I remember one particular one a few decades ago, where I was feverishly (pun intended) trying to achieve something with XML, only it being a fever dream, nothing of it made sense, so I was wracking my brain for nonsense those entire hours.
(tangent) Also, please forgive my question which may seem impolite but I really want to know: why did you type "whilst" instead of "when" or "while"? Have you ever said the word "whilst" out loud, in a normal conversation? More letters, an extra (half)syllable, zero meaning or nuance added, I just don't get it. I wonder this every time I see it, mean no disrespect and would be grateful for a straightforward reply. (/tangent)
Whilst to me is like being in the midst of something, not just that it is happening somewhere. It seems to have more specificity than 'while'.
"Whilst boarding the train..." Is going to be followed by something personal or hypothetical.
However, I think I'm prone to overlaying a gloss on words that isn't necessarily shared.
As I intimated 'whilst' I would use in philosophical contexts, arguments where there are alternative hypotheticals, say. "Whilst it might be said...".
Most likely it's just subconsciously learned, a product of native/mother tongue learning.
Would be interesting to see the word vectors extracted from literature/media moving over time and across contexts in order to make a comparison.
I find that I have two personalities and my writing/text personality is much more sagacious and better spoken (if that makes sense??)
> ... neural signals could predict upcoming words in a sentence. ... This kind of predictive coding is something we associate with being awake and attentive, yet it’s happening here in an unconscious state
In psycholinguistics, the assumption is, and always has been, that language processing is unconscious, a background process like visual object recognition. For starters, conscious attention is too slow by two orders of magnitude, and infants can process language, while presumably not yet (fully) conscious.
Sleep-learning https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleep-learning
Also, Sleep and learning https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleep_and_learning
A bit more seriously, the brain actually uses a significant chunk of the body's energy budget (no matter how efficient it is relative to human made equipment). So evolutionarily, it doesn't make sense unless it's doing something exceptionally useful.
Or... well, ok, maybe they can't experience if they are not conscious? I see how this can be argued, but I still do not agree. I'm sure qualia is created not by consciousness (I would notice if it was), and I'm sure it is created not for consciousness specifically, it must have some other uses too.
> I'm sure qualia is created not by consciousness
Whether or not qualia is created by consciousness, I don't see how we necessarily can tell one way or the other. We don't exactly have great introspective tools to do such self analysis, not to mention what we think we feel is often illusory/not reflective of reality.
(I think there are overwhelming reasons to think that LLMs don't experience qualia, but this has nothing to do with it.)
You're saying the discovery that humans can process language without being conscious "couldn't possibly" inform the debate about LLMs? When that debate is literal predicated on the assumption that the ability to process language implies consciousness?
This is a counter example to the fundamental assumption of that argument. Without that, you are left with something like "if we ignore their ability to to process language, do we have any reason to suppose that LLMs (as opposed to, say, a spread sheet or stats package) are conscious?"
I broke my leg recently. Shortly after that I've lost my consciousness. It was very painful, the body reacted with a lot of adrenaline, and after a several minutes when adrenaline was drained away my consciousness was drained too.
I experienced something like this several times, though not to the point of fainting. But this time was special in other way too: I had friends near me, they observed me through all the process and we could compare our observations later. It seems, that my memory stopped recording before I fainted. I was still operating to some extent, but I couldn't remember a thing. When asked something I grunted in answer. When one of my friends insisted that I stand up and come to a better place to sit down, I actually stand up and did several steps before stopping and slowly (and carefully) sank to the ground. (An interesting observation, my controls over my body were weakening, but I was still using them for what they worth. It fits with all other similar experiences: the limbs and all the muscles seem to be losing their strength, and it takes a lot of will to make them work.)
On the light of this, I'm very interested what proponents of the idea, that feelings need consciousness to work, would say about my half-unconscious state. Did I feel myself extremely bad at the time? Or maybe I didn't feel anything? My friends are sure that the former statement is true, but they may be mistaken by my outside looks. I personally don't remember. Up to some point I remember that I felt really bad, but the next thing I remember I look at the sky and I'm surprised by what I see (I was not in a place I expected to be). And at that moment I was pretty ok already, no more adrenaline issues, just my leg was aching.
Was I experiencing qualia is another interesting question. I'm pretty sure I was, but I'd like to hear an argument for the opposite.
I’d be REALLY curious to see a survey of philosophy 2015 vs 2025 UG entrants on mind-brain connection intuitions
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/12/21/the-mystery-of-c...
"For [John Searle's] part, he has one argument, the Chinese Room, and he has been trotting it out, basically unchanged, for fifteen years. It has proven to be an amazingly popular number among the non-experts, in spite of the fact that just about everyone who knows anything about the field dismissed it long ago. It is full of well-concealed fallacies. By Searle’s own count, there are over a hundred published attacks on it. He can count them, but I guess he can’t read them, [...]"
I don’t think that “experience as such” makes any sense. Experience is always of something. And that in turn implies that the something that is being experienced also exists independently of it being experienced.
I’m not one of these proponents, but to play the devil’s advocate: The fact that you can’t remember it doesn’t necessarily imply that you didn’t fully consciously experience it at the time.
Do you have any sources for the first claim? The second claim is of course trivially wrong.
> When that debate is literal (sic) predicated on the assumption that the ability to process language implies consciousness?
This is an incoherent claim. Debates are between people with differing claims and often differing assumptions; they aren't "predicated" on some assumption or another--that's a category mistake.
Someone can easily argue that LLMs are conscious (or have qualia--that was the disputed claim, and they aren't the same thing) without the strong claim that the ability to process language entails consciousness ... perhaps it is the processing of language together with other features that they think indicates consciousness. For instance, George Lemoine and Richard Dawkins didn't base their judgments on consciousness on such an entailment, but rather on the specifics of what the LLMs said to them.
I won't respond about this again.
The only reason we are having the argument at all is that people see LLMs responding appropriately to language, and _from_that_ conclude that LLMs may be conscious. You even sneak this in yourself when you say "George Lemoine and Richard Dawkins didn't base their judgments on consciousness on such an entailment, but rather on the specifics of what the LLMs said to them" -- in other words, they wouldn't have had judgements in the first place if the LLMs had not "said things to them".
Moreover, thinking about it, I come to a conclusion, that if I cannot reflect on qualia creation, then it is a (weak) evidence for qualia created by consciousness. I suppose the consciousness is harder to reflect on than other things, hard to map it into states of the content of consciousness. Like, I can reflect on my vision and see some hints on how I get these wonderful pictures, despite it being definitely not consciousness, I can reflect on how I produce or decode language. And to my mind it is because consciousness was devised to reflect on these things, so I could report on my observations to others. But to reflect on itself is a wholly different matter.
But yes, I would like to see a modern philosophers take on it.
I won't respond further.