15:[[47824463,{"by":"colesantiago","descendants":492,"id":47824463,"kids":[47829411,47826114,47826825,47825592,47832028,47826546,47824811,47826826,47824655,47831018,47824649,47825559,47825604,47824876,47826812,47831091,47830997,47825676,47832692,47825120,47827598,47826564,47831945,47825753,47825787,47835687,47840746,47834396,47827232,47825133,47827014,47825822,47833006,47826468,47830525,47830322,47824860,47826823,47831480,47824778,47826491,47824838,47827366,47828248,47831070,47829360,47825808,47826557,47827060,47825913,47829310,47824642,47826356,47977099,47947295,47875512,47834929,47829200,47886125,47886145,47829838,47828166,47846556,47825563,47827090,47829935,47834570,47829906,47824761,47827867,47826048,47829930,47827160,47827233,47825303,47830499,47826045,47827281,47825556,47824782,47824935],"score":867,"text":"https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...","time":1776608078,"title":"Vercel April 2026 security incident","type":"story","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vercel-confirms-breach-as-hackers-claim-to-be-selling-stolen-data/"}],[47692889,{"by":"yjcho9317","descendants":1,"id":47692889,"kids":[47697142,47727635],"score":1,"text":"$16","time":1775667308,"title":"Show HN: MCP-fence – MCP firewall I built and tried to break (6 audit rounds)","type":"story","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/mcp-fence"}],[47656608,{"by":"chrismeurer","descendants":3,"id":47656608,"kids":[47715040,47656630,47658439],"score":10,"time":1775445550,"title":"Show HN: Multi-agent coding assistant with a sandboxed Rust execution engine","type":"story","url":"https://github.com/christianmeurer/Lula"}],[47663147,{"by":"benswerd","descendants":158,"id":47663147,"kids":[47665887,47667273,47664499,47665917,47679269,47666254,47664910,47664587,47663754,47664302,47667719,47673066,47665454,47664441,47663474,47664315,47668764,47666516,47671674,47666602,47670122,47679360,47670587,47665924,47671104,47671055,47667224,47674891,47667286,47665609,47670695,47672123,47672447,47669242,47666423,47671618,47664666,47668619,47670525,47671254,47663864,47686788,47664925,47664844,47666929,47665301,47667001,47664335,47668964,47670771,47672138,47714344,47682017,47664299,47668435,47671444,47668245,47675773,47664082,47673942,47679001,47672878,47674036,47664674,47664480,47666333,47670445,47668399],"score":322,"text":"$17","time":1775493131,"title":"Launch HN: Freestyle – Sandboxes for Coding Agents","type":"story","url":"https://www.freestyle.sh/"}],[47704652,{"by":"michaelquigley","descendants":2,"id":47704652,"kids":[47714222,47710921],"score":4,"text":"MCP servers work great locally over stdio... until you need one on another machine, or want to share tools across a team. Most approaches to that involve exposing endpoints and managing network access. I built a tool that keeps remote MCP as simple and secure as local stdio.

mcp-bridge wraps any stdio MCP server in one command and shares it over a zrok/OpenZiti overlay. mcp-gateway aggregates multiple backends... local stdio servers and remote shares... into a single connection with a unified, namespaced tool registry. Permission filtering removes tools from the schema entirely... they're not checked at runtime, they're gone from the registry. No listening ports, no VPN, no port forwarding. Your MCP server doesn't change.

Go, Apache 2.0, single binaries, part of the OpenZiti project. Works seamlessly with the llm-gateway I introduced a couple of weeks ago.","time":1775746807,"title":"Show HN: MCP Gateway – Zero-Trust Access to MCP Tool Servers","type":"story","url":"https://github.com/openziti/mcp-gateway"}],[47691730,{"by":"blkhp19","descendants":328,"id":47691730,"kids":[47692860,47701168,47692465,47692305,47696003,47695027,47697948,47699107,47694061,47692582,47697213,47694302,47692554,47700071,47701210,47694029,47696066,47692444,47692189,47694237,47694223,47694062,47693797,47698415,47692096,47695781,47702352,47700968,47702279,47692631,47699542,47694679,47694782,47705074,47696953,47694972,47717995,47692217,47701597,47692342,47707931,47703282,47692688,47696615,47695619,47693158,47694777,47718575,47696082,47693065,47695826,47699745,47703077,47695850,47692177,47698758,47693409,47700860,47696160,47731551,47697317,47692227,47692439,47694304,47703546,47700580,47693931,47695411,47695735,47692191,47696301,47693503,47698892,47699421,47699006,47692558,47692517,47694393,47697457,47695859,47692169,47692393,47698209,47692431,47694615,47697334,47694463,47693775,47696902,47692654,47692473,47693816,47695622,47693237,47694155,47695311],"score":1924,"time":1775662800,"title":"I ported Mac OS X to the Nintendo Wii","type":"story","url":"https://bryankeller.github.io/2026/04/08/porting-mac-os-x-nintendo-wii.html"}],[47679121,{"by":"Ryan5453","descendants":836,"id":47679121,"kids":[47685285,47679745,47679406,47679397,47688452,47686445,47679653,47681769,47681825,47685847,47681896,47690125,47679433,47681164,47683200,47680125,47679428,47683506,47681367,47679529,47679364,47679276,47679418,47682135,47681619,47680897,47680272,47679542,47680698,47681369,47680503,47680291,47681069,47741137,47692284,47689809,47686948,47711779,47680155,47686020,47681915,47680297,47679706,47680782,47681767,47688907,47687352,47719445,47686366,47700656,47679453,47685607,47680574,47688043,47679798,47679658,47687011,47687355,47679578,47686075,47682700,47687968,47681998,47689226,47682001,47686900,47690102,47686099,47692669,47686552,47679215,47680523,47679450,47683941,47689899,47688534,47685560,47683243,47679814,47680936,47681984,47686984,47683528,47682613,47693287,47683309,47689041,47681082,47686233,47688691,47680067,47679922,47682257,47684947,47680251,47685058,47679464,47686465,47679427,47686200,47679625,47692195,47688185,47681480,47680907,47679502,47685107,47739184,47718139,47686946,47685492,47681422,47679969,47691478,47689322,47682033,47686895,47765782,47679574,47679635,47682494,47687830,47689087,47682946,47685290,47694865,47691124,47685088,47681682,47708293,47683028,47708943,47685017,47681426,47681901,47685520,47685093,47679311,47680078,47689160,47683957,47686439,47687975,47686849,47681327,47679305,47680347,47681639,47681772,47681981,47680086],"score":1541,"text":"Related: Assessing Claude Mythos Preview's cybersecurity capabilities - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47679155

System Card: Claude Mythos Preview [pdf] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47679258

Also: Anthropic's Project Glasswing sounds necessary to me - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47681241","time":1775585374,"title":"Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era","type":"story","url":"https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing"}],[47672287,{"by":"PrismerAI","descendants":0,"id":47672287,"kids":[47672394,47672291],"score":1,"time":1775551021,"title":"Show HN: AI agents that learn from each other's mistakes","type":"story","url":"https://github.com/Prismer-AI/PrismerCloud"}],[47655618,{"by":"andmerm","descendants":6,"id":47655618,"kids":[47658558,47656196,47661446,47656621,47655991,47656496,47655625,47670609,47660133],"score":12,"time":1775436632,"title":"Apex Protocol – An open MCP-based standard for AI agent trading","type":"story","url":"https://apexstandard.org/"}],[47665902,{"by":"hackernj","descendants":90,"id":47665902,"kids":[47667977,47669205,47667925,47668531,47667412,47679916,47666059,47667804,47667911,47668170,47666200,47668754,47670607,47675889,47667088,47674661],"score":73,"time":1775504499,"title":"Wikipedia's AI agent row likely just the beginning of the bot-ocalypse","type":"story","url":"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/ai/2026/04/wikipedias-ai-agent-row-likely-just-the-beginning-of-the-bot-ocalypse"}],[47530428,{"by":"aerostack","descendants":0,"id":47530428,"kids":[47622940,47611193,47532847,47595122],"score":2,"text":"$18","time":1774532803,"title":"AI Agent Has Root Access (and That's a Problem)","type":"story"}],[47555597,{"by":"paolovella","descendants":1,"id":47555597,"kids":[47622937,47559674],"score":2,"text":"Reposting because the March thread linked a now-outdated repo, and the project has changed substantially.

VellaVeto is a fail-closed gateway between an AI agent and its MCP tools. Every tool call is evaluated before execution; if evaluation fails for any reason, the call is denied.

Concrete example: under shield mode, a filesystem server trying to read ~/.ssh/id_rsa is denied by default. A list_files /tmp call from the same server is allowed.

What it does not solve: prompt injection, model-level jailbreaks, or supply-chain attacks in server packages. It only controls what crosses the tool-call boundary.

Since March, I added three zero-config protection levels, topology discovery, tamper-evident audit, Consumer Shield, and MCPSEC, an open benchmark for MCP gateways.

The feedback I’d most like:

Is the tool-call boundary the right place to enforce MCP security?\nAre the MCPSEC attack classes sensible?\nWhat important attack classes am I still missing?","time":1774712490,"title":"Show HN: VellaVeto — blocks unsafe MCP tool calls by default","type":"story","url":"https://github.com/paolovella/vellaveto"}]]

user:	willamhou
created:	April 2, 2026
karma:	2
about:	https://github.com/Prismer-AI/signet