Something tells me the NSA is none too pleased about the advent of LLMs.

Or is there a tradeoff?

Fewer ancient holes like this for their hackers but wide open access to anyone who installs codex or claude code?

As the person who wrote the fix for this issue (and not the original code), I will just mention that I find this paragraph makes the author sound incredibly entitled:

    Shamefully, the inetutils project hasn’t actually released a fixed version of their software (at least at the time of publishing).

The bug was reported on a public mailing list, which is sadly common nowadays [1]. After my workday, during which I was not able to review the report, I wrote a script to confirm the bug was real, since I was seeing way too many slop reports at the time. Then I sent a patch before going to bed [2]. A third party then graciously shared the patch on oss-security [3], which all distributions follow. There is no need to make a new release, which is harder for the distributions than simply applying a small patch.

Perhaps I am just unlucky in my interactions, but I feel like this entitlement is too common among software security people. Note that I see zero return in spending time working on Inetutils, and I find other projects I work on more interesting.

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-inetutils/2026-03/msg... [2] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-inetutils/2026-03/msg... [3] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/12/4

> "1994" > "RISC was a distant dream"

Ahem

Needs a (March 19) (I know HN only does this for years, but this being about vulnerabilities…)

I really dislike articles that blow out of proportion the technical details. TLDR; bounds checking was missing leading to potential memory corruption.

FYI all signalling is in-band signalling

If you're going to rip off xkcd pictures, I feel it'd be polite at least credit and/or link the original.

A surprisingly long article for a one-line fix the authors didn’t send.

RISC was not a distant dream in 1994 LMAO.