The better the autopilot the worse the pilot(julienreszka.com) |
The better the autopilot the worse the pilot(julienreszka.com) |
The entire premise of a system is that it removes the need for careful attention.
system: signal lights tell me whether or not I can pass through an intersection, so that I do not have to attend to potentially high speed traffic from a variety of directions.
system: the side my knife blade sits on my arched guide fingers, so that I do not have to attend to the edge of the blade or the location of my fingers.
etc etc.
I think this premise is flawed or, at best, too narrow. A system is just a logical grouping of items that perform a function. Sometimes that function can be to reduce cognitive burden, but it doesn't have to be. A "vision system" like what humans use does not reduce attention, but increases/enables it, while a autonomic nervous system can reduce attention. The ability to increase/reduce attention is not the central principle of a system.
No they don't, they tell you and other vehicles to stop. You would fail your driving test if you depend only on the traffic lights and don't bother to verify it is safe to pass yourself.
(If safety/the red phase was the purpose, the intersection would use a roundabout instead.)
You know I noticed this... I lived in a country where people obey traffic laws, and in a country where they very much don't.
I witnessed many more traffic accidents in the country where people are used to relying on the traffic lights to tell them if it's safe or not.
Whereas in the other country, everyone correctly assumes that the other drivers are completely insane, and so they stay vigilant.
Now I do think the science shows if you design roads and systems to make drivers more thoughtful it can improve outcomes. Size roads for the speed limit, roundabouts, etc. these can make a difference as it balances the system.
The insane driving country has double the traffic related deaths as the chill, lawful driving country.
For example, if you live somewhere where you use the highway more often, that sure as heck can skew the result.
Or if you live(d) somewhere where people tend to hit and run instead of waiting... you're obviously not going to witness them as often.
Also, note that accidents and injuries are not the same thing. You can totally have fewer accidents but more injuries or fatalities.
Without knowing the neighborhoods you've lived in (so people can compare the data for themselves) you're really not going to make a compelling case.
People die on road more in countries that conventionally don't follow traffic laws.
Someone learning to fly may be described as paying careful attention: to every little sound, vibration, and sensation. A common tactic by student pilots is overcontrolling the aircraft, e.g., large sudden changes rather than smooth pressures from flying with a light touch.
Automation requires active, intentional attention particularly when flying in clouds. What are my instruments telling me? Are they all telling the same story? Have any failed? Which ones?
A significant part of flight training and testing emphasizes the ability to divide attention between multiple competing needs, being able to correctly prioritize them, and responding promptly and safely in order of priority.
If your task is for example, to pilot a preset route with stable condition and very low surprise, you will fall for the "getting too comfortable" trap and we tend to start to get lazy(or efficient) and offload the mental effort and skills atrophy. A common workaround to this is to have regular training(deliberate practice) that introduce the "tricky" situation to keep the skill up. Problem ofc arises when people don't keep this up.
This can be seen in the diagnostic performance differences between junior and senior doctors, not always in the favor to the senior [3]. If you add a layer of automation but the insight gathered by working on that layer is great (and falls off) then deliberate practice start to become a requirement
[1] https://commoncog.com/putting-mental-models-to-practice/
>The argument for automation is that it frees up cognitive bandwidth. Fewer routine decisions means more headroom to think carefully about the ones that matter.
So if the expectation is that the human pilot is expected to pay attention to mitigate the dangerous edge cases "that matter", there is a contradiction: the tool that promises to free up the bandwidth for that attention creates a complacency that prevents that attention from being applied.
In other words, it makes the normal situations safer but the abnormal situations more dangerous.
[1] https://static1.squarespace.com/static/644321e78cd2dd37613af...
There are, of course, many benefits to automation such standardisation, measurability and the list goes on. Plus cuurrently we have this sweet spot where the workforce contains several generations who have experienced both very manual and highly automated processes. This dual experience is invaluable for investigation and continuous improvement. It makes me wonder what will happen when the workforce consists entirely of operators and engineers who simply press start most of the time.
5min to learn. A week of normal driving to get not bad. I wouldn't say it's hard.
It certainly takes more than a week!
Also if you know that automation induced complacency is a thing then it must surely become a target for training, surveillance, and adaptation not mere hand wringing.
In aviation, commercial pilots have very strict and extensive training and monitoring and as a result are generally able to utilize automation effectively while keeping up their manual skills. There are very rarely CFIT incidents in major commercial airlines.
The opposite is true in general aviation (small private Cessnas, etc), where it’s extremely common for pilots to buy more plane than they can handle and then rely on automation to bridge their skill gap. CFIT is much more common in general aviation, along with incorrect actions in response to real system failures that should have been recoverable. Automation complacency regularly kills in general aviation.
A key thing to notice is that automation isn’t outright prohibited in either commercial or general aviation, but there are distinct regulatory frameworks based on potential impact.
We accept looser rules for general aviation because the failures are societally less severe and because the population is much larger so effective training and enforcement would be significantly harder. In commercial airliners where failures are catastrophic, we have much stricter policies and require training and testing regularly to avoid automation complacency.
Will we start to see this practice in software? Probably, but only if/when the societal cost of NOT doing it becomes more clear. We regulated aviation because crashing planes are obviously bad. We license structural engineers because collapsing bridges are obviously bad. Will automation-induced software failures hit a similar tipping point?
I know this is an analogy to AI, but I wish we would dispense with this idea that there’s some appropriate level of machinery which was reached just a hair before right now. There is no appropriate level of machinery, no point at which the nature of the system itself will unambiguously say “that’s enough.”
Actually this could be a side channel to measure the efficiency of automation. If the human operators are just as good in every aspect as before, we know all the money put into automation is wasted.
I wonder what we'd call the children today in hindsight and what line they're chasing now...
Evidence: Look at the most recent article on this blog: https://julienreszka.com/blog/difficult-conversations-don-t-...
"Memory is reconstructive. When someone recalls events differently, it feels like gaslighting. It usually isn't. Document first, then negotiate."
Bleugh
If the automation is for the easy/routine stuff, then no. The automation doesn't work in exactly the most safety-critical situations, and then the human operator is thrust into fixing the situation without the full context.
even if the average rate goes up tor net benefit, are organizations prepared for increased carastrophic failures?
Any equipment on the aircraft can and will fail. Becoming dependent on autoland — not a worry on most general aviation aircraft — is terrible risk management. Every pilot must maintain hand flying skills. Automation is nice and reduces workload, but the pilot must actively manage it.
Not to mention that they get mandated regular reviews of their ability to fly manually. And even with that, there's still a reason why "children of the magenta line" (i.e. pilots who passively follow automated systems into danger and/or have seriously degraded stick-and-rudder skills) has become a term.
On top of that I'm sorry but you seem to have skimmed over both the article and what I said in favour of clutching pearls at some nebulous entity apparently claiming that "automation should be ripped out" when what is actually being explained to you is that without actual, manual, hands-on, current experience the "human in the loop" loses the ability to properly control or take over from an automated system - and worse, the ability to even understand when it is doing something nonsensical and/or dangerous.
As an aside, I assume that by "radar systems" you are referring to radio navigation aids. Like I've already mentioned (though in fairness not everyone knows what a non-precision approach means), pilots of airliners are still trained to fly without them, are expected to know how to fly without them, and shockingly enough DO fly without them in the real world where equipment fails or cannot even be installed at all. I know most of the software that people write here is insulated by several layers of abstraction from the hardware, but surely we haven't already lost the understanding that automated systems are not in fact magic - that they depend on real world hardware with real world physical constraints?
Taking off, flying, and landing are all absolutely required in the normal operation of a plane. If your plane is not engineered in such a way that landing is normal, it won't last long
An abnormal landing would be something like trying to land with a broken elevator surface.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20020021642/downloads/20...
A more recent example is the Boeing 737-Max where there was a focus on automating trim control. In that case, the automation made the system more complex, to the detriment of a pilot understanding and reacting to an abnormal operation.
We should also be careful that we don't create a false dichotomy between "all automated or no automation", or an expectation that more automation is always better. The goal should be the right balance that increases reliability/safety.
To be fair this is not entirely accurate: a focus was made on stall prevention in a very specific mode of flight given the variant's increased susceptibility to pitch-power coupling. It did not make the system any more complex per se than other airliners - see e.g. Airbus aircraft which do actually have autotrim in normal flight. The actual kicker was that the existence of MCAS was hidden to avoid the need for lengthy re-training of pilots if the 737 MAX was deemed sufficiently different from its predecessor variants (on top of MCAS being rather poorly implemented in its first iteration).
In contrast, most careless driving habits don't actually get anybody to their destination any quicker.
So too is what's happening with LLMs: they're writing code that the programmer is increasinging unaware of and the programmer is increasingly not capable of understanding because they dont have the experience of writing and navigating complex codes. So in the event of a permissions prompt, the fallback condition, you have the same race condition between increasing automation removing the knowledge generation of the operator.
So there's obviously a rubicon where automation _has_ to be 100% because no operator can be a fallback.
You can't make that assertion (well you can, it's called "lying with statistics" but that's beside the point) without knowing if the fatalities the result of the accident rate or just a higher conversion ratio as a result of reduced safety equipment, reduced seatbelt usage, more motorcycles, etc, etc, worse emergency services, etc, etc.
INB4 other people start whining on your behalf, I'm not saying those countries aren't less safe to drive, just that you can't do a straight comparison of accident rates and fatalities without considering the conversion ratio.
But at some point you have to look at the totality of the evidence. Countries with better road infrastructure, enforcement, vehicle standards, and driving behavior generally produce better safety outcomes. The fact that multiple factors contribute doesn’t make the observed outcome meaningless.
As I already stated there is absolutely systems that increase the perceived sense of risk that can help outcomes (road width sizing, roundabouts, minimal signs/lines) but those typically work best in a system where there is already some sense of order.
Less Reddit style snark would go a long way too.
Secondly, MCAS autonomously adjusts trim based on sensor inputs to avoid a hazard. It is not advisory and directly controls flight surfaces. This would make it automation according to how organizations like NASA categorize flight software taxonomy.
Not to mention I lost count of how many dozens of accidents I witnessed in my year there. I've personally been in 3 rickshaw crashes.