> I don't get why such commitments were made in the first place. Why is it OK for Russia to be dictating what sovereign countries can or cannot do within their own borders?

It wasn't a Russian dictate, it was an agreement. Russia didn't want a strong NATO presence in eastern Europe. NATO of course has to be able to defend its members. But the best defense is if they don't get attacked at all, so if Russia promises not to threaten or attack, then NATO an promise not to commit a large defense there.

But it's been pretty clear that this has been woefully outdated for some time now. Russia does attack its neighbours, takes land from them, and threatens NATO members.

The commitments made sense when Yeltsin was president of Russia. Yeltsin had honestly no interest in conquering, threatening or coercing Russian neighbours. It's a good idea to formalise that so NATO can reduce its military presence. But Putin is very different, and has been very threatening and aggressive. In violation of the treaty, and clearly making NATO presence necessary.

It doesn't make it right but hypothetically if your neighbor set up claymore mines facing your property that would be a problem. Don't worry, they won't set them off unless you attack them.

Russia can dictate whatever they want- free countries need to tell them to jump in a lake.

The principles guiding these specific Nato committments will likely be expressed in contemporaneous reports. Here's an NY Times archive search for Nato and Russia in the period 1996--1998:

https://www.nytimes.com/search?dropmab=false&endDate=1998123...

I've yet to read through those (or others elsewhere), but at the time, there was much being made of the peaceful transition of the former Soviet bloc to democratic and independent rule, including the former states of the Soviet Union, some of which remained within Russia, others, including Ukraine, which did not. There was a delicate balance of diplomacy, military concerns, economics, and internal politics in seeking a successful path forward. Committments to ease Russian concerns were all but certainly made under those considerations.

The general principle of spheres of influence or concern are old and long-standing. The US Monroe Doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas was a potentially hostile act against the United States. It was first articulated in 1823 and goverened US policy through the early 20th century.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_doctrine

See also the Carter Doctrine, which put a specific emphasis on oil:

The notion of a sphere of influence dates to ancient times, though most typically refers to the 19th century and following.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence

Put simply: a state's interests and concerns extend past its borders. That does not give unlimited licence to act beyond borders, though this has of course occurred frequently throughout history by any number of parties: Russian and its precursor state the Soviet Union, the United States, the UK and its precursor England, Germany, Japan, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and more. Whether acting unilaterally and without reasonable provocation or expressing interests and concerns, any major state will have such concerns, and will likely have some history of action.

That said, a defensive alliance to which states seek membership on a voluntary basis without coercion from the alliance itself, and in paritcular under a credible hostile external threat, as seems to be the present case with Russia, would be hard to argue against under even the broadest of Sphere of Influence / external concerns constructions.

> Why is it OK for Russia to be dictating what sovereign countries can or cannot do within their own borders?

This is political reality and what Merkel really meant with Realpolitik. It was very well known that NATO involvement in these countries is seen as aggression and that makes the reaction of Putin almost predictable. Most did not believe he would do the last step and he certainly surprised with that. But Ukraine has to have a relation to Russia too. If they want to associate with former enemies of the Russia, the result might also be a war.

Without context this question is almost comical because western nation more often than any other group of countries to intervene in other countries. Lybia, Iraq, Afghanistan, ... It is simply a question of political will, power and interests. Ukraine suffers from that aggression. It was no secret that it is seen as nothing else. Does it ever justify an invasion? Of course not but that also is of no relevance.

> Also in case you're going to pull out some kind of whataboutism with regards to America's behaviour on the world stage, please spare me.

I probably did just that in your opinion, but "whataboutism" is of no relevance. Geopolitics isn't about morals or justifications for foreign interventions.

> I grew up behind the iron curtain so I experienced the "Russian Mir" first hand.

You and millions of others. So that gives you some sort of privilege to tell everyone about America and NATO? Also, Russia is not the USSR.

> I don't get this narrative - what escalation? What's there to be escalated?

It's find to support turning a border conflict into WWIII, but pretending like sending $40 billion of arms to Ukraine isn't an escalation is beyond the pale. Russia's yearly military budget is only $70 billion.

> I don't get this narrative - what escalation? What's there to be escalated?

Continually moving a hostile presence closer, and performing strategic encirclement, with missiles, is part of Russia's argument. This is an old argument too, and well known.

The well-known late Stephen F Cohen (2010) https://www.youtube.com/embed/mciLyG9iexE

The eminent John Mearsheimer (2015) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r4Oo-5vDvo

You were saying?

Hmm, why did you stop at 1939?

1938 has athing to say, too: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement

I would say American lobbying and propaganda in Sweden and Finland, which we've had for decades. We were already de facto members anyway though. On the other hand, it's not like we had a choice. We voted for anti-NATO parties who, after the war started, changed their position and rejected any referendum and refused to wait until the autumn elections. Polls showed that a majority in Sweden didn't want to join if Finland didn't (and a majority did if Finland did), so you can effectively restrict your question to Finland (maybe someone else here has more details on their case.) There was a good reason for joining if Finland did though. We dismantled a lot of our military at the end the cold war and so we relied on an exclusive partnership with Finland; thus, without them, we'd be pretty weak.

Losing some amount of autonomy to the U.S. is far preferable to what we are seeing in Ukraine, or even Belarus.

Edit: That being said, Sweden and Finland were already quite integrated as NATO partners. It's unclear to me, a layman, how much is really changing vs. just being formally declared.

Absolutely no details that we would be aware of. Diplomacy happens behind the scenes.

> what made Sweden and Finland finally want to join now after all these years?

Honestly I suspect that's just a momentary bout of mass irrationality (to put it politely). Both countries are completely safe, de-facto NATO members. Russia has no stated or implied interest in invading either. More importantly, Russia has no capacity to do so - they can barely push 50 km into Ukraine as it is.

America, otoh, has a lot to gain in extra weapons sales (remember NATO comes with a 2% of GDP spending target).