Ask HN: How do most dry theory writers struggle to get started? I’m an independent researcher working on political modeling and some philosophical theory. Every essay I publish disappears without notice. I’ve decided not to chase current events just to get clicks. The problem isn’t quality of discussion, it’s that nobody even opens the articles. What else can someone in my position do? |
> nobody even opens the articles
Speaking for myself, if your article was (say) "Why [do] [the] UK and Japan still keep their monarch", you need to put your thesis in the title or tagline or first paragraph. If I don't see a coherent premise that at least sounds interesting or informative or novel (or contrarian, or satirical), I'll bounce. (Do you have analytics on which channels incoming readers come from? Experiment.)
And you could personalize the article with some anecdote/ historical reference/ quote/ illustration so it isn't all dry theory, which few will read. (Not to the degree popularizers like Freakonomics did, but somewhat.)
Anyway the reason the UK still keep their monarch is centuries of political inertia; if they abolished that they'd have to abolish peerages, the social order, honors lists, end the CoE being established state church (that issue alone is a hand-grenade), then they'd have to decide if they wanted an elected or appointed President etc etc. The fact that they never had a (long-lived) revolution means they don't have a (written) Constitution. It would also cause shock waves on their status wrt Canada, Australia, NZ, the Caribbean. So it's too anachronistic to persist, yet it's too complicated to change. Realistically they only get to make changes whenever the monarchy e.g. passes from Charles to William.
Japan is different: it was what the US permitted them to retain after WWII, to maintain continuity as they reshaped postwar Japan. If the US had forced too much change too fast, there could have been resistance.
The first two essays explain what these new dimensions are, with the second focusing on the logic of coupling. The third essay, which I am still working on, turns to detailed case studies.
If you are interested in reviewing or analyzing my arguments, I would be deeply grateful. I’ve attached my Medium link below and would very much welcome any feedback or criticism.
https://medium.com/why-democracy-fails/beyond-separation-of-...
In 7+ centuries Britain(/UK) the ruling class never had a revolution/civil war that lasted longer than a generation, hence the builtin default action is to continue with the monarchy and associated class system. This also avoids all the (enormous) internal and external turmoil I cited. (PS In the age of social media I don't think you can call a popular referendum 'democracy', Brexit being the very obvious example. It depends on how literate the electorate at large are, and how tight(/loose/nonexistent) the controls on media spending to manipulate them are.)
Whereas in Japan, it was the US occupation post-WWII which intentionally decided to keep the monarchy for social cohesion, while reducing it to being titular, and abolishing the nobility. This was the US's (and MacArthur's) architecting, not Japan's. It's not like Japan had a referendum or parliamentary debate about the Showa Consitution [0]. And one intent was to prevent Japan fracturing internally, but to keep it from going imperialist again, and totally dependent on the US militarily. (Japan didn't even have provision for a constitutional referendum until a decade ago, and if it ever achieves the 2/3 support to have one, it'll more likely be about removing the Self-Defense Clause than abolishing/reducing the monarchy.)
It would be an interesting what-if to conjecture how the US might have reshaped Britain in the 1940s, like Japan.
Re your article, it's a strength not a weakness that the US doesn't have a national/federal referendum, most states have a pretty active ballot initiative system, so e.g. state taxation, legalizing marijuana etc. can be tried out and then we have statistics to inform federal (legislative) policy-making, plus there's less inertia to undoing bad decisions, like when Michigan nearly taxed itself out of existence and all its jobs and young people emigrated (internally).
I wouldn't say the UK has a disciplined approach to referendums. You can't even tell what % of GDP was spent (by third-parties) on political/social-media influence campaigns during 2015/6 (Brexit referendum), not even now a decade later. Not just [1] but all the other campaigns and interest groups.
[0]: Showa Constitution of 1946, seems pretty clear it was authored by the US not Japan [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Japan]
[1]: "Arron Banks and the mystery Brexit campaign funds", FT 11/2018 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18382116
Archive: https://archive.ph/V4aHb
But the reasoning does not stop there. The most important additional constraint is that these three sources of legitimacy must never be coupled with the lower triad of separation of powers at the federal level. If they are, the result is destructive: for example, a monarch deciding executive affairs turns into dictatorship, while referendums deciding legislative matters become tyranny of the majority—the clearest case being Britain’s 51% vs. 49% Brexit vote. Only when the upper and lower dimensions remain uncoupled does democracy become highly resilient.
I believe Britain has not done well in resisting this vertical coupling, while the United States has yet to fully develop the concept of a ceremonial sovereign. What I am sketching is a somewhat complex six-dimensional model of democratic tension. If it takes shape, it might provide an optimal solution to democracy, building on Lijphart’s two-dimensional model—but I have not yet reached a full conclusion.
At present I am writing a comparative study of constitutional monarchy in Britain and Japan. I am deeply grateful for your help and inspiration. Recently I have been studying everything from Britain’s last royal veto in 1708, to modern European referendums, to the unique features of Japan’s constitutional text. This is time-consuming work, but thanks to AI, my efficiency has already improved greatly.
What you want to call "The Symbolic Sovereign" boils down to a (reasonably) independent judiciary/Supreme Court/High Court + (optionally) a constitutional monarch or ceremonial president, which the US does not have as a separate office (that gap gets filled by other nonprofits, watchdogs, civic bodies, activists like Leonard Leo, media organizations, churches, commentators like Jon Stewart, interest groups, lobbyists, authors). Couldn't we just call that "rule of law + an independent civil society + media"?
But the US Supreme Court is(/used to be) credible not because it rarely took action, but because justices and their rulings (and the appointment process) were non-partisan. Pre-Citizens United (2010), anyway.
Post-2013 the US now has unlimited untraceable dark money in politics, amplified by social media to inject influence into the political process. I think that renders it utterly irrelevant now whether a country has a popular referendum process (or else uses the executive or legislature to change things). Clearly this leaked into other countries. At least a-decade-and-a-half ago.
If you have enough money you can now pervert/coopt any of these. The details are irrelevant (unless you're doing a post-mortem). Scott Galloway keeps warning about increasing inequality of wealth in US politics: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEJ4hkpQW8E
You don't want to talk about social media + money replacing discourse, post-2010. I think that intentional omission alone invalidates everything else in your analysis. At least tell me why you disagree.
Pointing out the Brexit vote was only 51-49 doesn't matter; with more spending it could have been made 60-40 but then the electorate might have smelled the rat that's been there for smelling for a long time. Why have 40+ years of UK referendum process not resulted in any referendum on anything constructive, e.g. renationalizing UK water, electricity and railways? How has that not happened, if the UK is a functioning democracy?
But where we differ is on the role of referendums. I do not see referendums as inherently democratic; their scope must be strictly limited. Using referendums to decide day-to-day policy (Brexit being the obvious case) is dangerous, because it allows short-term passion and financial influence to reshape a country’s direction. By contrast, referendums that are narrowly restricted to constitutional amendments carry a different weight and legitimacy.
This is why I emphasize that the “upper triad” (constitutional state, symbolic sovereign, and referendum) must remain separate from the “lower triad” (executive, legislature, judiciary). When they couple vertically, the results are destructive: a monarch deciding executive affairs becomes dictatorship, while referendums deciding legislative matters become tyranny of the majority. Only when the two dimensions are kept apart does democracy gain true resilience.
As for the United States: yes, the Supreme Court has historically played a quasi-sovereign role. But unlike the common view, I would argue its credibility has come from greater restraint—speaking only on the most fundamental constitutional questions, not by becoming more entangled in daily legislative and administrative disputes. The increased politicization since Citizens United shows how quickly resilience erodes once the symbolic anchor is dragged into ordinary partisan combat.
Civil society and media absolutely matter. But they are always active participants in daily contestation. What my model requires is at least one symbolic institution that stands above politics—its authority latent, not constant. That distinction is crucial for long-term stability.
The same reasoning applies to political figures. Even someone like Trump should certainly be allowed to explore different executive strategies. But the system must never allow him—or anyone else—to undermine state sovereignty, trigger populist plebiscites on ordinary policy, or erode the separation of powers. Flexibility in policy and rupture in constitutional order must remain categorically distinct.
I do not deny the corrosive influence of money and media platforms. On the contrary, that is my starting point. My point is simply this: because we cannot fully control these forces, democracy must be designed with either sufficient redundancy, or strong institutional anchors—and ideally both—while still allowing individuals in society to voice diverse perspectives. Without such architecture, democracies that look stable in calm times will appear dangerously fragile when the storm comes.
And for ordinary citizens, if dark money and social media manipulation become a systemic cancer, resilience still exists in layers. At the shallowest level, you can “vote with your feet” by moving to a clearer state environment. Deeper, you can keep appealing to the Supreme Court as a constitutional guardian. At the state level, you still defend your values with one person one vote. And at the very last resort, the people themselves remain the ultimate guarantor that democracy cannot be permanently hijacked.
Sure in principle, a (US or UK) referendum process would have to be safeguarded, if all the other legs of healthy democracy were still in place, and the (US) judiciary hadn't already in 2010 removed the mechanism by which excessive money coud be kept out of politics, but that's all well in the rear-view mirror.
I think your analysis is wanting to hang everything on some structurally independent mechanism that will persist longterm, regardless whether it's a referendum mechanism or rule of law + independent media.
> At the state level, you still defend your values with one person one vote.
No you can't do that either, because only a few (27+16 / 438) Congressional districts in 2024 were toss-up/competitive and not safe/gerrymandered, per Brennan/Cook Political Report [2]. And when one party establishes a quadrifecta in a state, they try to lock down that numerical advantage for another decade or two.
[0]: "U.S. Debt Is on Pace to Set a Record High, Going All the Way Back to 1790" https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/20/upshot/record-debt-republ...
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEJ4hkpQW8E
[2]: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/comp...
But precisely because corruption runs so deep, structural anchors are more essential, not less. You say it’s deckchairs on the Titanic, but isn’t the better analogy to ask whether we can refine them into lifeboats? Otherwise, collapse is the only destination.
If we abandon the search for resilient anchors, then democracy becomes exposed to only two paths: slow erosion into dysfunction, or a dangerous temptation toward authoritarian shortcuts. Structural anchors may not be perfect, but without them, there’s nothing left to resist the slide.