Car Hacker's Handbook(opengarages.org) |
Car Hacker's Handbook(opengarages.org) |
Just FYI, this book literally teaches you how to identify security vulnerabilities in modern cars and exploit them.
You can purchase it from Amazon here[0], or download the book for free in EPUB[1] or PDF[2].
[0] http://www.amazon.com/2014-Hackers-Manual-Craig-Smith/dp/099...
[1] https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzxo-UKxFmN-bDlNSi1IT1JLdHM...
[2] https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzxo-UKxFmN-WFVjcEVVX3B5azg...
http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/24/8490359/general-motors-eff...
The article that you cited does not seem to advance the argument in your comment, even though it opens with a story of a company getting sued for actual copyright infringement. (Ford has not sued the "ForSCAN" team.)
The carmakers are bound by law to implement the OBD2 application with an acceptable OBD2 PHY. They are also bound by law to provide their dealer system for flash-programming and for operations that cannot be carried out using the OBD2 application. Anyone can obtain a J2534 gateway to use these tools, and anyone can obtain access to these tools.
This is necessary to resolve antitrust issues and because a broken car is a potential emissions problem.
The carmakers have not stopped thirdparty diagnostic providers from reverse engineering the carmakers' tools to develop their own tools for sale. Autoenginuity, Launch X431, Snap-On are examples of companies that do this and who have no connections to the vehicle manufacturer supply chain the way that Bosch, Actia, and Continental do.
https://web.archive.org/web/20150628210322/http://opengarage...
https://web.archive.org/web/20150525100844/http://opengarage...
https://web.archive.org/web/20150628210322/http://opengarage...
Many folks have mentioned how the Tesla Model S at least is more of a supercomputing cluster on wheels than a car with some ECUs. I don't know how armored their CAN bus(es) are, but I'm sure the "Attacking ECUs and other embedded systems" is giving some safety engineers white hair.
(of course, everything I've said about Tesla is just about equally applicable to other high-end vehicles. It's just that Tesla are a bit more connected to the traditional software world)
If the systems were properly documented for the owners I seriously doubt there would be a problem. Give people a USB stick with docs, sources and signing keys and those who can make sense of them are probably smart enough to hack responsibly.
Ahahahaaa!
It only takes one jerk to ruin it for everyone.
I would have bought the Kindle e-book for sure - Does Amazon allow pay-what-you-want?
In another news , access to the terminal is now based on an "authentication key" , root access is not enough. For development purposes , Harman provides these keys and they expire after a certain period of time. I am not sure those "fixed" telematic models are out there on the market currently.
The attacks in the book are low grade attacks just about anyone with just a basic curiosity could probably pull off - like making up a cable. Ford SYNC, for example, required signed payloads.
Infotainment systems, generally speaking, are not even on the same CAN bus as the engine control unit.
The book spends an inordinate amount of its pages talking about stuff you can easily google and get much more detailed and more accurate information like LIN, ODB2, etc...
Why not talk about CAN arbitration? The book fails to mention a simple attack vector everyone in automotive knows about. ArbID on CAN is not only unique to CAN frame but also used to win arbitration. You can flood a CAN bus with CAN frames using an ArbID of 0x01 or 0x00 to kick off a sort of denial of service attack.
The UDS hacks they talk about are not really hacks at all. They are part of what is known as right to service. Automotive manufacturers are not allowed to lock out small mom & pop service shops or 3rd party tools. The really sensitive stuff typically requires what is known as a VIN unlocker. For example, you can't easily change the ODO (odometer) value. With Ford ECUs, you get a DLL from Ford Motor and a key. You then take CAN data off the bus, pass it through the provided DLL and along with the key, get back a value that you send back out to "unlock" the ECU to program it. Why not talk about reverse engineering this?
They talk about CANiBUS which is a nice tool but a better one is Vehicle Spy which does the same thing and more. Chip tuners use this to reverse engineer the CAN signals.
In the industry, all these CAN bus signals can be decoded if you have what is called a DBC file. DBC file is file format used to lookup values to translate into human readable descriptions. The format is owned by Vector which is another company that makes, over priced, CAN diagnostic and simulation tools that everyone uses.
The Ethernet metasploit looks like pie in the sky talk. Every Ethernet system in a car today is basically infotainment system and benign data like album art, Mirrorlink, and simple data sharing between say a center stack and a cluster. There's nothing there... On top of this, every automotive ethernet is Broad-R-Reach which is Broadcom's 2-Wire Ethernet and to tap into it requires expensive demo boards from Broadcom. It's not like you can simply take a 2-wire Ethernet and put into a Linksys switch to see the packets. More misinformation.
The Keypad for the passive entry looks like good material but it, too, looks very dated.
sorry to be such a downer but felt after reading through the material they should be called out.. buyer beware.
* If the info there is as outdated as you say, where could one find a reasonably complete and up to date intro to car computer technology?
* Are there any tools out there that can be used for simulating a car network (CAN bus, ECU etc.) for lab purposes?
The box is really cool, it would be neat to develop our own applets, but mostly people are only interested in changing the splash screen. We found some really neat things about it too, for instance if a second device appears on the ethernet it can be a 'slave' to the first one and access its media.
We have seen demonstrations of the keyless cars from this automaker being started and driven without the actual rfid-key device. Someone apparently used some hardware to bruteforce the private key of the security controller so that the authorised rfid-key information can be read and modified. This is apparently becoming a problem in Europe where a car thief can simply drive east for a while and be out of reach of the law.
You won't find this in the public. You would need to work in the industry to get access to all the specs. Much of it is under NBA between companies.
' Are there any tools out there that can be used for simulating a car network (CAN bus, ECU etc.) for lab purposes?"
Yes, Vector CANOE is probably the most widely used tool for this. It has a scripting engine called CAPL that closely resembles the C programming language. dSPACE is another one.
“Due to the salvage status of your Model S , I have been instructed to cease providing you with parts. Tesla is very concerned about vehicles with salvaged titles being improperly repaired. Going forward, all salvaged vehicles must be inspected by us or our approved body shop, Precision Auto Body. If declared a candidate for proper repair, reconstruction must be completed by a Tesla-Certified Body Shop.”
Tesla are a small part of the automotive industry, a low volume manufacturer making products with limited availability. I think this will likely change one day, but for now, if I ran an indy mechanic shop, and advertised Tesla services, I would be surprised to get one inquiry in a year.
Tesla doesn't really lock it down any more than they need to for safety and sanity reasons, as far as I can tell.