM, then they have to do it on your Apple device.
I don’t understand… Apple can’t change their TOS but they can install this scanning service on your device?
Why not... has anyone actually successfully sued a company for changing their ToS from under them?
You can buy a SIM card and send images to your enemies/competitors through WhatsApp, and these images automatically gets downloaded to iPhone and potentially uploaded to iCloud.
What precautions are Apple taking against such actions? Or will it be some kind of exploitable implementation where you can easily swat any person you want and let them go to courts to prove their innocence?
I think the article is wrong about this. Or, right-but-situationally-irrelevant. As far as I can tell from Apple's statements, they're doing this only to photos which are being uploaded to iCloud Photos. So, any photo this is happening to is one that you've already asked Apple to copy to their servers.
> In this case, Apple has a very strong reason to believe they are transferring CSAM material, and they are sending it to Apple -- not NCMEC.
I also suspect this is a fuzzy area, and anything legal would depend on when they can actually be said to be certain there's illegal material involved.
Apple's process seems to be: someone has uploaded photos to iCloud and enough of their photos have tripped this system that they get a human review; if the human agrees it's CSAM, they forward it on to law enforcement. There is a chance of false positives, so the human review step seems necessary...
After all, "Apple has hooked up machine learning to automatically report you to the police for child pornograpy with no human review" would have been a much worse news week for Apple. :D
Presumably to implement E2E encryption, while at the same time helping the NCMEC to push for legislation to make it illegal to offer E2E encryption without this backdoor.
Apple users would be slightly better off than the status quo, but worse off than if Apple simply implemented real E2E without backdoors, and everyone else's privacy will be impacted by the backdoors that the NCMEC will likely push.
It isn’t a back door to E2E encryption. It can’t even be used to search for a specific image on a person’s device.
It could be used possibly to find a collection of images that are not CSAM but are disliked by the state, assuming Apple is willing to enter into a conspiracy with NCMEC.
> [Revised; thanks CW!] Apple's iCloud service encrypts all data, but Apple has the decryption keys and can use them if there is a warrant. However, nothing in the iCloud terms of service grants Apple access to your pictures for use in research projects, such as developing a CSAM scanner. (Apple can deploy new beta features, but Apple cannot arbitrarily use your data.) In effect, they don't have access to your content for testing their CSAM system. > If Apple wants to crack down on CSAM, then they have to do it on your Apple device.
(which also doesn't really make sense, if the iCloud ToS don't grant Apple the necessary rights to do CSAM scanning there, they could just revise it, however, I think they probably have the rights they need already)
"Security and Fraud Prevention. To protect individuals, employees, and Apple and for loss prevention and to prevent fraud, including to protect individuals, employees, and Apple for the benefit of all our users, and prescreening or scanning uploaded content for potentially illegal content, including child sexual exploitation material."
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/
Under "Apple's Use of Personal Data". They had that in there since at least 2019.
Add that an Apple executive told congress two years ago that Apple scans iCloud data for CSAM.
I also question the value of e2e there’s an arbitrary scanner that can send back the unencrypted files if it finds a match. If apple’s servers controls the db with “hashes” to match then is it all that different from apple’s servers holding the decryption keys?
Sure e2e still prevents routine large scale surveillance but at the end of the day if apple (or someone that forced apple) wants your data, they’ll get it.
That's my suspicion too, but has it actually been confirmed?
"You scratch my back and I scratch yours". Apple doesn't want to go through an antitrust lawsuit that will kill their money printer so they kowtow with these favors.
It doesn't matter anyway, end to end cryptography is meaningless if someone you don't trust owns one of the ends (and in this case, Apple owns both.)
"The trouble with fighting for human freedom is that one spends most of one's time defending scoundrels. For it is against scoundrels that oppressive laws are first aimed, and oppression must be stopped at the beginning if it is to be stopped at all." — HL Mencken
I have objections to this tool and have many of the same concerns expressed in these comments, but your example seems like a bit of a corner case compared to the broader "government panopticon" problem.
CP is rape porn. People who produce or knowingly distribute actual rape porn (of children or adults) should be going to jail for 25+ years. I would not rule out life for extreme cases that also involve other forms of abuse.
Yet as far as I know this isn’t what is being pushed for. Instead we get a dragnet to try to catch low level offenders who will probably barely see prison because sex crimes are just not punished much in our society.
Secondly… look into some of the people who have set up fake CP honey pots. These have included both vigilantes and security researchers trying to get a sense of how much CP is on Tor. Turns out most of these people are imbeciles and catching them is easy. Why don’t police do this more? Because… well… as I said sex crimes are just not a priority.
I really feel like the whole argument is in bad faith. If they really cared about the children there are so many other things that would be both easier and more effective.
> Levin was ultimately nabbed conversing with police officers posing as single moms. He encouraged them to sexually abuse their kids and in some cases shared photos. [1]
> In one case, Levin sent photographs to a New Zealand police officer, one showing a “close-up of the face of a crying child, her face smeared with black makeup.” Levin suggested to her the image was “hot,” according to parole board documents. Another photo he sent showed a young female bound and leashed, with a gag in her mouth and Levin commented, “Mmm, so hot to imagine a mother doing that to her girl to please her lover.” [1]
> On May 29, 2015, he was sentenced to three years in prison. He only spent 3 months of his sentence in jail before being paroled [2]
[1] https://torontosun.com/2017/10/07/ex-deputy-education-minist... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Levin_(academic)
Lots of rape porn is produced by women, for women. Typically novels, and sometimes graphic novels.
It’s legal, and definitely not something that takes with it a 25+ year sentence.
You can literally find rape porn on Amazon bookshelves. Literally.
What it looks like to me is that Apple is planning on releasing end-to-end encryption for iCloud. But they know that whenever E2EE comes up, people get mad that terrorists, child molesters, and mass shooters can hide their data and communications. Hell, they've been painted as the villain when they say they can't unlock iPhones for the FBI. This heads off those concerns for the most common out of those crimes.
> Think of it this way: Your landlord owns your property, but in the United States, he cannot enter any time he wants. In order to enter, the landlord must have permission, give prior notice, or have cause. Any other reason is trespassing. Moreover, if the landlord takes anything, then it's theft. Apple's license agreement says that they own the operating system, but that doesn't give them permission to search whenever they want or to take content.
This viewpoint is like thanking your landlord for warning you that they are going to enter your home and root through your private items, all in the name of some greater good. Let's not spin it as if the landlord is doing us a favor in this scenario.
This is Gruber's optimistic take on it as well. If so, why not make both changes at once? Given that they've walked back E2EE on iCloud before, I'm not holding my breath.
But in that case it would much more likely be a crime, it would certainly cost them a tremendous amount of good will.
Your personal computing device is a trusted agent. You cannot use the internet without it, and esp. in lockdown you likely can't realistically live your life without use of the internet. You share with it your most private information, more so even than you do with your other trusted agents like your doctor or lawyers (whom you likely communicate with using the device). Its operation is opaque to you: you're just forced to trust it. As such your device ethically owes you a duty to act in your best interest, to the greatest extent allowed by the law. -- not unlike your lawyers obligation to act in your interest.
Apple is reprogramming customer devices, against the will of many users (presumably at the cost of receiving necessary fixes and security updates if you decline) to make it betray that trust and compromise the confidentiality of the device's user/owner.
The fact that Apple is doing it openly makes it worse in the sense that it undermines your legal recourse for the betrayal. The only recourse people have is the one you see them exercising in this thread: Complaining about it in public and encouraging people to abandon apple products.
E2EE should have been standard a decade ago, certainly since the Snowden revelations. No doubt apple seeks to gain a commercial advantage by simultaneously improving their service while providing some pretextual dismissal of child abuse concerns. But this gain comes at the cost of deploying and normalizing an automated surveillance infrastructure, one which undermines their product's ethical duty to their customers, and one that could be undetectable retasked to enable genocide by being switched to match on images associated with various religions, ethniticities, or political ideologies.
The mechanism doesn’t scan anything except images, and won’t trigger on a single bad image - only a set.
Yes, that set could be something other than child porn, assuming Apple and NCMEC conspire, but this is not a general purpose backdoor.
Isn't that the shtick with Apple though? That they own the devices you rent and you don't have to worry too much about it. They always had the backdoor in place, they used it for software updates. Now they will also use it for another thing.
You didn't need to worry about it because they did a sufficiently good job at making the choices for you. This is a sign that they stopped doing so.
An appropriate metaphor might be a secretary. They can handle a lot of busy work for you so you don't have to worry about it, but they need access to your calendar, mails etc. to do so. This is not an intrusion as long as they work on your favor. If you suddenly find your mails on the desk of your competitor, though, you might reconsider. That, however, does not mean that the whole idea of a secretary is flawed.
As a disclaimer, I haven't done the actual math here. This also implies that the risk of your account getting flagged falsely is tightly related to how many images you upload.
> Perhaps Apple is basing their "1 in 1 trillion" estimate on the number of bits in their hash? With cryptographic hashes (MD5, SHA1, etc.), we can use the number of bits to identify the likelihood of a collision. If the odds are "1 in 1 trillion", then it means the algorithm has about 40 bits for the hash. However, counting the bit size for a hash does not work with perceptual hashes.
> With perceptual hashes, the real question is how often do those specific attributes appear in a photo. This isn't the same as looking at the number of bits in the hash. (Two different pictures of cars will have different perceptual hashes. Two different pictures of similar dogs taken at similar angles will have similar hashes. And two different pictures of white walls will be almost identical.)
> With AI-driven perceptual hashes, including algorithms like Apple's NeuralHash, you don't even know the attributes so you cannot directly test the likelihood. The only real solution is to test by passing through a large number of visually different images. But as I mentioned, I don't think Apple has access to 1 trillion pictures.
> What is the real error rate? We don't know. Apple doesn't seem to know. And since they don't know, they appear to have just thrown out a really big number. As far as I can tell, Apple's claim of "1 in 1 trillion" is a baseless estimate. In this regard, Apple has provided misleading support for their algorithm and misleading accuracy rates.
No, because they’re not identifying content, they’re matching it against a set of already-known CSAM that NCMEC maintains. As you go on to say, telecoms and other companies already do this. Apple just advanced the state of the art when it comes to the security and privacy guarantees involved.
Apple just opened the door for constant searches of your digital devices. If you think it will stop at CSAM you have never read a history book - the single biggest user of UKs camera system originally intended for serious crimes are housing councils checking to see who didn't clean up after their dog.
https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initia...
(No, not arresting parents over bath time.)
> Will Apple actually flatly refuse any and all such demands? If they do, it’s all good. If they don’t, and these features creep into surveillance for things like political dissent, copyright infringement, LGBT imagery, or adult pornography — anything at all beyond irrefutable CSAM — it’ll prove disastrous to Apple’s reputation for privacy protection. The EFF seems to see such slipping down the slope as inevitable.
What seems to be missing from this discussion is that Apple is already doing these scans on the iCloud photos they store. Therefore, the slippery slope scenario is already a threat today. What’s stopping Apple from acquiescing to a government request to scan for political content right now, or in any of the past years iCloud photos has existed? The answer is they claim not to and their customers believe them. Nothing changes when the scanning moves on device, though, as the blog mentions, I suspect this is a precursor to allowing more private data in iCloud backups that Apple cannot decrypt even when ordered to.
The idea that standard moderation steps are a felony is such a stretch. Almost all the major players have folks doing content screening and management - and yes, this may invovle the provider transmitting / copying etc images that are then flagged and moderated away.
The idea that this is a felony is rediculous.
The other piece is that folks are making a lot of assumptions about how this works, then claiming things are felonies.
Does it not strain credibility slightly that apple, with it's team of lawyers, has decided to instead of blocking CASM to commit CASM felonies? And the govt is going to bust them for this? Really? They are doing what govt wants and using automation to drive down the number of images someone will look at and what even might get transferred to apple's servers in the first place.
And when they’re notified, Apple manually checks (a modified but legible version of) the images.
Why is it like this? Why are we not jailing people who enjoy watching gore?
[1]http://www.princeton.edu/~sociolog/pdf/asmith1.pdf
[2]https://davetannenbaum.github.io/documents/Implicit%20Purita...
[3]https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/478/832/RUG01-0024788...
For example, the main system in discussion never sends the image to Apple, only a "visual proxy", and furthermore, it only aims to identify known (previously cataloged) CSAM.
There's a [good primer of this on Daring Fireball](https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initia...)
Apple has always had the decryption keys for encrypted photos stored in iCloud, so this isn't new. They never claimed that your photos were end-to-end encrypted. I'm not sure how this is a "backdoor" unless you think there's a risk of either something like AES getting broken or Apple storing the keys in a way that's insecure, both of which seem unlikely to me.
>Also, what controls exist on those who have to review the material? What if it's a nude photo of an adult celebrity? How confident are we that someone can't take a snap of that on their own phone and sell it or distribute it online? It doesn't have to be a celebrity either of course.
I'm equally interested in the review process. But while perceptual hash collisions are possible, it seems unlikely that multiple random nude photos on the same device would almost exactly match known CSAM content, which is the threshold for Apple reviewing the content.
No, no, no. As has been said a billion times by now, this system matches copies of specific CSAM photographs in the NCMEC’s database.
Now that the technology is on-board the device, how many lines of codes do you think it will take to scan the full photo-roll?
Do you think that this ability will not tempt LEA, law makers, governments, to push for that ever-so-small change to the code, either for blanket monitoring (see if China is not tempted, using their own database of "illegal" content) or for targetted monitoring (some specific users, with or without valid court orders).
The main issue is that the wall has been breached: monitoring data that was otherwise only on-device is now possible with little to no change as the feature is now embedded in the OS.
You can argue we're not there yet and can trust Apple to do-the-right-thing and that the Rule of Law will protect citizen against abuse, but that's a big step into a worrying trend, and not all countries follow the Rule of Law and have checks and balances to avoid misuse. Don't forget that Apple abides by the laws of countries where it sells its devices. That means they will -forced or not- do what they are told.
Yes, which is what I was saying in my comment. If or when it comes to Apple changing this then I would agree it's a battle worth fighting, but that is not what is happening here and that is not what I was correcting in this article itself.
>The main issue is that the wall has been breached:
The wall was breached when we opted to run proprietary OS systems. You have zero clue what is going on in that OS and whether it's reporting; you have to trust the vendor on some level and Apple is being fairly transparent here. I would be far more worried if they did this without saying anything at all.
The only change necessary to scan other files is changing a path and that's configuration that could even be silently done per-device.
It's a proprietary OS. This literally could exist already and you would have zero clue.
You misunderstand the purpose of the human review by Apple.
The human review is not due to false positives: The system is designed to have an extremely low rate of hits where the entry isn't in the database and the review invades your privacy regardless of who does it.
The human review exists to legitimize an otherwise unlawful search via a loophole.
The US Government (directly or through effective agencies like NCMEC) is barred from searching or inspecting your private communications without a warrant.
Apple, by virtue of your contractual relationship with them, is free to do so-- so long as they are not coerced to do so by the government. When Apple reviews your communications and finds what they believe to be child porn they're then required to report it and because the government is merely repeating a search that apple already (legally) performed, no warrant is required.
So, Apple "reviews" the hits because, per the courts, if they just sent automated matches without review that wouldn't be sufficient to avoid the need for a warrant.
The extra review step does not exist to protect your privacy: The review itself deprives you of your privacy. The review step exists to suppress your fourth amendment rights.
This is basically fearmongering, and saying "if you're not a pedo, you have nothing to fear", installing the tech on all phones, and then using that tech to find the next wikileaks leaker (who was the first person with this photo), trump supporters (just add the trump-beats-cnn-gif to the hashes), anti-china protesters (winnie the pooh photos), etc.
This is basically like forcing everyone to "voluntarily" record inside of their houses, AI on that camera would then recognise drugs, and only those recordings will be sent to the police.
On which note... it really does seem to be voluntary, as there's an easy opt-out of the process in the form of "not using iCloud Photos". Or Google Photos, or assorted other services, which apparently all do similar scanning.
Yes, there's a slippery-slope argument here, but the actual service-as-it-exists-today really does seem scoped to a cautious examination of possible child porn that's being uploaded to Apple's servers.
They could literally do this right now server-side and nobody would ever know.
The techno-legal framework is worse than just "reversing the hashes is possible". You could brute force creation of matching images using a cloud service or online chat as an "oracle".
They enjoy being “unquestionable”/above being audited.
I expect they will simply become P2P E2EE darknets eventually, meaning there won't really be a "service" anymore. Matrix already has E2EE and is actively working towards P2P.
Another reason is that basic material needed to conduct this research (child porn) is legally toxic to posses. Sure, there are ways around that for sufficiently motivated researchers. But if you are a CS researcher, you have a lot of research oppurtunities that do not involve any of that risk or overhead.
I highly doubt that with how each photo is 10+MB and Apple only gives an abysmal 5GB of free iCloud storage, which includes everything else. My iphone 6s backups got to 4.5gb on their own years ago, turning off photo storage was the only way to avoid paying for iCloud storage outright.
Lots of people had this problem back in the 60s. Funny - except that some guys were jailed or worse because of it.
Unfortunately not fast enough, so some banks got away with the first year or two worth of loot due to statutes of limitations, but it's now clear that companies can't just change material parts of the ToS without explicit, active consent (it's not enough to notify customers and consider it agreement if they don't do anything).
Not really. Two points:
1) Many / all CP boards these days ask applicants to provide CSAM (as police in almost all jurisdictions except for IIRC US and Australia are banned from bringing CSAM into circulation). And to keep police where allowed from simply re-uploading stuff, they (as well as the "client base") demand new, yet-unseen stuff, and so no matter what the police is doing there will always be pressure for new content.
2) The CSAM detection on popular sites only hits people dumb enough to upload CSAM to Instagram, Facebook and the likes. Granted, the consumer masses are dumb and incompetent at basic data security, but ... uhh, for lack of a better word, experienced CSAM consumers know after decades of busts that they need to keep their stashes secure - aka encrypted disks.
> If so, an AI solution that also flags previously unknown abuse material and a lot of human review are probably our only chance. What is your take on this?
There are other chances to prevent CSA that don't risk damaging privacy, and all of them aim at the early stages - preventing abuse from happening:
1) teach children already in early school years about their body and about consent. This one is crucial - children who haven't learned that it is not normal that Uncle Billy touches their willy won't report it! - but unfortunately, conservatives and religious fundamentalists tend to blast any such efforts as "early sexualization", "gay propaganda" and whatnot.
2) provide resources for (potential) committers of abuse. In Germany, we have the "Kein Täter werden" network that provides help, but many other countries don't have anything even remotely similar.
3) Screening of staff and volunteers in trust / authority positions dealing with children (priests and other clergy, school and pre-school/kindergarten teachers, sports club trainers) against CSA convictions. Unfortunately, this is ... not followed thoroughly very often and in some cases (cough Catholic Church) the institutions actively attempt to cover up CSA cases, protect perps and simply shuffle staff around the country or in some cases across the world.
> I believe it would because other image systems will probably have to make similar implementations and trade offs that PhotoDNA did.
Even if that's the case, that's too subtle of a point to be very effective, and you'll have all kinds of PR people (Apple and otherwise) selling the "we don't use that [so those criticisms don't apply to us]" narrative.
There are a handful of hashing methods in papers, and each can have its parameters tuned, again making trade offs for things like efficiency or accuracy.
Then when it comes to efficient searching through hashes for matches and fuzzy matches, there are common algorithms and data structures used across perceptual hashing systems, each with with their own trade offs, implementation details and parameters that can be tuned.
If there's an issue with PhotoDNA that doesn't come down to a poor implementation, then there's a good chance that other systems might have met the same pitfalls they did. And if it comes down to a poor implementation, it would be prudent for operators of other systems to make sure their own systems don't make the same mistakes.
It also seems to be the kind of thing that is hard to measure.
What makes you say it’s hard to measure? The definitions are pretty clear cut.
It is way more commonplace than you would like to think.
The people merely avoiding the tainted products aren't on blast here.
Pls have a family first and then see if you ask for more state governence into your life?
It is true, most abuse happens in the family, but there is also schools, churches, sports clubs, ...
But the thing is, if the schools for example would have the stuff, with enough time (and empathy) to care about the actual children and talk with them and interact with them (and not mainly the paperwork about them) - then you could easily spot abuse everywhere and take action.
But they usually don't, so you have traumatized children coming into another hostile and cold environment called public school, where they just stonewall again and learn to hide their wounds and scars.
Child abuse is a complex problem, with no simple solution. But I prefer a more human focused solution amd not just another surveillance stepup.
Child abuseres also do not fall from the sky. If you pay more attention to them while they are young - you can spot it and help them, while they need help, before they turn into creepy monsters.
"Whoever spares the rod hates their children, but the one who loves their children is careful to discipline them."
https://www.bibleref.com/Proverbs/13/Proverbs-13-24.html
This is the ideological base for it, in my opinion. Unchecked authoritive power tpgether with physical violence. The thing is, the state institutions have not really a clean record on abuse either.
And I did not say anything about excluding the family from monitoring of abuse. I said I see no reason to increase the monitoring. With the meassure in place right now, you could spot plenty of abuse already everywhere - if it would be really about the children.
No easy problem, no easy solution.
My impression is that the abuse is easily spotted, and paperwork done, but that often not much comes of it. We (USA) don't actually seem to have very good systems for handling things once they're discovered, partly (largely?) due to lack of resources.
It might simply be truthful. And if the author is proud of that, it is both irrelevant and perfectly okay. Let's focus on the facts and arguments relevant to the article, not personal attacks.
When it comes to governments being able to pressure them into being more invasive, nothing has changed with this update. If a government wanted to poison the CSAM database, they could have already. You'd end up reported when the server does the scanning. If the government wanted to expand scanning to include things that you're not uploading, they already could have asked Apple to do that. It would have been possible to silently add a much simpler scanning mechanism or data exfiltration into an update.
This isn't a spin to say anyone is doing us a favor. iCloud should be end-to-end encrypted and there shouldn't be any scanning at all. But why should that opinion on how we should treat privacy be taken as the only valid opinion? The people who do want the scanning are not simply asking for it because they are stupid or uninformed. Instead they put different weights into what they value.
This is a way to root them out and report them to law enforcement.
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/20/563889510/preventing-police-b...
My point about visual proxies was in reference to the OP's point:
> Also, what controls exist on those who have to review the material? What if it's a nude photo of an adult celebrity? How confident are we that someone can't take a snap of that on their own phone and sell it or distribute it online? It doesn't have to be a celebrity either of course.
I never said that a visual proxy/derivitive wasn't CSAM.
I assume your point had something to do with the legality of sending this data to Apple for review?
I'm not a lawyer, and I have read that NCMEC is the only entity with a legal carve out for possessing CSAM, but if FB and Google already have teams of reviewers for this type of material and other abuse images, I imagine there must be a legal way for this type of review to take place. I mean, these were all images that were being uploaded to iCloud anyway.
We’ve already seen this mission creep in action. One of the technologies originally built to scan and hash child sexual abuse imagery has been repurposed to create a database of “terrorist” content [2] that companies can contribute to and access for the purpose of banning such content. The database, managed by the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) [3], is troublingly without external oversight, despite calls from civil society [4]. While it’s therefore impossible to know whether the database has overreached, we do know that platforms regularly flag critical content [5] as “terrorism,” including documentation of violence and repression, counterspeech, art, and satire.
[1]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-diff...
[2]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/one-database-rule-them...
[3]: https://gifct.org/
[4]: https://cdt.org/insights/human-rights-ngos-in-coalition-lett...
[5]: https://www.eff.org/wp/caught-net-impact-extremist-speech-re...
I agree that has potential for abuse but it doesn't seem to explain what the actual link is to NCMEC. It just says "One of the technologies originally built to scan and hash child sexual abuse imagery has been repurposed..." but doesn't name this "technology". Is it talking about PhotoDNA?
I understand very broad stuff might be sold as "helping to fight child abuse" while avoiding talking about the full scope, but that isn't what Apple/NCMEC are doing here. They are making quite explicit claims about the scope.
That's why I'm wondering if there is precedent for claims about "we will ONLY use this for CSAM" which were later backtracked.
However, I find this risk exaggerated because if someone actually does this, you can just block the app’s ability to access your camera roll in the privacy settings or stop using the app. And report the user to the service, of course.
We will see.
... but I'm not sure that would apply here, especially if Apple has a pop-up that the user dismissed a long time ago.
How would this let them search for a subversive PDF?
It wouldn’t. This is just fearmongering.
> The result would be a total loss of privacy, basically Apple is privatising mass surveillance with that. Without oversight, no matter how small, or accountability.
You are talking about an imagined system someone could build in the future, not the system Apple has put in place.
1) Someone can't just randomly review one of your images. The implementation is built on threshold secret sharing, so the visual derivative can't be reviewed (is cryptographically secure) unless you hit the threshold of matched content.
2) You're uploading these files to iCloud, which is currently not end-to-end encrypted. So these photos can be reviewed in the current iCloud regime.
1) Still, I'm unable to audit this protocol which has a threshold I'm not allowed to know. It also always comes back to control over the "hash" DB. If you can add anything to it (as apple could), then the threshold part becomes more trivial.
2) My understanding was that they currently don't but perhaps I'm incorrect. I know for a fact that they give access to law enforcement if there's a subpoena however. Also, there is a difference in terms of building in local scanning functionality. When it's done on their server, they can only ever access what I have sent. Otherwise, the line is much fuzzier (even if the feature promises to only scan iCloud photos).
“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies.
The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep ,his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.
They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the same time likelier to make a Hell of earth. This very kindness stings with intolerable insult. To be "cured" against one's will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level of those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals.” C.S. Lewis
There are so many problems with this feature :
- it can easily be used to identify also other types of dangerous material such as warnings against government activity or posters of organized protests
- some malicious actor can send you this kind of content in order to get you in trouble
- false positives
- moral busy bodying (your employer not agreeing with you going drinking sunday night)
Honestly, it feels like we're about to enter a new age of surveillance. Client-side surveillance.
Once the technology exists it will be abused.
But time has shown that an initial good concept will transform into something worse.
We have a very recent example with Corona contact-tracing apps, that law enforcement in multiple democratic countries are now using for other purposes.
So no, we should not allow this client-side scanning to go through, it will not end well.
Perhaps even worse. They move on to some ML based detection that uploads suspected CP that is not in the database. Most people have no idea how bad a false accusation can destroy their lives. Even if you are 100% innocent there is already a formal government case against you. At the very least you will be compelled to hire a very expensive attorney to handle the matter for you. After all you cant risk a budget attorney with a huge caseload to handle this potential life sentence case. Not to mention that during this time you will possible be locked out of accounts,finances, put on leave from employment, banned from hiring, banned from assistance programs. Perhaps even posted in the media as a sex offender.
Do we know this for sure? And even if it is, this is still apparently illegal under current law.
Perceptual hashes are just integer/byte encodings of images that were scaled down and had some transformations applied to them.
If you convert a hash into an array of pixels and reverse the transformations, you'll get some of the original image that was scaled down and hashed.
Also the > x "hits" part is a good feature assuming that the database only looks for CSAM. Otherwise it's useless (not to mention totally unauditable).
My guess is that they're doing it on device because they've had several years of marketing and proclaiming that "everything is done on-device" so to implement CSAM scanning server side would go against that. Maybe they thought this would somehow look better to the average consumer who thinks "on-device" is automatically better?
It’s August. New iPhones and iOS / macOS are released in September. If they want to introduce E2E encryption for photos and need this in place to do it, then it makes sense to announce this ahead of time and get the backlash out of the way so that they can announce the headline feature during the main event without it being overshadowed.
All of these types of problems are likely better solved in some other ways. Why not have general mental health coaching in schools freely available to increase the chance of early detection of abusive behaviors? Why not improve the financial situation of parents so that the child is not perceived to be another burden in a brutal life? Why not offer low-friction free mental health coaching to all individuals?
The way the world is organized now is ABSURD to the highest degrees! We pretend to care about a thing but only look at issues narrowly without considering the big picture.
In the end, politics and the way power is distributed is broken. There are too many entrenched interests looking out for their narrow self-interest. There seems to be not enough vision to unite enough power for substantial change. Even the SDGs don‘t seem to inspire the developed nations as something to mobilize for. We need the fervor of war efforts for positive change.
Doing the right thing and doing things right needs to become the very essence of what we as individuals stand for. Not consuming goods or furthering the idealogical agenda of a select few. Each and every one of us should look into themselves and look into the world and work to build a monument of this collective existence. We were here. Let us explain to all following us how we tried our best to do the right things in the right way and where we fell short of our ambitions and hope that others might improve upon our work.
Sorry, I think this turned into a rant but it comes from the heart.
There is also (almost always) an unhealthy matching support for an enormous military with nuclear weapons whose sole purpose - when push comes to shove - is to indiscriminately murder the same babies once they have grown up.
Its a symptom of a deeper mental pathology.
The fundamental problem with short term thinking (positive time preference) is that people want to "flee" into fictional wealth. Rather than build a long lasting monument (companies like blue origin count as monument) they prefer to increase a number on a balance sheet in the form of a bank account. What makes fictional wealth so attractive? As mentioned above money is just the other side of a debt contract. By withholding your money you extend the debt. In other words, a lot of people promise to work for you. Having idle servants is the entire reason behind accumulating money. If you truly wanted to achieve full employment then all money earned must be spent eventually, to be more specific all debts must be fulfilled. It would mean that your wealth cannot exist in the form forced coercion of other people. Employees would still come and work in your companies but they would leave each day with a fair share of the wealth they helped create. All your wealth would have to be long lasting and the environment, which is the longest lasting form of prosperity, would be considered part of your wealth.
Ancient Egypt had something closer to a "grain standard" meaning that farmers deposit grain in a storehouse where they receive something akin to a coupon which you can trade in for grain. Their money is representing a claim to a spoiling good! The horror! The complete antithesis of the gold standard. Just imagine what a backwards society that must have been! Of course the truth is everyone remembers ancient Egypt as an advanced civilization for its time.
I wonder where you got your data from.
And the details around matching (and groups, etc) are trivial to change in a later update.
Ok, so not other files at all then. Just photos of documents.
> And the details around matching (and groups, etc) are trivial to change in a later update.
Ok, so this mechanism can’t do more than us claimed, but they could add a new mechanism later?
I am okay with giving up some privacy under certain conditions, that is directly related to democracy. In essence a database and tech of any kind that systematically violates privacy we need the power distributed and "fair" trials. I.e. legislative branch, executive branch and judiciary branch.
* Only the legislative branch, the politicians, should be able to enable violation of privacy, i.e. by law. Then and only then can companies be allowed to do it.
* The executive have oversight of the process and tech, they would in essence be responsible to saying go/no-go to a specific implementation. They would also be responsible to perform a yearly review. All according to the law. This also includes the police.
* The judiciary branch, the justice system, is responsible for looking at "positive" hits and grant the executive branch case by case powers to use the information.
If we miss any of those three, I am not okay with systematically violation of privacy.
Now we have the expensive and pretty much useless "HADOPI" paying a private company to do the same for copyright infringement.
Ironically enough, it seems the interior and defence ministries cried out when our lawmakers decided to expand it to copyright infringement on the request of copyright holders. They were afraid some geeks, either out of principle or simply to keep torrenting movies, would democratise already existing means to hide one's self online, and create new ones.
Today, everyone knows to look for a VPN or a seedbox. Some even accept payments in crypto or gift cards.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
> it doesn't seem to explain what the actual link is to NCMEC
The problem I see is the focus that is put onto the CSAM database. I quote from Apples FAQ on the topic [1]:
Apple only learns about accounts that are storing collections of known CSAM images, and only the images that match to known CSAM
and
Our process is designed to prevent that from happening. CSAM detection for iCloud Photos is built so that the system only works with CSAM image hashes provided by NCMEC and other child safety organizations. This set of image hashes is based on images acquired and validated to be CSAM by child safety organizations.
Which is already dishonest in my opinion. Here lie the main problems and my reasons to find the implementation highly problematic derived from how I personally understand things:
- Nothing would actually prevent Apple from adding different database sources. The only thing the "it's only CSAM" part hinges on is Apple choosing to only use image hashes provided by NCMEC. It's not a system built "specifically for CSAM images provided by NCMEC". It's ultimately a system to scan for arbitrary image hashes, and Apple chooses to limit those to one specific source with the promise to keep the usage limited to that.
- The second large attack vector comes from outside, what if countries decide to fuse their official CSAM databases with additional uses? Let's say Apple does actually mean it and they uphold their promise: There isn't anything Apple can do to guarantee that the scope stays limited to child abuse material since they don't have control over the sources. I find it hard to believe that certain figures are not already rubbing their hands about this in a "just think about all the possibilites" kind of way.
In short: The limited scope only rests on two promises: That Apple won't expand it and that the source won't be merged with other topics (like terrorism) in the future.
The red flag for me here is that Apple acts as if there was some technological factor that ties this system only to CSAM material.
Oh and of course the fact that the fine people at Apple think (or at least agree) that Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Open Privacy Research Center, Johns Hopkins, Harvard's Cyberlaw Clinic and more are "the screeching voices of the minority". Doesn't quite inspire confidence.
[1]: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_...
“Several solutions to this were considered, but ultimately, this issue is addressed by a mechanism outside of the cryptographic protocol.”
I'm not suggesting that this is absolutely positively a situation where strict liability exists and that moderation isn't allowed. But the idea that "hey we're trying to do the right thing here" will be honored in court is....not obvious.
So if apple is going to jail for child porn because they moderate / report content after flagging (this is normally actually required to do - report it), then this article writer should be going to jail as well - I guarantee his services stores, forwards and otherwise handles CASM content.
My complaint is just - HN used to focus on stuff where folks didn't just always jump to worst case arguments (ie, apple is guilty of child porn and is committing felonies) without at least allowing that apple MAY have given this a tiny bit of thought.
It's just tiresome to wade through. It's a mashup of they are blocking too much, are the evil govt henchperson to they are breaking the law and going to jail for felony child porn charges.
I get that it generates interaction (here I am), but it's annoying after a while. Clickbait sells though no question so things like "One Bad Apple" are probably going to keep on coming at us.
Whereas Apple is moderating the suspected images so they intentionally look for CP (which, according to the author and his lawyer, is a crime).
Isn't it too late to fight the battle then? They've already built the infrastructure to make it trivial to scan any file on your device.
Yes, those are the main things we’re concerned about.
> Apple just opened the door for constant searches of your digital devices.
Specifically, it opens the door to them scanning content which is then end-to-end encrypted, which is the main problem.
I think the jury is out on whether this capability will be abused. Apple has said they will reject requests to use it for other purposes, but who really knows whether they will end up being forced to add hashes that aren’t CSAM?
I agree that both of these are potential problems.
Which camera system? Do you have a citation for that?
https://www.thewestmorlandgazette.co.uk/news/17327294.cctv-c...
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-22792013
Anecdotally my Mum works for Coventry City Council (though she is in events planning) but has noted complaints from colleagues about “busy work” from “fussy old people who keep asking for camera footage” — though Coventry often declines.
Information on those cameras: https://www.coventry.gov.uk/cctv
> If the people had their way, those suspected of child sex crimes wouldn’t even get trials.
Emphasis on suspected.
I agree that the question, as phrased, would be interesting and you'd probably be right that a lot of people would condone or even engage in mob justice. Given this thread, however, it seems that the actual question posed is the one I formulated.
As a side note, my formulation would also be the one to find out how likely people are to presume guilt, as the original formulation confirms guilt directly in the prompt.
The idea that this makes them guilty of felony child porn charges is so ridiculous and offensive.
Facebook (with Insta) alone is dealing with 20 million photos a year -
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-instagram-report-20...
This lawyer is an absolute idiot.
How about we ask the actual folks involved in this (NCMEC) what they think about apples "felonies". Maybe they have some experts?
Oh wait, the folks actually dealing with this, the people who have to handle all this crap - are writing letters THANKING apple for helping reduce the spread of this crap.
So - we have a big company like Apple (with a ton of folks looking at this sort of thing). We have the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children looking at this. And we are being told - by some guy who will not even name the attorney and law firm reaching this opinion, that apple is committing child porn felonies.
Does no one see how making these types of horribly supported explosive claims just trashes discourse? Apple are child pornographers! So and so is horrible for X.
Can folks dial it back a TINY bit - or is the outrage factory the only thing running these days?
I 100% understand why Apple doesn't want to do that - automatic forwarding - they're clearly worried about false positives. I also think Apple has competent lawyers. It's entirely possible that the author and their lawyers' interpretation could be wrong (a possibility).
Point is - the author isn't trying to say moderation is illegal.
Additionally, we already know they consulted with NCMEC on this because of the internal memos that leaked the other day, both from Apple leadership and a letter NCMEC sent congratulating them on their new system. If you think they haven’t evaluated the legality of what they’re doing, you’re just wrong.
https://www.kansascity.com/news/special-reports/article23820...
Why does the state, when they treat children like this, get to proceed on "more" child protection to protect children? Are we totally mad? Any effort to protect children is always a de facto effort to deliver more children into this system, and the state system is much worse than being abused in society (never mind that someone found there's actually more abuse in foster care than with abusive parents! Therefore even if you assume social services is always right ... they never protect kids against social services itself. Therefore you can reasonably assume that a kid that is getting abused will be forced into a worse situation by state "help")?
I mean if you want to protect children, obviously the first step is to fix the child protection system that everybody knows is badly broken (you constantly hear stories about schools sabotaging research into abusive parents to protect the child against social services, covering for the child, lying about attendance or even wounds, ..., because they know social services will be much worse for the child).
There's states where the corrections department provides better care (and definitely better educational instruction) for children than social services do. And yes: that is most definitely NOT because the corrections department provides quality instruction. It's just MUCH worse with social services.
They cover themselves by showing the worst possible situations in society "demonstrating the need to intervene". And you won't hear them talk about how they treat children ... because frankly everyone knows.
Reality is that research keeps finding the same thing: a child that gets abused at home ... is being treated better (gets a better future, better schools, better treatment, yes really, more to read, ...) than children "protected" from abuse by the state:
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.97.5.1583
(and that's ignoring that reasons for placement are almost never that the child is unsafe. The number 1 reason is non-cooperation with mental health and/or social care by either one of the parents or the child themselves. There is not even an allegation that the child is unsafe and needs protection. Proof is never provided, because for child protection there is no required standard of proof in law)
And we're to believe that people who refuse to fix child services ... want extra power "to protect children"? How is this reasonable at all? They have proven they have no interest whatsoever in protecting children, as the cost cutting proves time and time again.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judge_Rotenberg_Educational_Ce...
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/massachuse...
> Yeah, and none of these assholes (pardon the language) is willing to spend a penny to provide for millions of children suffering of poverty: free education, food, health, parental support. Nothing, zero, zilch. And these millions are suffering right now, this second, with life-long physical and psychological traumas that will perpetuate this poverty spiral forever.
Many people in child safety and I, personally, strongly support policies that enhance the lives of children, including improved education, food, access to health services, and support for parents. To your point, though, it's also true that many political leaders who vocally address the issue of child sexual abuse on the internet also happen to be opposed to the policies I would support. Like most political alliances, it is an uncomfortable one.
> Anyone questions you, just destroy their reputation by calling them a pedophile.
I see this sentiment a lot. I have worked with people across law enforcement, survivors, survivor advocates, NGOs, social workers, private companies, etc. and I don't know anyone who responds this way to people raising privacy concerns. At worst, they might, rightly or wrongly, consider you alarmist or uninformed or privileged (in that you don't have images of your abuse being actively traded on the internet). But a pedophile? I just can't imagine anyone I've worked with in this space accusing you or even thinking of you as a potential pedophile just because you're opposed to content scanning or want E2EE enabled, etc. I suppose maybe someone far, far removed from actual front line workers would say something so ridiculous.
---
Separately, I want to suggest that there are paths forward here that could include risk controls to reduce the risk that this technology gets extended beyond its initial purpose. Maybe NCMEC could provide verifiable digests of the lists used on your device to verify that additional things haven't been added to it. Or there could be public, concrete, transparent criteria for how and when a lead is referred for law enforcement action. By designing this system by which the matching occurs on device against a list that can be made available to the user, Apple has made content scanning far more privacy-preserving and also created avenues by which it could be further regulated and transparent. I'm very excited about it and, honestly, I think even the staunchest privacy advocates should be cautiously optimistic because it is, in my opinion, a step in the direction of less visibility into user data.
I think that privacy advocates are arguing in good faith for protecting society from a surveillance state. I think that advocates of scanning are arguing in good faith for protecting children. I also think that both sides are using language (screeching on the NCMEC side, comparisons to hostile regimes on the other) that make it very hard to move forward. This isn't pedophile privacy advocates vs. surveillance state NCMEC. Neither of those groups even exist. It's concerned citizens wanting freedom for all people vs. concerned citizens wanting freedom for all people.
I don't think I trust actual authorities either.
NCMEC are willing to completely compromise their mission in order to chase other moral crusades that are unrelated to children, and seem to never care about the consequences of any of the things they call for.
I don't trust them, and they've earned that.
You work with people who, almost always against the will of children and parents kidnap children (sorry, but search on Youtube for images of their action: kidnap is the only correct term) ... then proceed to NOT care for those children and destroy their lives. Obviously this is the only correct reasoning is that this is entirely immoral until the care system is fixed, because they are not improving the lives of children, and their complete lack of caring about this tells you what they're goals aren't.
Watch "Short Term 12" for what facilities these children are provided with. Stop pretending that helping these people acquire children (because that's exactly what you're doing) helps a single child. It doesn't. Terrible, abusive, violent, parents take better care of children than these places do. The moral reaction should be to do what most of society, thankfully, does: sabotage the efforts of social workers.
And if you're unwilling to accept this, as soon as this whole covid thing dies down a bit, find the nearest children's facility and visit. Make sure to talk to the children. You will find you're making a big mistake.
Whatever you tell yourself, please don't believe that you're helping children. You're not. You're helping to destroy their lives
> I see this sentiment a lot. I have worked with people across law enforcement, survivors, survivor advocates, NGOs, social workers, private companies, etc. and I don't know anyone who responds this way to people raising privacy concerns.
I'm adding this response to the other reply to your comment ... which makes 2 people who disagree with your assessment: you are likely to be threatened in many places. I feel like one might even say it's likely we're 2 people who have been threatened.
I would like to add that either as a child or an adult, child protection authorities, the people you help, will threaten you, and I've never known a single exception if they think (correctly or otherwise) that you're hiding something from them. That's if you're at their mercy (which is why every child in child services makes sure to commit some despicable/violent/minor criminal act or two every month and keep it secret: if you don't have something to confess that won't get you sent to a "secure facility" you will be horribly punished at some unexpected random time. That's how these people work. And over time you may learn that, for a kid in the system, a whole host of places are traps. Like the hospital, child services itself, police, homeless shelters or school. As in every person in one of those places will be shown your "history" as soon as you mention your name and if they report you ... very bad things will happen. Some children explicitly make bad things happen (e.g. commit violent theft), because they'll get sent to "juvie" and finally the stress of suddenly getting punished out of nowhere disappears. Also some believe you get better schooling in juvie. So you hide, even if you're hurt or sick. This is why some of those kids respond angrily or even violently if someone suggests they should see a doctor for whatever reason. Sometimes literally to make sure the option of suicide remains open (which is difficult in "secure" care). And why does this happen? NOT to protect children: to protect themselves and "their reputation", and their peace of mind against these children).
This, of course, you will never hear your new friends mention needs fixing. They are in fact fighting with this side of the system over money, so that EVEN LESS money goes to the kids the system takes care of. That, too, you will never hear from them. They are doing the opposite of what someone who means well with disadvantaged children will do.
I have zero doubts they will use your work, not to convict offenders, because that's hard, years of very difficult work, but to bring more kids into a system that destroys children's lives, and MORE so than the worst of parents do. Because throwing children into this system (and destroying their lives) is very easy. I'm sure occasionally they will convict an offender (which, incidentally, doesn't help the kids) or get a good outcome for a child. It happens. If is absolutely not common.
And not to worry they will put great emphasis on this statement: "I've never seen anyone in the system who didn't mean well". Most are idiots, by the way, if you keep digging at their motivations, they will reveal themselves very clearly quite quickly.
These "people in child safety" DO NOT mean well with children. They merely hate a portion of society (which includes those victimized children) and want to see them punished HARD. If you are a moral person, volunteer at a nearby children's shelter and show understanding when the inevitable happens and you get taken advantage of (do not worry, you will learn). DO NOT HELP THESE PEOPLE GET MORE CHILDREN.
This comment does not add any argument in favor of its point, despite its length.
Now: You upload images to iCloud Photos. When doing so, your device also uploads a separate safety voucher for the image. If there are enough vouchers for CSAM matched images in your library, Apple gains the ability to access the data in the vouchers for images matching CSAM. One of the data elements in the voucher is an “image derivative” (probably a thumbnail) which is manually reviewed. If the image derivative also looks like CSAM, Apple files a report with NCMEC’s CyberTip line. Apple can (for now) access the image you stored in iCloud, but it does not. All the data it needs is in the safety voucher.
Lot of words spilled on this topic, yet I’d be surprised if a majority of people are even aware of these basic facts about the system operation.
I think Apple has botched the rollout of this change by failing to explain clearly how it works. As a result, rumors and misunderstandings have proliferated instead.
https://digit.fyi/apple-admits-scanning-photos-uploaded-to-i...
So the author of the article is technically correct: Apple intentionally uploads CP to their servers for manual review which is explicitly forbidden by law.
He even describes the issue with thumbnails
When you choose to upload your images to iCloud (which currently happens without end-to-end encryption), your phone generates some form of encrypted ticket. In the future, the images will be encrypted, with a backdoor key encoded in the tickets.
If Apple receives enough images that were considered a match, the tickets become decryptable (I think I saw Shamir's Secret Sharing mentioned for this step). Right now, Apple doesn't need that because they have unencrypted images, in a future scheme, decrypting these tickets will allow them to decrypt your images.
(I've simplified a bit, I believe there's a second layer that they claim will only give them access to the offending images. I have not studied their approach deeply.)
In no step of the proposal does Apple access the images you store in iCloud. All access is through the associated data in the safety voucher. This design allows Apple to switch iCloud storage to end to end encrypted with no protocol changes.
They could instead send the list of hashes to the device (which they already must trust is faithfully computing the local hash) and just let the device report when there are hits. It would be much more CPU and bandwidth efficient, too.
The PSI serves the purpose that if Apple starts sending out hashes for popular lawful images connected to particular religions, ethnicity, or political ideologies that it is information theoretically impossible for anyone to detect the abuse. It also makes it impossible to tell if different users are being tested against different lists, e.g. if Thai users were being tested against political cartoons that insult the king.
Not having backdoors is a hard requirement for end to end encryption offering privacy guarantees.
Apple have always had the ability to do great evil to a lot of people, this update doesn't change that. They haven't gained any power they didn't already have.
The government, for example, do not currently have the infrastructure to push updates to iPhone. If they passed laws, built servers etc to allow this then that would be a meaningful change that would be worth all this chatter.
That's the point, this is a slippery slope -- without this system, governments have no way to compel Apple to scan for objectionable photos, Apple could claim, rightly so, that due to encryption technology and privacy, they have no way to do it. But now they've removed both the technological and privacy hurdle, and it's just a matter of logistics.
Now governments know that all they need is a database of banned photos and they can go to Apple and say "In our country, it's illegal to share photos that put our government in a bad light. Here's a database of banned photos. If you don't comply, you can't sell your phones to our 1.4 billion citizens".
If China had previously demanded they scan users photos for certain material, then Apple could always have done so.
Sure, it would involve pushing an update to all phones, but so would the change you are talking about (to check more hashes).
The UK doesn’t have a super camera system used for minor crimes like you insinuate.
The high camera counts in the UK come from including private CCTV cameras in the data which privately owned and are not linked together, hence the government is not using a network of cameras to monitor dog poo clean up as you claim.
This totally makes sense, having one cop checking 100+ CCTV is far more efficient than a full team walking in the streets. Once you justified the cost on privacy and managed to deploy such system, it's so easy and convenient to use it for something else.
This is on top of the cameras that ARE owned by government entities - 18+ city councils [2]. And it's expanding [3].
Why do you think it matters if they are linked together? Retaining footage and handing it over to police on request (not warrant) is a requirement. The IPA allows collecting this information in bulk (eg from cctv providers) with warrants. [4]
[1] - PDF Warning https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/...
[2] - https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-17116526
[3] - https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/uk-funds-stre...
[4] - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/contents/enacte...
What even is the "camera system originally intended for serious crimes"?
I think the actual idea, which the nuance is often lost (and let's be honest, some people aren't really aware of and are just jumping on the bandwagon), is that privacy is a right, and erosion of rights is extremely important because it has been shown many times in the past to have far reaching and poorly understood future effects.
It's unfortunate that some would choose to link their opposition to the idea with making the thing it's attempting to combat legal when it's something so abhorrent, but in general I think a push back on any erosion of our rights is a good and useful way for people to dedicate time and effort.
While we shouldn't lose sight that there are real children in danger and that this should help, we also shouldn't lose sight that there is plenty of precedence that this could eventually lead to danger and problems for a great many other people, children included.
The encryption everywhere mindset of a lot of the tech community is changing the nature of the right to privacy. 50 years ago all these images would have been physical objects. They could have been found by the person developing the photos or the person making copies. They could have been found with a warrant. Now they are all hidden behind E2EE and a secure enclave. To a certain extent the proliferation of technology means people can have an even stronger degree of privacy today than was practical in the past. It is only natural for people to wonder if that shift has changed where the line should be.
Not only has communication become easier, so has surveillance. The only difference now is that it's easier for people not to be aware when their very personal privacy is invaded, and that it can be done to the whole populace at once.
Is it intangible? 18% of the world lives in China alone. That's more people than the "1/10 who are victims of child abuse*", and I'm sure that 18% will only grow as other authoritarian countries get more technologically advanced.
I think "Think of the kids" applies very well to the CREATORS of pornography. Per wikipedia, there isn't any conclusive causal relationship between viewing CP and assaulting children.
* Per a google search "A Bureau of Justice Statistics report shows 1.6 % (sixteen out of one thousand) of children between the ages of 12-17 were victims of rape/sexual assault" which is a lot less than 10% figure you're citing. Non-sexual abuse wouldn't really have any bearing here, right?
You didn't mention any tangible results here. How would this system by Apple make my life worse? Can you answer that without a slippery slope argument?
>I think "Think of the kids" applies very well to the CREATORS of pornography. Per wikipedia, there isn't any conclusive causal relationship between viewing CP and assaulting children.
Why does the causality matter? A correlation is enough that cracking down on this content will result in less abusers on the streets.
>* Per a google search "A Bureau of Justice Statistics report shows 1.6 % (sixteen out of one thousand) of children between the ages of 12-17 were victims of rape/sexual assault" which is a lot less than 10% figure you're citing. Non-sexual abuse wouldn't really have any bearing here, right?
I wasn't the one citing that, but you are also citing an incomplete number since it excludes younger children.
So far any defense of this whole fiasco can be boiled down to what you are trying to imply in part. When you say "The possibility of abusing this system is a slippery slope argument", as if identifying a (possible) slippery slope element in an argument would somehow automatically make it invalid?
The other way around if all that can be said in defense is that the dangers are part of slippery slope thinking, then you are effectively saying that the only defense is "trust them, let's wait and see, they might not do something bad with it" or "it sure doesn't affect me" (sounds pretty similar to "I've got nothing to hide"). This might work for other areas, not so much when it comes to backdooring your device/backups for arbitrary database checks.
And since "oh the children" or "but the terrorists" has become the vanilla excuse for many many things I'm unsure why we are supposed to believe in a truly noble intent down the road here. "No no this time it's REALLY about the kids, the people at work here mean it" just doesn't cut it anymore. So no, I'm not convinced the people at Apple working on this actually do it because they care.
When "but the children" becomes a favourite excuse to push whatever, the problem are very much the people abusing this very excuse to this level, not the ones becoming wary of it.
> some of the tech community has begun to think we should do absolutely nothing about this problem
I don't believe that people think that, I believe that people rather think that the ones in power simply aren't actually mainly interested in this problem. The trust is (rightfully) heavily damaged.
That's a weird goal-post.
>> Why does the causality matter? A correlation is enough that cracking down on this content will result in less abusers on the streets.
Obviously of the people who look at cp, a higher percentage of those will be actual child abusers. The question for everybody is -- does giving those people a fantasy outlet increase or actually reduce the number of kids who get assaulted. At the end of the day that's what matters.
>> I wasn't the one citing that, but you are also citing an incomplete number since it excludes younger children.
[EDIT: Mistake] Well you didn't cite anything at all, and were off by a shockingly large number. Please cite something or explain why you made up a number.
“With the first link, the chain is forged. The first speech censured, the first thought forbidden, the first freedom denied, chains us all irrevocably. The first time any man's freedom is trodden on we're all damaged...."
(And why do you think it's morally right, or the responsibility of a foreign private company to try and force anything into China against their laws? Another commenter in a previous thread said the idea was for Apple to refuse to do business there - but that still leads to the question, how would that help anyone?)
“Think of the Kids” damn well applies to the consumers of this content - by definition, there is a kid (or baby in some instances) involved in the CP. As a society, the United States draws the line at age 18 as the age of consent [the line has to be drawn somewhere and this is a fairly settled argument]. So by definition, in the United States, these are not consenting victims in the pictures.
Demand drives creation. Getting rid of it on one of the largest potential viewing and sharing platforms is a move in the right direction in addressing the problem.
What I haven’t seen from the tech community is the idea that this will be shut down if it goes too far or beyond this limited scope. Which I think it would be - people would get rid of iPhones if some of the other cases privacy advocates are talking about occur. And at that point they would have to scrap the program - so Apple is motivated to keep it limited in scope to something everyone can agree is abhorrent.
Yeah, that focus has worked really well in the "war on some drugs," hasn't it?
I don't pretend to have all (or any good ones for that matter) the answers, but we know interdiction doesn't work.
Those who are going to engage in non-consensual behavior (with anyone, not just children) are going to do so whether or not they can view and share records of their abuse.
The current legal regime (in the US at least) creates a gaping hole where even if you don't know what you have (e.g., if someone sends you a child abuse photo without your knowledge or consent) you are guilty, as possession of child abuse images is a felony.
That's wrong. I don't know what the right way is, but adding software to millions of devices searching locally for such stuff creates an environment where literally anyone can be thrown in jail for receiving an unsolicited email or text message. That's not the kind of world in which I want to live.
Many years ago, I was visiting my brother and was taking photos of his two sons, at that time aged ~4.5 and ~2.
I took an entire roll of my brother, his wife and their kids. In one photo, the two boys are sitting on a staircase, and the younger one (none of us noticed, as he wasn't potty trained and hated pants) wasn't wearing any pants.
I took the film to a processor and got my prints in a couple of days. We all had a good laugh looking at the photos and realizing that my nephew wasn't wearing any pants.
There wasn't, when the photos were taken, nor when they were viewed, any abuse or sexual motives involved.
Were that to happen today, I would be sitting in a jail cell, looking at a lengthy prison sentence. And when done "repaying my debt to society" I'd be forced to register as a sex offender for the rest of my life.
Which is ridiculous on its face.
Unless and until we reform these insane and inane laws, I can't support such programs.
N.B.: I strongly believe that consent is never optional and those under the age of consent cannot do so. As such, there should absolutely be accountability and consequences for those who abuse others, including children.
Why not police these groups with.. you know.. regular policing? Infiltrate, gather evidence, arrest. This strategy has worked for centuries to combat all manner of organized crime. I don't see why it's any different here.
Here's a relevant extract sourced from Wikipedia:
"Most sexual abuse offenders are acquainted with their victims; approximately 30% are relatives of the child, most often brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers, uncles or cousins; around 60% are other acquaintances such as friends of the family, babysitters, or neighbours; strangers are the offenders in approximately 10% of child sexual abuse cases.[53] In over one-third of cases, the perpetrator is also a minor.[56]"
Content warning: The WP article contains pictures of abused children.
I don't think full scale surveillance is the way to go in free, democratic societies. It is the easiest one, so. Even more if surveillance can be outsourced to private, global tech companies. It saves the pain of passing laws.
Talking about laws, those along with legal proceedings should be brought up to speed. If investigators, based on existing and potential new laws, convince a court to issue a warrant to surveil or search any of my devices, fine. Because then I have legal options to react to that. Having that surveillance incorporated into some opaque EULA from a company in US, a company that now can enforce its standards on stuff I do, is nothing I would have thought would be acceptable. Not that I am shocked it is, I just wonder why that stuff still surprises me when it happens.
Going one step forward, if FANG manages to block right to repair laws it would be easy to block running non-approved OS on their devices. Which would than be possible to enforce by law. Welcome to STASI's wet dream.
We’re talking a life-long impact from being abused in that stuff…
>>The problem here is with you or your electors not with the technology itself
No offense, but this is such a shitty answer, and it's always made by apologists for these incredibly invasive technologies. Like, please explain to me, in simple terms, how can I, an immigrant who doesn't even have the ability to vote, vote to make an American corporation do nor not do something. I'm super curious.
Is America the entire world to you? What should a Chinese citizen do? What should a Saudi citizen do? What should a Russian citizen do? Even if you ignore the fact that the chance of fascism in American is not zero, why should Apple make it easier for totalitarian regimes to spy on their citizens? Or do you expect a Saudi person to "just move to America"?
Except like I clearly said above, I'm an immigrant without the right to vote, so I'm not electing shit. Again, how exactly am I supposed to vote my way out of this?
Actually I do. Governments abuse their powers all the time. They have done it before, are doing it right now and will continue to do it in the future. This is not fallacy, it is fact.
Here's an example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOVEINT
The only solution is to take their power away. No way to abuse power they don't have. We must make it technologically impossible for them to spy on us.
The database is embedded into iOS. There are at least three primary sources which say that users will not receive different databases, and it should be easily confirmed.
Otherwise there is no way to detect if the system is abused to target lawful activities.
The fancy crypto in the system isn't there to protect the user, it's to guard the system's implementer(s) against accountability. It protects Apple's privacy, not yours.
Your wikipedia link doesn't show anything regarding abuse of the governing body ALL of the examples are from private persons.
Have you even like....read the page they linked?
"Siobhan Gorman (2013-08-23). "NSA Officers Spy on Love Interests". Washington Wire. The Wallstreet Journal. "
Are NSA Officers "private persons" now? They are government employees, they were abusing the power they were given while employed by the government. It doesn't matter in the slightest if they were abusing the power for private or state gain, it's a state agency and its employees abusing the access, that implicitly makes it the state abusing the power they have.
In any case, there's no reason why politics and democracy ought to be the only way to bring about change. We have a far more powerful tool: technology.
Governments make their laws. People make technology that neutralizes their laws. They make new laws. People make new technology. And so on. With every iteration, the government must become ever more tyrannical in order to maintain the same level of control over the population it previously enjoyed. If this loop continues long enough, we'll either end up with an uncontrollable population or with an oppressive totalitarian state. Hopefully limits will be found along the way.
> Your wikipedia link doesn't show anything regarding abuse of the governing body ALL of the examples are from private persons.
A government employee abused his access to the USA's warrantless surveillance apparatus in order to spy on his loved ones. If this isn't abuse of power, I don't know what is.
Honestly, it's just human nature. No person should ever be given such powers to begin with. I wouldn't trust myself with such power. It should be impossible to spy on everyone.
Want to fix child abuse? Fund teachers and child care. Apple cannot help those kids and I don't mean that as an indignation towards the company.
They could have done that at any time in the past, and could do so in future.
‘NSA could force Apple to do something in secret’ is an evergreen fear just like ‘think of the children’. Such comments get added to every thread about Apple and privacy or security.
It’s a different thing entirely to do a minor extension to a system that they rolled out publicly that already essentially does this!
The first one will almost certainly be noticed, and will be clearly illegal/violate contracts, and can therefore be identified and rooted out.
The second one you could do for groups of people or targeted individuals trivially and would be under the radar and probably never noticed - and could be denied unless truly rock solid evidence existed. Which would be easy to avoid existing if you used the same mechanisms (but different types of matches) you were public about - in a closed ecosystem with a Secure Enclave, for instance. It’s not like anyone is going to be able to do step-by-step instruction debugging on the code running on their iPhone!
There is a long history of this happening. Not everyone is as blatant as the stasi - and even then, no one knew who was working for them or what was tapped until the whole system collapsed and their records became public. It still took a long time to unravel.
Well since they have made very detailed public statements about the limits of this system and. not letting it be misused, they would certainly be in violation of contracts if they did start misusing it.
> if you used the same mechanisms (but different types of matches)
What kinds of ‘different matches’ do you think this mechanism can be used to make?
>You know what would help people in regimes? Governing bodies that stand up for them in other countries... guess who could change that.
What would also help is if Apple didn't build tools for those regimes to suppress opposing political bodies.
Sorry, I am just baffled by your last point here. How can I be off by a shockingly large number when I didn't even cite a number?
Look, speech is important. So is protecting the public good. But if one believes in absolutes, rather than takeoffs, they are IMO getting too high on their own supply.
Let’s talk about the trade offs that we have already made.
We're lying to ourselves if we think this couldn't be abused and can implicitly be trusted. We should generally be sceptical of closed source at the best of times, let alone when it's inherently designed to report on us.
To your point of 'as a layman end user what is the cost to me?': more code running on your computer doing potentially anything which you have no way to audit -> compromising the security of whatever is on your computer, and an uptick in cpu/disk/network utilisation (although it remains to be seen if it's anything other than negligible).
My defeated mentality is partly - 'well they're already spying on us anyway'...
Frankly, yes.
However I absolutely agree that it could be used to detect non-CSAM images if Apple colludes with that use case.
My point is that this is immaterial to what is going on in China. China is already an authoritarian surveillance state. Even without this, the state has access to the iCloud photo servers in China, so who knows what they are doing, with or without Apple’s cooperation.
Hell, do I miss the old internet. The one without social media.
No you would not, I was ready to somewhat agree with you but this is just false and has nothing to do with what you were talking about before. The law does not say that naked photos of (your or anyone else's) kids are inherently illegal, they have to actually be sexual in nature. And while the line is certainly not all that clear cut, a simple picture like you're describing would never meet that line.
I mean let's be clear here, do you believe the law considers to much stuff to be CSAM, and if so why? How would you prefer we redefine it?
But that depends on who looks at it.
People have been arrested and (at least temporary) lost custody over their children because someone called the police over perfectly normal family photos. I remember one case a few years ago where someone had gotten into trouble because one photo included a toddler wearing nothing (even facing away from the camera if my memory serves me correctly) playing at the beach. When police realized this wasn't an offense, instead of apologizing they got hung up on another photo were kids were playing with an empty beer can.
Recently this was also linked https://jonathanturley.org/2009/09/18/arizona-couple-sues-wa...
which further links to a couple of previous cases.
I'd say we get police or health care to talk to people who think perfectly normal images are sexual in nature, but until we get laws changed at least then keep us safe.
> I mean let's be clear here, do you believe the law considers to much stuff to be CSAM, and if so why? How would you prefer we redefine it?
Another thing that comes up is that a lot of things that are legal might be in that database because criminal might have a somewhat varied history.
Personally I am a practicing conservative Christian so this doesn't bother me personally at the moment since for obvious reasons I don't collect these kinds of images.
The reason I care is because every such capability will be abused, and below I present in two easy steps how it will go from todays well intended system to a powerful tool for oppression:
1. today it is pictures but if getting around it is as simple as putting it in a pdf then obviously pdfs must be screened too. Same with zip files. Because otherwise this so simple to circumvent that is worthless.
2. once you have such a system in place it would be a shame not to use it for every other evil thing. Dependending on where you live this might be anything: Muslim scriptures, Atheist books or videos, Christian scriptures, Winnie the Pooh drawings - you name it and someone wants to censor it.
If Apple starts using the tech to scan for religious material, there will be significant market and legal backlash. I think the fact that CSAM scanning will stop if they push it too far will keep them in check to only do CSAM scanning.
Everyone can agree on using the tech for CSAM, but beyond that I don’t see Apple doing it. The tech community is reacting as if they already have.
Personally I don't find anecdotes convincing compared to the very real amount of CSAM (and actual child abuse) we already know exists and circulates in the wild, but I do get your point. That said personally I don't think changing the laws would really achieve what you want anyway - I don't think a random Walmart employee is up-to-date on the legal definitions of CSAM, they're going to potentially report it regardless of what the law is (and the question of whether this is a wider trend is debatable, again this is an anecdote).
With that, they were eventually found innocent, so the law already agrees what they did was perfectly fine, which was my original point. No it should not have taken that long, but then again we don't know much about the background of those who took them, so I'm not entirely sure we can easily determine how appropriate the response was. I'm certainly not trying to claim our system is perfect, but I'm also not convinced rolling back protections for abused children is a great idea without some solid evidence that it really isn't working.
> Another thing that comes up is that a lot of things that are legal might be in that database because criminal might have a somewhat varied history.
That didn't really answer my question :P
I agree the database is suspect but I don't see how that has anything to do with the definition of CSAM. The legal definition of CSAM is not "anything in that database", and if we're already suggesting that there's stuff in there that's known to not be CSAM then how would changing the definition of CSAM help?
[1]: I looked up the cases of sex offenders living around me several years ago.
An unsolicited email / having photos planted on your phone or equipment is a problem today as much as it will be then, but I think people over-estimate the probability of this and ignore the fact it could easily happen today, with an “anonymous tip” called into the authorities.
If they are scanning it though iMessage they will have logs of when it arrived, and where it came from as well - so in that case it might protect the victim being framed.
It is a devil's advocate response, but can you explain why this is a bad thing? If communication is scaling and becoming easier, why shouldn't surveillance?
2. I am a law abiding, innocent citizen. Why should I have to face the same compromised privacy as a criminal? It used to be that only people under suspicion are surveilled and that a judge had to grant this based on preliminary evidence. Now everyone is surveilled. How long until people who are sidestepping surveillance (i.e. using Open Source systems that don't implement this stuff), fall under suspicion just because they are not surveilled? How long until it's "guilty until proven otherwise"?
In my opinion it is absolutely fair and necessary to scan images that are uploaded to the cloud in a way that makes them shareable. But never the stuff I have on my device. And the scanning system has to be transparent.
Speaking as someone who as a boy was tortured and trafficked by operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America, I am surprized how little appreciation there is for the standard role of misdirection in the espionage playbook.
It is inevitable that all these obstensibly well-intended investigators will have their ranks and their leadership infiltrated by intelligence agencies of major powers, all of whom invest in child-trafficking. What better cover?
And sometimes, the "good guys" in their attempts to be as good as they can imagine being, turn into the sort of person who'll look a supreme court judge or Congresspeople or oversight committees in the eye and claim "It's not 'surveillance' until a human looks at it." after having built PRISM "to gather and store enormous quantities of users’ communications held by internet companies such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Facebook."
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/14/q-us-warrantless-surveil...
Sure, we copied and stored your email archive and contact lists and instant messenger history. But we weren't "surveilling you" unless we _looked_ at it!
Who are these "good guys"? The intelligence community? The executive branch? The judicial branch? Because they're _all_ complicit in that piece of deceit about your privacy and rights.
Take, for instance, the collection of metadata that is now so freely swept up by the American government without a warrant. This includes the people involved in communication, the method of communication, time and duration of communication and locations of those involved with said communication. All of that is involved in the metadata that can be collected without a warrant by national agencies for "national security" done on a massive scale under PRISM (PRIZM?).
Now, this is non targeted, national surveillance, fishing for a "bad guy" with enhanced surveillance capabilities. This doesn't necessarily seem like a good thing. It seems like a lazy thing, and a thing which was ruled constitutional by people who chose to not understand the technology because it was easier than thinking down stream at the implications.
And that the people running the surveillance have a rich track record of lying to the people who are considering whether to pass the laws they're proposing.
"Oh no, we would _NEVER_ surveil American citizens using these capabilities!"
"Oh yeah, except for all the mistakes we make."
"No - that's not 'surveillance', it's only metadata, not data. All we did was bulk collect call records of every American, we didn't 'surveil" them."
"Yeah, PRISM collects well over 80% of all email sent by Americans, but we only _read_ it if it matches a search we do across it. It's not 'surveillance'."
But they've stopped doing all that, right? And they totally haven't just shared that same work out amongst their five eyes counterparts so that what each of them is doing is legal in their jurisdiction even though there are strong laws preventing each of them from doing it domestically.
And how would we even know? Without Snowden we wouldn't know most of what we know about what they've been doing. And look at the thanks get got for that...
I didn't state it as a bad thing, I stated it as a counter to your argument that encrypted communication is more common, and therefore maybe we should assess whether additional capabilities are warranted. Those capabilities already exist, and expanded before the increased encrypted communication (they happened during the analog phone line era). I would hazard that increasingly encrypted communication is really just people responding to that change in the status quo (or overreach, depending on how you view it) brought about by the major powers (whether they be governmental or corporate).
It is bad to post passwords, not just because you lose privacy, but because you'd lose control of important accounts. Asking people to post their passwords is not reasonable.
I think you might have a point you're trying to make, but please spell it out fully.
This is by design and actually a good thing.
It becomes a problem because problem number 2:
No one is accountable if someone gets their life ruined over a mistake in this database.
I'd actually be somewhat less hostile to this idea if there was more regulatory oversight:
- laws that punishes police/officials if innocent people are harmed in any way
- mandatory technical audits as well as verification that for what it is used for: Apple keeps logs of all signatures that "matched"/triggered as well as raw files, these are provided to the court as part of any case that comes up. This way we could hopefully prevent most fishing expeditions - both wide and personalized ones - and also avoid any follow up parallel reconstructions.
I'm not saying I'd necessarily be OK with it but at that point there would be something to discuss.
A couple of hours online found
- the company behind that operated out of the UK - the call center was not in Austria but used local numbers for a while - company was known for that shady business but never even got a slap on the wrist
I decided to never count on authorities for that kind of fraud. Or report it, because that's just a waste of time, unless you lost a shitload of money.
:sigh:
First: This is not hearsay or anecdotal evidence, this is multiple innocent real people getting their lives trashed to some degree before getting aquitted.
> I don't think a random Walmart employee is up-to-date on the legal definitions of CSAM, they're going to potentially report it regardless of what the law is (and the question of whether this is a wider trend is debatable, again this is an anecdote).
Fine, I too report a number of things to the police that might or might not be crimes. (Eastern European car towing a Norwegian luxury car towards the border is one. Perfectly legal in one way but definitely something the police was happy to get told about so they could verify.)
> With that, they were eventually found innocent, so the law already agrees what they did was perfectly fine, which was my original point.
Remember the job of the police is more to keep law abiding citizens safe than to lock up offenders. If we could magically keep kids safe forever without catching would-be offenders I'd be happy with that.
Making innocent peoples lives less safe for a marginally bigger chance to catch small fry (i.e. not producers), does it matter?
The problem here and elsewhere is that police many places doesn't have a good track record of throwing it out. Once you've been dragged through court for the most heinous crimes you don't get your life completely back.
If we knew police would always throw out such cases I'd still be against this but then it wouldn't be so obviously bad.
"multiple" is still anecdotal, unless we have actual numbers on the issue. The question is how many of these cases actually happen vs. the number of times these types of investigations actually reveal something bad. Unless you never want kids saved from abuse there has to be some acceptable number of investigations that eventually get dropped.
> Remember the job of the police is more to keep law abiding citizens safe than to lock up offenders.
Maybe that should be their purpose, but in reality they're law enforcement, their job has nothing to do with keeping people safe. The SCOTUS has confirmed as much that the police have no duty to protect people, only to enforce the law. However I think we agree that's pretty problematic...
> Making innocent peoples lives less safe for a marginally bigger chance to catch small fry (i.e. not producers), does it matter?
I would point out that the children in this situation are law abiding citizens as well, and they also deserve protection. Whether their lives were made more or less safe in this situation is debatable, but the decision was made with their safety in mind. For the few cases of a mistake being made like the one you presented I could easily find similar cases where the kids were taken away and then it was found they were actually being abused. That's also why I pointed out your examples are only anecdotes, the big question is whether this is a one-off or a wider trend.
If reducing the police's ability to investigate these potential crimes would actually result in harm to more children, then you're really not achieving your goal of keeping people safer.
> The problem here and elsewhere is that police many places doesn't have a good track record of throwing it out. Once you've been dragged through court for the most heinous crimes you don't get your life completely back.
Now this I agree with. The "not having a good record of throwing it out" I'm a little iffy on but generally agree, but I definitely agree that public knowledge of being investigating for such a thing is damaging even if it turns out your innocent, which isn't right. I can't really say I have much of a solution for that in a situation like this though, I don't think there's much of a way to not-publicly take the kids away - and maybe that should have a higher threshold, but I really don't know, as I mentioned earlier we'd really need to look at the numbers to know that. For cases that don't involve a public component like that though I think there should be a lot more anonymity involved.
Now people are seriously arguing that continuous searching through your entire life without any warrant or justification by opaque algorithms is fine.
It only took what, 10 years?
Where is anyone arguing that?
Does anyone seriously doubt that Germany will use this mechanism to ban Nazi imagery?
Then from there, it’s not a big leap to talk about controlling far right (or far left) memes in France or the UK.
More insidiously, suppose some politician in a western liberal democracy was caught with underage kids, and there were blackmail photos that leaked. Do you think those hashes wouldn’t instantly make their way onto this ban list?
I’ll let you change the subject, but let’s note that every time someone realizes privacy in China as a concern, it’s just bullshit.
> Does anyone seriously doubt that Germany will use this mechanism to ban Nazi imagery?
Yes.
> Then from there, it’s not a big leap to talk about controlling far right (or far left) memes in France or the UK.
This one is harder for me to argue against. Those countries could order such a mechanism, whether Apple had built this or not. Because those countries have hate speech laws and no constitutional mechanism protecting freedom of speech.
This is a real problem, but banning certain kinds of speech is popular in these societies. It is disturbingly popular in the US too. That is not Apple’s doing.
During the Cold War, the West in general and the US in particular were proud of spreading freedom and democracy. Rock & roll and Levi’s played a big role in bringing down the USSR.
Then in the 90s, the internet had this same ethos. People fought against filters on computers in libraries and schools.
Now that rich westerners have their porn and their video games, apparently many are happy to let the rest of the world rot.
I guess I just expected more.
In America one of those lines is that your personal papers are private. Get a warrant. I don't have to justify this stand. I might choose to explain why it's a good stand, or I might not; it's on you to persuade us.
Part of the problem is that these devices are encrypted so a warrant doesn't work on them. That is a big enough change that maybe people need to debate if the line is still in the right place.
I think my vehemence last night might've obscured the point I wanted to make: what a right is supposed to be is a principle that overrides case-by-case utility analysis. I would agree that everything is open to questioning, including the right to privacy -- but as I see it, if you ask what's the object-level balance of utilities with respect to this particular proposal, explicitly dropping that larger context of privacy as a right (which was not arrived at for no reason) and denigrate that concern as science fiction, as a slippery-slope fallacy -- then that's a debate that should be rejected on its premise.
I just think that exaggerating scares is part of the problem, not the solution, regardless of which side of a debate is doing it.
Like with the TSA and the no-fly list. Civil liberties groups said it was going to be abused, and they said so well before any actual abuse had occurred. But they weren't overreacting, and they weren't exaggerating. They were right. Senator Ted Kennedy even wound up on that list at one point.
This really is a narrowly targeted solution that only works with image collections, and requires two factors to verify, and two organizations to cooperate, one of which is Apple who has unequivocally staked their reputation on it not being used for other purposes, and the other is NCMEC which is a non-profit staffed with people dedicated to preventing child abuse.
People who are equating this with a general purpose hashing or file scanning mechanism are just wrong at best.
It’s not like the no-fly list at all.
