> For a period of 14 days, while actively investigating, Okta did not identify suspicious downloads in our logs. When a user opens and views files attached to a support case, a specific log event type and ID is generated tied to that file. If a user instead navigates directly to the Files tab in the customer support system, as the threat actor did in this attack, they will instead generate an entirely different log event with a different record ID.

> Okta’s initial investigations focused on access to support cases, and subsequently we assessed the logs linked to those cases. On October 13, 2023, BeyondTrust provided Okta Security a suspicious IP address attributed to the threat actor. With this indicator, we identified the additional file access events associated with the compromised account.

Ok, this is the part which seems truly embarrassing to me, and I understand why BeyondTrust and 1Password sounded so frustrated. Okta staff should know their own systems well enough to identify all potential endpoints / log events to review.

Original title (which was too long for HN): Unauthorized Access to Okta's Support Case Management System: Root Cause and Remediation