Hi, Ted here, creator of Mog.

- Mog is a statically typed, compiled, embedded language (think statically typed Lua) designed to be written by LLMs -- the full spec fits in 3,200 tokens. - An AI agent writes a Mog program, compiles it, and dynamically loads it as a plugin, script, or hook. - The host controls exactly which functions a Mog program can call (capability-based permissions), so permissions propagate from agent to agent-written code. - Compiled to native code for low-latency plugin execution -- no interpreter overhead, no JIT, no process startup cost. - The compiler is written in safe Rust so the entire toolchain can be audited for security. Even without a full security audit, Mog is already useful for agents extending themselves with their own code. - MIT licensed, contributions welcome.

Motivations for Mog:

1. Syntax Only an AI Could Love: Mog is written for AIs to write, so the spec fits easily in context (~3200 tokens), and it's intended to minimize foot-guns to lower the error rate when generating Mog code. This is why Mog has no operator precedence: non-associative operations have to use parentheses, e.g. (a + b) * c. It's also why there's no implicit type coercion, which I've found over the decades to be an annoying source of runtime bugs. There's also less support in Mog for generics, and there's absolutely no support for metaprogramming, macros, or syntactic abstraction.

When asking people to write code in a language, these restrictions could be onerous. But LLMs don't care, and the less expressivity you trust them with, the better.

2. Capabilities-Based Permissionsl: There's a paradox with existing security models for AI agents. If you give an agent like OpenClaw unfettered access to your data, that's insecure and you'll get pwned. But if you sandbox it, it can't do most of what you want. Worse, if you run scripts the agent wrote, those scripts don't inherit the permissions that constrain the agent's own bash tool calls, which leads to pwnage and other chaos. And that's not even assuming you run one of the many OpenClaw plugins with malware.

Mog tries to solve this by taking inspiration from embedded languages. It compiles all the way to machine code, ahead of time, but the compiler doesn't output any dangerous code (at least it shouldn't -- Mog is quite new, so that could still be buggy). This allows a host program, such as an AI agent, to generate Mog source code, compile it, and load it into itself using dlopen(), while maintaining security guarantees.

The main trick is that a Mog program on its own can't do much. It has no direct access to syscalls, libc, or memory. It can basically call functions, do heap allocations (but only within the arena the host gives it), and return something. If the host wants the Mog program to be able to do I/O, it has to supply the functions that the Mog program will call. A core invariant is that a Mog program should never be able to crash the host program, corrupt its state, or consume more resources than the host allows.

This allows the host to inspect the arguments to any potentially dangerous operation that the Mog program attempts, since it's code that runs in the host. For example, a host agent could give a Mog program a function to run a bash command, then enforce its own session-level permissions on that command, even though the command was dynamically generated by a plugin that was written without prior knowledge of those permission settings.

(There are a couple other tricks that PL people might find interesting. One is that the host can limit the execution time of the guest program. It does this using cooperative interrupt polling, i.e. the compiler inserts runtime checks that check if the host has asked the guest to stop. This causes a roughly 10% drop in performance on extremely tight loops, which are the worst case. It could almost certainly be optimized.)

3. Self Modification Without Restart: When I try to modify my OpenClaw from my phone, I have to restart the whole agent. Mog fixes this: an agent can compile and run new plugins without interrupting a session, which makes it dynamically responsive to user feedback (e.g., you tell it to always ask you before deleting a file and without any interruption it compiles and loads the code to... actually do that).

Async support is built into the language, by adapting LLVM's coroutine lowering to our Rust port of the QBE compiler, which is what Mog uses for compilation. The Mog host library can be slotted into an async event loop (tested with Bun), so Mog async calls get scheduled seamlessly by the agent's event loop. Another trick is that the Mog program uses a stack inside the memory arena that the host provides for it to run in, rather than the system stack. The system tracks a guard page between the stack and heap. This design prevents stack overflow without runtime overhead.

Lots of work still needs to be done to make Mog a "batteries-included" experience like Python. Most of that work involves fleshing out a standard library to include things like JSON, CSV, Sqlite, and HTTP. One high-impact addition would be an `llm` library that allows the guest to make LLM calls through the agent, which should support multiple models and token budgeting, so the host could prevent the plugin from burning too many tokens.

I suspect we'll also want to do more work to make the program lifecycle operations more ergonomic. And finally, there should be a more fully featured library for integrating a Mog host into an AI agent like OpenClaw or OpenAI's Codex CLI.