The text describes the world to humans. This is the crucial thing that you miss. It is very subjective.

Imagine that you learn the grammar of a foreign language without learning the meaning of the words. You might be able to make grammatically valid sentences. But you will still will not understand a single thing that something written in that language describes. But that will be perfectly clear to someone who actually understand the meaning of the words.

When you train LLMs on large volumes of text that describe logically consistent facts in a million different ways, the "logic" sort of becomes part of the grammer that the model learns. That is logic becomes a higher kind of "grammer" or a enormous set of grammatical rules that it captures. But that does not mean the model can do actual logic.

That's captured elsewhere - attempts to create "synthetic human behavior" - but mostly around ethics vs practical function or consumer appeal.

Even just a "stochastic parrot" can be extremely valuable if the parrot is fast enough and can connect enough dots in a human-reasoning-style to say things like "what could come after a description of a problem, some background info, and a question about what could have caused the problem? Probably a relevant hypothesis that fits the background facts and the problem description" and then generate a high-probability-fitting sequence of text to spit out.

There doesn't need to be any more intent in that than just "predict what would be the next text that would be similarly connected to the previous in the same way text in the model training process would." It doesn't need to be intending to solve the problem if the hit rate is good enough such that predicting how someone else would describe the solution is often the same as actually "intending" to solve it...

Nor does the ability to predict things stochasticly mean that there isn't any symbolic way to do the same. Quite possibly the stochastic process is just a brute-force rough approximation of what a true symbolic model could do. IMO the success of the stochastic approach is exactly in line with the existence of some sort of underlying structure/system. (Though such as system would have to be incredibly complex to support all the crazy things we do with language.)

When I prompt a coding agent to fix a bug, it outputs text describing a hypothesis and more text that results in running shell commands to test the hypothesis. If the output shows that it guessed wrong, it outputs more text to test a different hypothesis, and more text to edit code, and in the end, the bug is fixed.

The text resembles the output of a reasoning process closely enough to actually work. Maybe, for some purposes, it doesn't matter if it's "real" or not?

What does "real" reasoning do for us that the imitation doesn't do? Does it come up with better hypotheses? Is it better at testing them? Sometimes, but not always. Human reasoning is more expensive, less available, and sometimes gets poor results.

> Text generated by an LM is not grounded in communicative intent, any model of the world, or any model of the reader’s state of mind. It can’t have been, because the training data never included sharing thoughts with a listener, nor does the machine have the ability to do that. This can seem counter-intuitive given the increasingly fluent qualities of automatically generated text, but we have to account for the fact that our perception of natural language text, regardless of how it was generated, is mediated by our own linguistic competence and our predisposition to interpret communicative acts as conveying coherent meaning and intent, whether or not they do [89, 140]. The problem is, if one side of the communication does not have meaning, then the comprehension of the implicit meaning is an illusion arising from our singular human understanding of language (independent of the model). Contrary to how it may seem when we observe its output, an LM is a system for haphazardly stitching together sequences of linguistic forms it has observed in its vast training data, according to probabilistic information about how they combine, but without any reference to meaning: a stochastic parrot.

Do you really think that claiming the output of an LLM “has no reference to meaning” is not an empirical claim? That it doesn’t attempt to place any bounds whatsoever on what LLMs can and cannot do? LLMs can solve some very difficult mathematical problems quite well now: see the article from Gowers that was on here recently. Do you think that the output in a situation like that “has no reference to meaning?” If so, you’ll have to explain why, because I don’t understand at all.

and

> "Meanwhile you have multiple Fields Medalists (Tau, Gowers) saying they’re very impressed by LLMs’ mathematical reasoning, something that the stochastic parrots thesis (if it has any empirically-predictive content at all) would predict was impossible. I doubt Tau and Gowers thought much of LLMs a few years ago either. But they changed their minds. Who do you want to listen to?"

I don't understand how these things are supposedly incompatible.

Larger models and further other refinement reduce the "haphazardness" of produced text. A big enough model with enough semantic connections between different words/phrasings/etc plus enough logical connections of how cause and effect, question and answer, works in human language can obviously stitch together novel sequences when presented with novel prompts. (The output was not limited to sequences of n words that appeared 1:1 in the training data for any n for at least three and a half years now, if not even back to when the paper was written.)

"without any reference to meaning" veers into the philosophical (see how much "intent" is brought up in the linked post today). But has anything been proven wrong about the idea that the text prediction is based on probabilistic evaluation based on a model's training data? E.g. how can you prove "reasoning" vs "stochastic simulated reasoning" here?

Perhaps a useful counterfactual (but hopelessly-expensive/possibly-infeasible) would be to see if you could program a completely irrational LLM. Would such a model be able to "reason" it's way into realizing its entire training model was based on fallacies and intentionally-misleading statements and connections, or would it produce consistent-with-its-training-but-logically-wrong rebuttals to attempts to "teach" it the truth?

> without any reference to meaning

is vague, but I read it as actually quite a strong claim about the limitations of LLMs. I don’t think it would be possible for LLMs to do long chains of correct mathematical reasoning about novel problems that they haven’t seen before “without any reference to meaning.” That simply isn’t possible just by regurgitating and remixing random chunks of training data. Therefore I consider the stochastic parrots picture of LLMs to be wrong.

It might have been an accurate picture in 2020. It is not an accurate picture now. What is often missed in these discussions is that LLM training now looks totally different than it did a couple years ago. RLVR completely changed the game, allowing LLMs to actually do math and code well, among other things.

Then… what’s the point of the label, if it’s not making any empirically-meaningful claims about LLMs at all? I know that LLMs involve sampling over a distribution of output logits. I’ve written code to do it. So what? I know they have statistical elements. Yet I don’t go around calling LLMs stochastic parrots, because that label implies a whole lot of claims about LLMs that I don’t think are true any longer, like that they are just regurgitating and remixing training data and can’t successfully model structured systems (like mathematics or programming).

She also says:

> What I am trying to do... is to help people understand what these systems actually are

Can a phrase that has no empirical content aid people in understanding an empirical phenomenon?

> the astonishing willingness of so many to... turn to synthetic text... for all kinds of weighty decisions.

Why is this astonishing, if the nature of these models as "stochastic parrots" places no limitations whatosever on their empirical capabilities, reliability, etc?

> the field of linguistics is particularly relevant in this moment, as a linguist’s eye view on language technology is desperately needed to help make wise decisions about how we do and don’t use these products

Is it wise to make decisions about a product on the basis of information that has no relevance to how it is actually likely to behave?

(It may be, if one has ethical concerns with "data theft, the exploitative labor practices", etc -- but one could have such concerns about any kind of product, not just a "stochastic parrot", and linguists are not generally academia's experts on, e.g., labor practices.)

https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

Not only would it be a leap to suggest that people automatically lose their integrity by taking funds for projects they believe are useful, especially after involvement with adjacent fields, but you are suggesting merely being impressed by a fund is enough to dismiss their views?

You also have no evidence that Renaissance Philanthropies is a front for VC companies. All news coverage indicates that they seek to be an alternative for high net worth individuals engaging in philanthropy.

Many people discovering Erdos results, engaging in Olympiads etc, are doing so with publicly available models and publish the resources used in the process.