Russian TLD .RU fails DNSSEC validation(dnsviz.net) |
Russian TLD .RU fails DNSSEC validation(dnsviz.net) |
EDIT: rollout in some very large telecom here is still in progress, by region.
As user, I am unable to visit any pages on .ru domains, as their IP would not resolve.
Reason is highly likely mistake (human side) in signing procedure, not something time- or hack- related.
Someone is most likely CC for TLD RU, aka АНО КЦНДСИ, official registry of .ru TLD.
I can understand not using larger RSA key sizes for framing reasons, but what is stopping the DNSSEC ecosystem from using ECC?
[1]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.S...
The .EDU, .NET, and .COM zones were recently migrated from RSA to ECDSA (DNSSEC algorithm 13); see, for instance: https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/2023-Dec...
Anyone newly enabling DNSSEC on their zone should probably use ECDSA.
Also: why would you bother changing at this point? DNSSEC isn't getting traction (see, once again, Geoff Huston).
The 1024-bit key thing is unforgivable in 2024, but also endemic to DNSSEC.
There are others around which I won't link to right now lest they get clobbered too.
Also, the security chain is top-down, from owner of the TLD to the domain to the resolver to the client. With DNS over TLS and DNSCurve, you have it the other way around.
15bg9l6359f5ch23e34ddua6n1rihl9h.example.org
in zone file