If your threat model includes US state actors at the national border, then your security practices need to account for the confiscation of your device at that border without requiring you to willfully wipe the phone and (in the eyes of police and prosecutors) destroy evidence.
That means:
1. Don't travel with anything you can't afford to lose on device. This means setting up travel-specific password managers and hardware keys for a subset of your accounts that you absolutely need to access while abroad, and being prepared to reset those passwords and disable those hardware keys very quickly once home.
2. Review past legal cases against travelers and identify what behaviors the government considers worthy of prosecution or harassment. Your secure setup must function without needing you to engage in those behaviors, even if it is less convenient as a result. This isn't perfect, as the government may decide some new behavior is prosecutable.
3. Consult with a lawyer and review your security procedures from a legal standpoint. All of the above is technical and practical advice, not legal counsel and no substitute for it.
We Americans are fortunate to carry powerful passports and enjoy relatively easy international travel but, for better or worse, that velvet glove covers an iron fist we would be foolish to forget or ignore.
A duress PIN to wipe the device don't exist to absolve the owner of liability... It exists for when compromising the device could get people the owner cares about killed or disappeared and the owner considers their own liability, disappearance, or death a preferable outcome.
It is an extreme solution for extreme scenarios. People need to be sober in weighing its use.
Who said it was evidence? Did a judge authorize or issue a warrant to collect said evidence? Absent that, it's just your property, and you can do with it as you please.
“Hey! I saw you holding that Mexican pepper in Mexico, and then you threw it in that Mexican trash can before crossing into Texas!”
“Yeah, so?”
Though during traffic stops, if a defendant disposes of his drugs while on the run, that can also carry a charge of destroying evidence even though no warrant was issued.
IANAL
Something like this may need to become the standars over duress pins which should be treated as a fallback or more extreme alternative. Right now, A single choice to reasonably and rightfully protect your privacy reuslts in jail time over something which likely wouldnt have resulted in any issues if superficial compliance was observed.
These goons, even if a branch of a facist regime, are ultimately burocrats with violent options to settle. They aren't doing forensics on your device etc. They have neither means nor knowledge to do so. They just need to tick their boxes. Did the phone unlock? tick. Did our spyware complain? no? tick. Overall appearance of compliance from person? yes? tick. free to go, next!
You just have to find ways to stay safe without agitating their workflow and all is well.
- [1] https://veracrypt.io/en/VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%20Sys...
Most previous court cases involving encrypted devices have required substantial proof that the encrypted device contained incriminating evidence. To be clear "you sent this illegal thing from your house" levels of evidence.
It mostly seems inept, if you are going to push to expand your powers you do it on strong cases where you know what happened. Doing it on weak cases like this gives a judge an opportunity to shut down that without giving you a chance of a meaningful conviction and without that you won't get any benefits...
A well-informed person will know this includes re-entering their own country.
The next thing you should know is how large the zone is in which border police have meaningful jurisdiction. Varies by country.
It is amazing how many people will try silly stuff like travelling for work without a visa.
this problem may be solvable by a purpose-built abstraction where every write no matter what address will look identical to the firmware (naively, a randomized key-value map).
See: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49057812
Implementing it in a convincing way is harder than you think. Moreover if you're under the type of regime that will throw you in jail for not giving up a password, they're probably not going to let you off the hook because they can't definitively prove you have a hidden volume.
Done well, I see no reason it should raise redflags in routine stops, so unless you're being targeted (at which point you've got way bigger problems) it should just seem like you're a run of the mill person who does not use their device to its full capacity, which is the majority of users.
at some point, having any mitigations even present is a problem. At some point being met with a boot password at all is a problem that puts you on a list. I have no solution there other than to not go to those countries or keep dummy hot.
Obviously a good alternative is a dummy device but it carries similar risks, and the best option is to simply not go to authoritarian shitholes like the USA. Thankfully I've been able to avoid/push for US folks visiting us instead, but honestly the alternatives are as bad.
Its a shit situation where most reasonable actions carry real risks, its up to individuals to choose what is acceptable risk to them, but a dummy os you use as a daily driver for inconsequential work is, to me, an ideal midground.
See also relevant XKCD:
They don't have to, only that you destroyed evidence. That's why many people get prosecuted with "obstruction of justice" rather than the actual crime.
>While destruction of potential evidence does introduce a certain amount of leeway that doesn't allow going from absolutely nothing to "evidence was on the wiped device".
So if someone was doing insider trading, and the SEC came knocking, then immediately afterwards they start burning every document they have and microwaving their computers, do you think they should get off the hook? Surely you must think, even if the authorities or society can't a priori know you were guilty, the subsequent activity should be illegal? Note this isn't the same as banning burning documents or microwaving computers, only doing so after you're aware there's an ongoing investigation.
Your example is fabricated since the justice department didn't even bring forward a specific crime they believe was committed here.
If they charged him with a crime and had evidence his device had evidence of that crime (even if in reality it didn't) that would be a more interesting question.
But again where is the crime?
Apples and oranges. They presumably already have some sort of evidence in order to get a warrant and are under criminal investigation.
According to the article the agents said it was just a normal part of screening.
Attorneys are supposed to be adversarial. The system's soundness shouldn't depend on anything more than them not doing anything illegal.
Before public prosecutors, the job of a Grand Jury was to decide whether or not to hire a single-case prosecutor. Prosecutors were contractors, hired for a single case only, and prosecutorial decisions were made by the Grand Jury and nobody else.
1. SSDs (including phones) have TRIM/discard, so you need to disable it, otherwise the hidden volume would get wiped. You going out of your way to disable it is going to be suspicious.
2. Even if the above wasn't an issue, you can't really use the outer os to any meaningful extent, because you run the risk of overwriting the inner volume. That makes your decoy os suspicious. It's not definitive proof you have a hidden volume, but I doubt the authorities would care too much about that.
What if there was no warrant, and the SEC just came to ask questions?
Technically correct is not the same as practically correct.
They can detain you for days if you're not white. (Kavanaugh Stop)
That's as convincing as saying you burned all the documents because you don't want people who break in to read all your financial records. It just happened to start after the SEC came knocking